Is Reflective Reason A Virtue?

 Recently philosopher, Nick Byrd, asked whether reflective reason is a virtue. https://byrdnick.com/archives/13007/reflection-and-virtue#more-13007 Is the capacity to think in a rational and reflective manner--for example, when evaluating the cogency of an hypothesis or performing mathematical operations "in our heads"-- a moral virtue? It may or may not be. In order to ask that question though, there is another question regarding free will and determinism that must be first be addressed.

I. Must we have free will in order to possess virtues?

Many people (philosophers and otherwise)  hold that free will is an illusion, that our actions are largely if not wholly determined by causal chains.  It has been argued that in order to say that a person possesses a virtue, that person must have free will of the kind that is incompatible with hard determinism (the position that everything one does is a necessary result of prior causes and conditions governing behavior). The argument runs thus: 

Virtues must be under voluntary control in order that they can be praiseworthy or blameworthy. If a person is not responsible for cultivating virtue/s, then they deserve neither praise nor blame. That would be like praising one (as opposed to appreciating one) for the color of their eyes or hair.

On this view any and all virtues:

a) must be under voluntary control in order that

b) they can be praiseworthy or blameworthy.

Suppose reflective reasoning turns out to be deterministic rather than voluntary? Suppose, for example, it depends not on agency or free will but rather genetic and environmental determinants.

This issue is raised in Byrd's post. But it is equally problematic for the well established virtues (courage, moderation, etc.). These could also be distributed unevenly due to genetic and environmental determinants-- or at least strong influences. So the problem of whether reflective reasoning "can be a virtue" if it is not voluntary is a generic problem when considering any alleged virtuous traits and behaviors which may turn out to be deterministic.

Thus, if that is the main argument against calling reflective reasoning virtuous, then I think it is safe to say that reflective reasoning is as much a virtue as the more familiar virtues I mention above. In other words, the problem raised has less to do with the moral status of reflective reasoning as such than the question of whether or not non-voluntary behavior can ever be virtuous at all. If we say, 

"No," then by definition reflective reasoning is not virtuous no matter how much it may benefit ourselves and others.

II. Tentative Reason for believing Reflective Reason is a Virtue:

Let's suppose that, as I suspect, reflective reasoning can be refined even if we are born with unequal capacities. The virtue, then, would lie in learning how to think more clearly about problems in order to make better decisions, and thus act with greater prudence. Prudential wisdom is certainly a virtue, and as Aristotle discusses, it depends on the ability to think rationally and carefully about matters at hand. One should certainly be praised for long and patient efforts to think about problematic situations skillfully and rationally. I would argue that it is clear that rational thinking that is refined by learning skills such as critical thinking/informal logic is one vitally important factor in making good judgments that benefit ourselves and others.

Still, there remains the argument that reflective reason is neutral morally. What is or is not virtuous, on this view, is the use to which it is put, i.e. the context in which Reflective Reason (RR) occurs. It can be used to accomplish things that may be good or bad; to feed the hungry or kill the innocent, for example. A cunning dictator may use reflective reasoning as much as a peace activist.

So why is it sensible to call reflective reasoning a virtue?

I think it is sensible because most putative virtues (generosity, friendliness, courage, et al.) also do not insure good ethical judgment without the support of other virtues. Courage alone doesn't insure good judgment in general. Brave behavior can be found in terrorists as well as heroic firefighters. Intelligence, concern for the well-being of others, and other qualities, must be in place in order for the virtue of courage to result in good judgment and wise action. True courage requires the cooperation of other virtues in order to count as true courage (as opposed to reckless risk-taking, for example). In the same way, rational reflection is one among several basic virtues. Reflective reasoning without concern for the well-being of one's fellow human beings (compassion), without the ability to face our fears (courage), without the ability to avoid extremes (moderation) can lead to destructive and reckless acts. This line of thought leads to the old idea that the virtues are interdependent; that in some sense they form a unity. Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics all held to some variant of this idea (see https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00354.x  ) as do Buddhist ethics and Confucian ethics.

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Questions:

1) Must virtues be under voluntary control of an agent? Can one be virtuous even if the virtue is determined by causes outside the agent's control such as genetics? 

2) Is Reflective Reason a virtue or does it depend on the use to which it is put in our decisions and actions?

3) Do you think virtues such as courage, moderation, kindness, and others, are separate from each other or must they work together in some kind of harmony or unity in order to result in a life of virtue?

(These questions are suggestions only.)