Sunday, June 26, 2022

Hannah Arendt on Truths, Facts and Lying in Politics

Note: This OP was posted on Dissident Politics, where it can be read along with responses and comments of readers: https://dispol.blogspot.com/2022/06/hannah-arendt-truth-facts-and-lying-in.html

 

In 1967, Hannah Arendt published an essay entitled Truth and Politics in The New Yorker (it later appeared with revisions in the book, Between The Past and The Future). Though originally written as a response to critics she felt had lied about her coverage of the Eichmann trials,  the thinking  catalyzed by these concerns led to ideas and insights of much more general import, and well worth evaluating today in an age where distinctions between facts, conspiracy theories and lies seem to swirl around us in a miasma of misinformation, shaping everything from policy and elections in gov't to media/social media to everyday interactions in our dangerously conflicted society. As we try to understand a world in which lies and truths appear to be interchangeable  categories ("alternative facts"), and where the most egregious lying imaginable in the public realm has the potential to wreck our system of government, possibly once and for all, the topic of the essay could not be more important. It is among Arendt's most thought-provoking essays from her late period, whether one agrees or takes exception to the conclusions she reaches. Here I summarize some of the main theses in the piece concisely and in the context of our own political situation in the US.


Arendt begins by stating that not all truths are alike in their nature and status. We may speak of scientific truths, moral truths,  religious truths, historical truths, psychological truths, and-- most importantly for this essay-- factual truths. She divides these various types of truth up into 2 categories: "factual truths" and "rational truths." The definitions are useful descriptions or heuristics rather than epistemic claims. AS Arendt puts it, "I shall use this distinction for the sake of convenience [emph added] without discussing its intrinsic legitimacy."(Truth and Politics: p. 2) The purpose of this convenient distinction is to compare and contrast the outcomes when rational truths vs. factual truths come into conflict with political authorities and power structures.

Rational truths include the accepted truths of mathematics, science, philosophy and religion, among others.. Factual truths are derived from observation and experience (e.g. historical records, eyewitness accounts,  etc.). The first claim she makes is that while rational truths and factual truths can both be lost or wiped out when they bump up against political powers, factual truths (i.e. knowledge of actual events, people, and actions such as those journalists cover) are far more vulnerable to erasure at the hands of political authorities than rational truths.


One can imagine, for example,  knowledge of basic arithmetic being lost, or for some reason  banned by fanatical anti-mathematical clerics or something. All the text books would be burned, like in Bradburry's  Farenheit 451. Yet it is certainly not impossible that later generations would devise systems like addition and subtraction for themselves based on their own rational capacities.  At more abstract levels the likelihood or reestablishing rational truths gets slimmer but is still possible. Imagine General Relativity, Copernican Heliocentrism, or Euclidean geometry being banned for whatever reason (as the Church banned Heliocentrism in the 17th C). Perhaps such knowledge would eventually perish like so many books reduced to dust. And yet, Arendt claims, it is at least imaginable that some of these truths would emerge from later inquiries because they are based on reasoning and ideas rather than fleeting and unique events in history that must be witnessed and recorded to exist at all.  Factual Truths (e.g. Stalin and Hitler made a pact in 1939; Nixon bombed Cambodia illegally during Vietnam; Trump lost the 2020 election and no investigation has since uncovered "fraud" as he and others claim occurred) are MUCH easier to stamp out, to obliterate from public discourse when they inconvenience those in power. They are based on records rather than reasoning. The question that arises here is "How are factual truths obliterated in modern societies?" According to Arendt, it happens by means of what she calls *organized lying.* The facts are "lied away," as she puts it. 

We are often prone to thinking that the biggest threat to facts is false belief/crackpot theory/bullshit and the like. But the biggest threat comes not from merely false belief but deliberate falsehood/lying.While the opposite of a true mathematical result is an "error," and the opposite of a presumed scientific truth is a "falsehood," the opposite of factual truths on the public record  is a "lie." This doesn't mean there are no innocent mistakes in the recording of facts, by, for example, journalists. But these failed efforts to record actualities accurately--errata-- are not fundamentally *opposed* to factual truths. Indeed they are accidents that occur while acting as a "truth-teller" or chronicler of facts. So unlike other domains of truth, the opposite of factual truth is the lie, and in particular "organized lying." What, then,  is the main danger of lying in politics?

 

 Often we fear that the danger of lies is that they can come to replace factual truth, or provide a substitute for the public record, which serves as an orienting consensus in an otherwise diverse society. The fear, these days, is expressed in terms of some "alternative facts" coming to replace actualities. This is not the ultimate threat, thinks Arendt.  There is a point beyond which lying becomes incompatible with social stability and common understandings necessary for survival and shared life. You can only get so far in establishing "alternate accounts" of the facts without utterly destabilizing the fabric of reality itself. Taken far enough, the content of lies (be it conspiracy theories or arbitrary misstatements that attack facts) result not in a substitute for the shared public realm of acknowledged facts, but in confusion, disorientation and conflict over what is real-- and over what is really happening. Thus the ultimate threat isn't the content of the lying itself (though this obviously has proximate importance) but rather it is the coordinated and concerted effort to undermine or obliterate facts that threaten those in power for one reason or another. Publicly acknowledged and shared factual truth constitutes a minimal basis for any overlapping consensus within which we can communicate at all. It is one of the main ingredients in the very fabric of social existence, and it can't be replaced by lies. The fantasies of organized lying  and factual truths can't function in equivalent ways. One reflects a reasonably accurate grasp of realities we cannot escape--i.e. the social, historical realities within which we must exist and act-- while the fantastic lies have no ground at all. Once the ground of truth is lost, just about anything goes. As Arendt puts it famously elsewhere, the result is that "Nothing is true and everything is possible." In Truth and Politics, she writes that, "[truth] is limited to those things that men cannot change at will...[adding] Conceptually, we may call truth what we cannot change; metaphorically, it is the ground we walk on and the sky that stretches above us."(T&P:p. 19)

Factual truths, then, function to check arbitrary power from destroying our access to shared reality. This leads to a discussion of the importance of those public institutions "established and supported by the powers that be, in which contrary to all political rules, truth and truthfulness have always constituted the highest criterion of speech and endeavor."(T&P:17) In this connection, she mentions the importance in modern open societies of the independent judiciary, research centers and universities, government archives, et al. What all such domains share is a commitment to impartiality.  "Whether these places of higher learning are in private or public hands"  she writes,  "is of no great importance; not only their integrity but their very existence depends on the good will of the government anyway...Very unwelcome truths have emerged from the universities, and very unwelcome judgments have been handed down from the bench time and time again." (T&P: p. 17). But we must not take these "refuges of truth" for granted, as they are, along with the free press, vulnerable to the whims of political power-- even in "open societies" ruled by constitutions. Without real journalism, as opposed to what we call "fake news,"  she remarks, "we should never find our bearings in an ever-changing world and, in the most literal sense, we would never know where we are." This is the desired outcome of organized lying. So political lying typically targets not just recorded truths in the public realm, but the institutions in which disinterested studies and impartial determinations are made. Universities, the free press and independent judiciaries are often the first casualties of organized political lying campaigns. Over the past decade, we've seen a disturbing trend along just such lines in Hungary, Poland and a few other countries in Europe. Trump's effort to "drain the swamp" is largely tantamount to erasing the institutional memory-system of our "bloated government departments." Attempts to neutralize agencies like the EPA by staffing it with opponents of environmentalism also belie the desire to "lie away" even important scientific truths we face in the age of global warming. The list goes on and on. Organized lying depends on the dismantling of as many centers of relatively impartial inquiry as possible, and again this reveals the true goal not as one of "replacing" a world anchored by generally accurate public understandings, but destroying that world in service to the caprice of the will to domination, and not the will to truth.  The manipulation of social reality allows those in power to get away with almost anything, and then make up rationalizations as they go along.

Take the example of "memory laws" in which history is turned into official doctrine. In Turkey, one can't say there was an Armenian Genocide. In Poland, one can't say there were collaborators in WW2. In China, Tiananmen Square never happened, and surviving witnesses are carefully monitored to this day. (Louissa Lim's book, The People's Republic of Amnesia: Tiananmen Revisited,  describes that sad affair). Thus, lying in politics relies heavily on creating "public enemies." Recall Trump said the NY Times is "an enemy of the people"-- and though many laughed at the time, he soon stopped taking any questions he didn't like in press conferences, saying only  three words instead, "That's fake news." Perhaps the most concise statement he made along these Arendtian lines is when he told an audience, "What you're seeing is not what's  happening." https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/07/24/donald-trump-what-youre-seeing-not-whats-happening-tapper-sot-vpx.cnn  So we see in modern authoritarian politics, as with the totalitarian states of the 20th century, an attempt not to replace truth with some other stable "alternate reality" as some fear, but to make it seem that factual truths are really just so many "opinions." You think Trump lost, but I have a "different opinion"--  an "alternative account." That's the sort of attitude toward facts operative in the domain of organized lying.. Of course, there are areas in which citizens disagree because they hold different opinions-- a hallmark of free society. But these are opinions ABOUT agreed facts, not just opinions about other  opinions of opinions, ad infinitum with no bottom line or basis for mediation. If the distinction between these is lost or blurred, the results are disastrous. We already see a world in which people who live in the same cities seem to be denizens of utterly different universes as far as their basic beliefs about the world and reality are concerned. Some of us are able to remember that not so long ago this was simply not the case.

Once factual truths are leveled out and treated like mere opinions, there is no longer a possibility for shared understandings of reality to serve as a legitimate basis for debating and discussing policies as responses to situations and problems that are agreed upon on the basis of public records, journalism, social science etc. Suppose we are debating responses to urban crime or unemployment. We can only disagree meaningfully and offer our opinions on the topic if we at least agree on statements of crime rates or unemployment. In some political speeches these are almost completely fudged in order to achieve some political goal which treats such facts as mere obstacles to power.  Then the description of society and its problems and needed policies no longer rests on shared knowledge but becomes malleable in the hands of those who fabricate and deceive in order to impose their will on society with impunity. This , for Arendt,  is the heart of the fascist project. She writes:

"The result of a consistent and total substitution of lies for factual truth is not that lies will now be accepted as truths, and truths defamed as lies, but that the sense by which we take our bearings in the real world-- and the categories of truth vs. falsehoods is among the mental means to this end-- is being destroyed." (TP: p. 16)

So the goal is to render populations susceptible to the arbitrary refashioning of the public stock of knowledge on which political acts and decisions are based. Power determines alleged facticity, and the possibility of critique, dissent or simply holding authorities to accounts based on accurate knowledge is short-circuited. Facts then become radically free . That is, the usual constraints of accuracy are entirely loosened so that authorities can say things one day and contradict them, or say they never said them at all the next day. They can rewrite history to subserve their own ends. They can categorize whole groups as "criminals," "traitors," or "public enemies" with no burden of objective evidence at all.

An example of this from the 1/6 hearings is found in an interview with former AG Barr. He recalls conversations with Trump in which the latter would say things like, "I have evidence from Pennsylvania, you have to do something about that." Barr would say, "We investigated that claim, Sir, it doesn't check, it's simply not true." Barr recalls that Trump seemed "totally unconcerned with the facts" as he would effortlessly switch to some other allegation as if he had not registered the FACT that the first claim was being dismissed as false. He would say something like "Well what about the evidence I gave you from Georgia?" Barr went on to say, "I thought, 'boy, he's really detached from reality if he believes this stuff.'" I'm not sure Barr understood that what he was so surprised to see was no different from the way Trump had dismissed photographic evidence regarding the size of the crowd at his inauguration in 2017, when he insisted it was "the biggest crowd ever...bigger than Obama's inaugural" etc. The press treated that like it was merely some character flaw, a narcissistic personality disorder, etc. Even if that part is true, it is less important for Arendt than the real goal of such unremitting lying on all matters great and small. The real aim is to eradicate the distinction between facts and lies. After a while, GOP stalwarts asked about Trump's endless stream of obvious lies just submitted to their validity. They accepted the lies by adopting a blase attitude towards them, thus according the fact/lie distinction little importance. In such a blase mode it was no longer difficult let the lies stand simply by NOT refuting or denying them. I remember Pence being asked about some obvious lies and accusatory statements made by Trump in a speech in an interview. Asked if he agreed with the content of the lies, Pence simply said, "I think it's just Trump being Trump." This elides the entire fact/lie distinction by stating a banal truism, a tautology to be precise. Soon enough, "It's just Trump being Trump" or similar stock phrases became the common currency of his enablers. Barr was surely among them. Did none of these people realize that they too had become "detached from reality" (as Barr put it recently)  simply by accepting this discourse of lies as legitimate? 

Arendt thinks that to some extent, those implicated in organized lying like this are self-deceived. This is not to say they deeply and sincerely believe any of these things. No, these aren't held as deep convictions. Rather, the perpetrators don't really care about the truth/lie distinction except in cases where they must cover their asses. (And if they take all of this a bridge to far, they may well fail even to do that and be caught off guard). As long as  they can get away with it, they focus not on the true/false distinction but the distinction between gaining and losing power and the ability to dominate others. To a large extent, they stop questioning themselves about what is true and false, except in cases where their own power hangs in the balance. Otherwise, while delivering a speech or message, they likely do not notice that they are lying. It has become a default mode of operating in most situations. Arendt likens this mentality to "Madison Avenue Advertising" culture. Here we can think of politicians who "believe their own propaganda" or "get high on their own supply." Apparently, for example, Rumsfeld and others in the Bush Administration really believed US invaders and occupiers would be "greeted as liberators." The poor planning that resulted landed them in a quagmire. They bought their own lies. It seems Putin similarly somehow believed his own propaganda about Ukranians embracing Russian invaders as liberators-- and planned a victory statement for Feb. 28, a mere 4 days after "special military operations" began. This self-deception-- which can be ones' undoing-- is an occupational hazard faced by the authoritarian or fascist leader accustomed to the flattery of yes-men rather than quality information.

Here I have only summarized a few of the arguments advanced by Arendt because they are especially relevant to our situation today. But for the sake of clarity, Arendt does recognize that the truth is much more than just a collection of recorded facts. The latter are the indispensable basis for other forms such as scientific and philosophical truths. When organized lying becomes pervasive,  telling the truth or reporting facts becomes a form of political action, says Arendt. The journalist who digs for truth in Russia or China may well end up on a hit-list and become a dissident or honored hero, where in a society that takes free press for granted, it seems that simply reporting facts is apolitical. But Arendt is also aware that the truths we live by also include principles, values, norms and stories that lend meaning to these facts. Storytellers, historians, philosophers, religious figures and others have always played an important role in establishing moral, social and political understandings such as those encoded in laws and principles undergirding society, culture, law and the political domain. The values, for example, of liberty and equality, are not recorded facts. But they have been part of the commonly understood "World" inhabited by those of us who live in liberal or social democracies. I did not think it was as important to discuss her thoughts on how such "rational truths"  function, since the prerequisite for them is still, as she said, the kind of knowledge we need simply to "literally know where we are." And it appears such knowledge is now endangered here.




References/related reading:
 
 -Hannah Arendt:  Truth and Politics  (Between The Past and The Future: Penguin press  1977 Ch.7 Truth and Politcs pp. 223-260 or available as free stand-alone essay online)

-Frederica Merenda:  Reading Arendt to Rethink Truth  ( Democracy and Fake News Routledge, 2021 article by Frederica  Merenda page 19-30)




Possible Questions:

-Do you agree with Arendt's claim that the ultimate goal of political lying is NOT to replace one stable truth with some alternative to it, but rather to destroy the distinction between factual truths and mere opinions so that those in power can stipulate what counts as true with no regard to consistency or stability at all? 

-If Arendt's account is correct, it would seem to follow that the relatively accountable and honest institutions she mentions  (free press, universities, various governmental departments that collect and disseminate information etc.) are of vital importance. But she doesn't not make any suggestions in this essay regarding how to safeguard the integrity of such institutions. Do you have any ideas about how to do that in the face of a politically motivated all-out assault on factual truth?