Early Confucian Thought (6th to 2nd Century BCE)

Early Confucianism: A Basic Overview

Confucius is to China what Socrates and in some ways Jesus Christ is to the West. His teachings are  fundamental  not only to Chinese culture, but also much of East Asian culture.

"Confucianism" is a relatively recent term coined by Jesuit missionaries in the 16th century. The Chinese language knows no equivalent term, and the complex and ever-changing tradition Westerners call Confucianism was and still is generally called Rujia or Rujiao-- i.e. 'the traditional way of the scholars' and 'the teachings of the scholars' respectively. Confucius,  about whom we know little with certainty, was one of many members of a semi-noble class called the Shi  https://history.followcn.com/2019/02/01/the-shi-as-a-noble-occupation/ , who were well educated, and though they lacked political power, worked as advisors and teachers helping to shape the policies of competing leaders (often warlords) during the period of great fragmentation in which the Zhou emperors progressively lost power to regional warlords and hegemons who fought with one another for power in the once integrated lands of the nominal Zhou Empire. Emperors, by the time of Confucius' were reduced to figureheads while real power lay in the hands of ambitious military leaders and hegemons of the time.

Confucius' teachings are known to us primarily by way of a collection of allegedly accurate transcriptions of conversations with some of his students (the Lunyu or Analects of Confucius). The earliest of these seems to first appear no sooner than 100 years after Confucius' death (his traditional dates are 551-479 BCE). The version we have now appears between 200 and 300 years after his death, and there were several other versions in circulation before China's first Emperor, Qin Shi Huang, had all Rujia books (and any other books that contradicted his own policies) burned, and as many teachers and scholars as he could find executed-- often buried alive. Fortunately, the Qin Dynasty was very short lived, and those scholars who had escaped the Qin dragnet rewrote-- often from memory-- the classics of Confucius and others that had narrowly survived the burnings.  At any rate, the Analects, which is the main text under consideration here, is comprised of fragments placed in no special thematic or chronological order, though many scholars believe that the first 9 chapters -- esp. 3-9-- were written earlier than the others. The Analects ("conversations" or Lunyu) appears to be cryptic and enigmatic at best to those who read it without commentaries, which is always how it is read in China. As far as biographical knowledge goes, we rely mainly on the Analects and later texts including Mencius, Xunzi, Taoists such as Chuang Tzu and, significantly, the court histories of the official historian of the Han Dynasty,  Sima Qiang, whose writings--though valuable-- tend to blur the lines separating facts and legends or myths.

Confucius' teachings were presented by him as a distillation of the wisdom of earlier sages and wise governors-- mainly from the early Zhou Dynasty of the 11th century BCE, whom Confucius saw as paradigms of sagacity and virtue. He famously denied having any original doctrine, claiming to be a "transmitter and not an original thinker" (7.1). He specified the special place of early Zhou leaders saying: "We take the Zhou as our model." (3.14)  Of all the Zhou leaders, one, The Duke of Zhou, was given pride of place, and is mentioned frequently in the Analects. The Duke of Zhou did not have a formal claim on power, but ruled as a regent for the underage King Cheng when the founding emperor, King Wu died.The Duke staved off rebellion, expanded territory, and, according to legend, established the principle of the "Mandate of Heaven" which would become an important aspect of Confucianism (esp. in the writings of Mencius). What is important for our purposes is  Confucius' interpretation of history as a decline from a Golden Age (however accurate or not this may be) to the almost-anarchic state of affairs in his own time. Chinese culture (Huaxia) was being lost amidst the wars and corrupt feudal-type states of his era, in which peasants were routinely overworked and famines were very common.

Confucius' diagnosis and prescription for this perceived malady was moral in nature. Selfish rulers and citizens alike no longer had a sense of their place in society and the cosmos. For example, rulers acted as if they had no obligations to the ruled, and could rule with impunity. Confucius insists that the ruler who cannot rule over a sound economy in which peasants have food at the table have no business in government. At that time, this sounded more revolutionary than it might today. This, though, is only a basic starting point.

Genuine rulers, like those of the "Golden Age," must re-learn the Chinese classics, not merely intellectually but as a basis for proper living in order to cultivate virtue  (De) and benevolence (Ren)  which are to be expressed in a panoply of rituals (Li) that should guide people from the cradle to the grave. A lifelong moral training would result in a state in which the ideal person (Junzi) embodies virtue gracefully and effortlessly (Wu wei, i.e. graceful or  effortless action). Such an education of character was to be understood as nothing less than the re-appropriation of the ancient wisdom of the sages of yore which could not be improved on. For what these sages had mastered was The Tao, the eternal way of being which conforms to the Will of Heaven (Tianming), understood as an immanent moral force that has desires which are perfect and wise, and which is capable of punishing and rewarding human beings, especially rulers.

Originally Tian  (Heaven) was worshiped as a sky-god, but became less anthropomorphic while taking on a decidedly moral cast during the middle Zhou era. It was worshiped increasingly as the moral order of the universe rather than as a specific deity or being. Yet this moral order retained such properties as desire, will, judgment and the ability to act on the world so as to punish or reward people-- especially political leaders.  Confucius assumes as much, but is silent on the details of all things supernatural, focusing instead on what can be done here in this world (e.g. see Analects 6.22  and 11.12). The Mandate of Heaven  or Tianming (which makes rulers or "sons of Heaven" legitimate) can be stripped from leaders who do not act virtuously, or in accordance with the Tao (note Taoists will interpret the Tao in somewhat different ways, largely in response to Confucian teachings). When Heaven's Mandate is lost, it was thought that signs and portents would appear in the form of natural disasters, eclipses or famines. These were signs that leadership had weakened or become corrupt. Confucians concentrated less on such signs as  on the ethical prerequisites for gaining and maintaining the mandate. This requires the inculcation of leadership virtues  that conform to the will of Heaven and thus to  the eternal way of the cosmos, or the Tao.

 Confucius himself was viewed as something of an expert on Huaxia or traditional Chinese culture,  and taught the Tao (the established way or path) of the ancients found in such books as The I Ching (originally a book on divination which came to include philosophical elements); The Book of Odes (a collection of what might be called folk songs from the earlier Zhou era) and various documents that recount the history of Chinese civilization from the legendary rulers of the Xia Dynasty (about whom almost nothing is known) through the Shang and the Zhou dynasties. In later centuries, when Confucian thought (Rujia) became the official ideology of the Han Dynasty, five books were canonized as 'The Five Classics." These are:  The I Ching,  The Book of Odes(both mentioned above), The Spring and Autumn Annals (historical records pertaining to the state of Lu, which was Confucius' place of birth), The Book of Documents (containing semi-legendary and legendary stories about pre-Zhou dynasties) and The Book of Rites (or rituals). The centerpiece of Confucius' teachings and thought is to be found in  The Analects of Confucius (Lunyu or 'conversations' of Confucius) in which Confucius draws on such texts as the 5 classics, interpreting them in ways that were innovative (despite his claim that he was not an original thinker) and have formed much of the basis for Chinese culture, politics, religion and philosophy ever since.  His influence cannot be exaggerated.  Confucianism is as fundamental to  Chinese civilization and culture as were rationalistic Greek philosophy and Christianity in the West.
 
The Core Teachings:

Confucius' teachings have as their goal nothing less than the perfection of human conduct from the ruler down to the peasant. Of course,  he doesn't expect this to be thoroughly realized, but it is the ideal end or purpose underlying Analects and other texts used by Confucians.  Good conduct must be realized a) in communal settings characterized by much face-to-face interaction and b) involve the mastery of intricate rituals appropriate to the specific situations in which people interact. This "ritual propriety" which suffuses all relationships is not to be confused with mere etiquette in the sense of external behaviors. It is essential to understand li (ritual propriety) as sincere expression of reverence for what many westerners might see as "mundane matters." Learning, for example,  the proper way to bow, sit, serve food, mourn, celebrate holidays, marry,  address others, etc. may seem relatively unimportant from a moral perspective today, but it is only through the proper use of significant words and gestures that our sincere feelings of appreciation, respect, reverence, sympathy and even love can be reliably communicated. Weddings and funerals, for example, allow us to come together to share some of the profoundest human feelings and thoughts about life, love and death.   The internalization of ritual propriety can be illustrated by discussing the way Confucius used the Book of Odes (folk songs).  By singing these revered songs-- a ritual activity-- Confucius believed that students could come to embody the wisdom they contain. One of the odes/songs, for example,  is sung from the point of view of farmers oppressed by unjust rulers that overtax them even as they endure food shortages and hunger.

"Big rat, big rat/ Do not gobble our millet!/ Three years we have slaved for you, /Yet you take no notice of us." (The Book of Songs, trans. A. Waley: New York: Grove Press, 1960, p.309).

As stated above,  Confucius held that  no ruler incapable of providing for the basic needs of his subjects is a worthy ruler, and the Book of Odes provides a ritualized way of channeling grievances. By learning such a song, Confucius' students engaged in a ritual which also cultivated appropriate sympathy for the poor farmers whose lives depended on their produce. Without learning and singing such a song, it might be easy for the educated elites studying with Confucius to become insensitive to the needs of the ordinary farmers who comprised the majority of citizens.  More generally, Confucius says this about the Book of Odes:

"The songs number 300, but I will cover their meaning in a single phrase: 'Let there be no depravity in your thoughts.' (2.2: Dawson trans.).

 Another translation in Bryan Van Nordon has "Oh, they [the songs] will not lead you astray." As Van Norden states of this quotation, "In other words, the Odes ultimately are a guide to not swerving from the Way (Tao). " (p.30) So while some have criticized Confucius for emphasizing these songs and other rituals merely as mechanical means to solidarity, Confucius praised the wisdom of their content at every turn, pointing to the manner in which internal states (feelings, attitudes, thoughts, intentions etc.) must coincide with external rituals ( e.g. singing of odes, mourning the dead, marrying,  bowing properly, etc.). The worst outcome for Confucius, was one in which people do not know why they behaved as they do, lack the deeper understanding of rituals and, even worse, behave according to the right external forms while inwardly harboring mental states that run counter to their  meaning (e.g. mourning in the prescribed fashion but without inner feelings of grief).

Indeed, funeral rites were very important, as filial piety is the basis for a just social order, and veneration of ancestors is basic to Huaxia or Chinese culture. When one's mother or father dies, the traditional period of mourning was three years. This involved avoiding fancy clothes, festive foods and  practical activities when possible. This was criticized even by Confucius' student, Zai Wo, who complains in the Analects that 3 years is too long, and wastes time that might be better spent enjoying life and getting  on with practical activities such as farming. In Analects (17.19) Confucius askes Zai Wo:

 " 'If you were then to eat good rice and wear embroidered clothes, would you feel at ease?' 'Yes,' he  replied. 'If you would be at ease then by all means do so,' said the Master...When Zai Wo had left, the master said...As for [Zai Wo's] inhumaneness, it is not until a child is three years old that it escapes [the need of] being nursed by its parents. The three years' mourning is the mourning universally adopted by all under Heaven. Surely, Zai Wo had three years' love from his parents?" (Dawson trans. 17.19)

Here we can  see that one of the most prolonged and serious rituals discussed in Analects is not taught in the spirit of imitating outward behaviors without inner understanding of right motivation, underlying emotions, and an explanation of the function and origin of the ritual.  Unlike a cruel taskmaster, Confucius says, in essence, "if you don't get the point of the ritual you may as well not do it; go and eat all the fancy food you like if you are 'at ease.'" But once Zai Wo leaves the room, Confucius imparts the real lesson regarding this ritual to the students left in his presence. As with all rituals, it is meaningful only if the outward form is supported by the appropriate underlying emotional state (in this case, genuine feelings of sorrow and loss). It must also be matched by internal understanding of its purpose (to express gratitude for the many years of love and nurturance  the parent provided to the child). Without these and other internal states (reverence and love), the rituals, however perfectly executed behaviorally, are like corn husks without corn-- empty formalities. Viewing Confucian li (ritual propriety) in this way is one of the most common and serious misunderstandings of the entire Confucian project of action in accordance with the Tao. Just as the odes enable the noble classes to sympathize with peasants by assuming their viewpoint in songs about being exploited, as cited above, so we are asked not merely to mourn (i.e. wear certain mourning clothes,  participate in  funerary rites, etc.) but to undergo the corollary feelings/emotions, desires, motives and intellectual understandings that alone give vitality and spiritual significance to rituals.

The junzi (ideal person as opposed to the "petty person") will eventually move through life largely in terms of the prescribed rituals as if by second nature. He (or in our own times 'she')  will be fully present and sincere when bowing, eating, singing or mourning in accordance with the Tao by means of the rituals long ago prescribed by sages.  Everyday life, then, becomes something like an aesthetically graceful dance in which the dancers are not merely "going through the motions" but rather intimately connected with their every movement in a way that has been so thoroughly internalized as to be perfectly natural, effortless and unselfconscious. As any advanced musician or dancer knows, there comes a point where one is no longer thinking about technique while playing or dancing, because years of training have led to an ease and graceful spontaneity that has virtue, the root word of "virtuosity." This is Wu Wei (a state of "flow" and spontaneity while doing things one originally had to learn, e.g. walking, talking, riding a bicycle, driving or playing an instrument). Of course, Taoists will have much more to say about Wu Wei, some of it critical of the Confucian approach-- but there is also similarity between the 2 schools.

So insightful and sincere activity channeled through ancient rituals is what beautifies and intensifies spirituality in our everyday lives from farming, to interacting with loved ones in the family right up to honoring officials who have performed their duties well. But in order to better appreciate some of these examples, we turn now, to the cardinal virtues of Confucian thought as expressed in the  "5 Basic Relationships" taught by Confucius.

                                                    PART II

The Necessary Virtues of the Ideal Person and the 5 Basic Relationships:

The ideal person (junzi) must act in accordance with necessary virtues which have no exact Western equivalents. These virtues are most visible in our interactions with others. These interactions are, in turn, best understood in terms of the values, norms and roles so carefully articulated by Confucius and those who followed in his path. Again, the roots of all this are already evident in ancient writings from the sages of Ancient China.

Basic virtues include Ren (benevolence) De ( moral force or virtue), Li (ritual propriety which was discussed in the previous section) Wu Wei (also discussed above) and Remonstrance (the obligation to tactfully and respectfully correct superiors, but backing down if they refuse to stand corrected). There are others, but for a short overview like this one these are the essentials.

Ren  is a sine qua non. Without it no moral cultivation is possible. It is also, perhaps, the most elusive of all these terms. Confucius refers to ren  as the "single thread that runs" through all philosophy, all aspects of the Tao. A reasonably good starting point is to define it as a form of "benevolence" as many translators have it. The character for ren in Chinese pictures a man with the number two (represented as 2 horizontal lines) directly to his right. This signifies the irreducibility of virtue to any single individual. We are social through and through. To cultivate or learn virtue is possible only through interactions with at least one other being.  One can be benevolent only when others are there to be treated well. One can appreciate benevolence or good will only when others are there to demonstrate it in action. Still, ren is used frequently and conspicuously little is said about it by way of definition. It is so basic to so many other virtues, that it is hard to pin down verbally. For example, when discussing righteousness (yi), loyalty (zhong) or faithfulness (xin) we are already presupposing good will. It motivates righteousness, provides the basis of loyalty, and is demonstrated by long-lasting faithfulness, for example to loved ones. What is the common denominator of all these and other virtues, then? It is outgoing love, solicitude and/ or sympathy that is sometimes stronger (e.g. for members of one's family) and sometimes less strong (e.g. fellow citizens whom one has never met before a given interaction). Confucius does not expect nor advise people to feel and act on benevolence in equal measure to any and all persons with whom we interact. Contrary to something like Christian agape (equal love felt and shown to all human beings precisely because they are human beings), ren will naturally be felt more intensely towards those with whom we are intimate than  strangers. This is endorsed by Confucians as the natural way of things or The Tao, and is sometimes called the principle of "differentiated caring" by Confucian scholars.  Put simply, we usually do have and ought to have a greater sense of moral obligation toward those with whom we are bound in community-- esp. friends and kin.  A passage from Analects helps to illustrate this.

A regional governor bragged to Confucius that his subjects were so virtuous that one had recently turned his own father in for stealing a sheep. Confucius replied:

"In my locality, those who are upright are different from those. Fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. Uprightness is to be found in this. (Dawson trans. 13.18)

This, of course, doesn't mean that the son sanctions the father's behavior, and as a good son his role obligates him to remonstrate  (respectfully show disapproval of the behavior and attempt to correct the father who has stolen.) But any other philosophical schools in China (e.g. the Mohists who counseled universal love on an equal basis) and, of course, many Western moral views from Ancient Greece and the teachings of Jesus Christ right up to Kant, are highly critical of any such idea of preferential treatment, i.e. of making distinctions based on role differences. "Covering up" for a thief, no matter how close a relation, is immoral. Moral principles are universal, they apply equally to every person. Further, special treatment of loved ones thwarts the development of universal love-- the essence of religiosity and also of theories of Universal Human Rights. At worst, it justifies or rationalizes nepotism, favoritism, chauvinism and other dysfunctional practices that interfere with the development of just and fair ethical practice. What do the Confucians have to say about all this?

They point out that ethical theory that is not capable of being realized ordinary people is ultimately moot. Most, perhaps all people-- with a few exceptions such as alleged Saints and Boddhisattvas-- simply cannot feel impartial love for all persons including those from other lands, those not yet born, strangers, malefactors etc. The Mohist ideal (or Christian or Buddhist as well) of equal and impartial love for all is at odds with the natural tendency to, for example, become far more upset when a loved one dies than a stranger. To take another example, we don't all give equal attention and equally valuable gifts to everybody whose birthdays we happen to know.There is a certain kind of universal love endorsed by Confucians, but it must be set apart from those many important forms which come about through interaction and emotional attachment. Thus something like agape or universal love is captured in Analects 12.5 in which a disciple complains that unlike most other men, he has no brothers.  He is told that "if [you] are a gentleman [junzi or ideal person], if  [you] show courtesy in all your dealings with others, and observe the obligations of ritual [li], then all within the 4 seas are your brothers." In other words, the person who approaches the ideal state of the sage sees all people as, metaphorically and spiritually, "brothers/sisters."  This shows that Confucianism does not lack an appreciation of the basic humanism at the heart of so many philosophies and religion, but rather that it  recognizes that it is far easier to discuss such virtue than it is to feel and manifest it. It is only when one approaches the understanding of a realized sage that such fellow-feeling is truly activated in the inner life and outward behavior of any given individual.

Further, it is erroneous to assume that greater love or sympathy for certain people (e.g. friends and relations)  than for strangers somehow entails blase attitude of indifference towards the latter. Again,  the more one cultivates wisdom, the greater will be his or her capacity to feel love towards all human beings based on deep empathy and understanding of the human condition. It's simply that other crucial ethical precepts and behaviors are perfectly compatible with human psychology at a less developed stage. Thus we need ethical principles that can be practiced sincerely by those who are not saints and sages, but rather ordinary human beings. Confucius was, in this sense, a realist. It should also be remembered that dynastic governments in China depended on deeply loyal familial bonds, and this requires filial piety.

Ren, then is a necessary condition for most other virtues and for the expression of such virtues as loyalty on which society and governance depend for their legitimacy and stability. It is good will and benevolence which undergird so much of what we do and expect others to do in daily life in and outside of politics.

If ren is hard to define, it is made palpable to all by means of the many rituals we have already discussed (li or "ritual propriety" as in the cases of mourning, singing, marrying, bowing etc.). Put differently, these rituals-- the glue of society--  are hollow and mechanical when the vital element of ren  (benevolent spirit) is absent. Li minus ren (benevolence) comes to nought.  The external and internal worlds (i.e. behavior and underlying feelings and intentions) must be aligned, and both must conform to the Way or Tao which is not a set of man-made laws or norms, but ageless principles of being etched into, and constitutive of the cosmos or natural order itself. Just as ren and li must be correlative, so must Heaven and Earth.  Tanxia (all things under heaven) must express the "will of Heaven" and thus the eternal way of being-- The Tao.

The Tao of Confucius is far more social than that of Taoists, many of whom lived as hermits and reacted against Confucian thought. They came to form the second of China's 3 principle teachings, the Taojia (the school of the Taoists). According to Confucius, the will of Heaven dictates that all is well only when  certain social roles and rituals are properly understood and practiced, both in politics and society generally. A special emphasis is placed on familial relations (familial piety). In order to  understand the basic Confucian virtues such as  ren,  de and wu wei (i.e. benevolence, moral force and effortless action) we must first understand the five basic relationships in Confucian thought, viz., Father and son; ruler and subject; husband and wife; elder and younger brother; and  friend and friend.

The first thing to note is that all these relationships, with the exception of friend/friend, presuppose a hierarchical and patriarchal social structure. Even friendships in Chinese culture are embedded in hierarchies to varying degrees. Which is the older and which the younger friend? Has one achieved greater rank or education than the other? To the extent that social differentiation exists between friends it will probably find expression in the various interaction rituals (greetings, titles used to address others etc.) that suffuse the relationship. But the most important relationships in Confucianism are those within families. Sincerely felt adherence to the rituals binding on family members are at the core of Confucianism. The observance of such rituals is called "Ritual Piety," and much of East Asian culture from the household to the government cannot be properly understood without some appreciation of the hold ritual propriety still has on East Asians. Today we even see it reflected in "filial piety" laws that obligate adult children to look after their aging parents. Confucius believed that when laws are necessary to uphold filial piety, it is already very weak. The basis for social cohesion and shared morality in Confucian thought is not law (as often is the case in the West) but folkways and rituals that are enacted with genuine enthusiasm and good will because they are so deeply internalized. In each of the five relationships, both parties have obligations to the other, and these are emphasized over privileges.

The son is obliged to yield to the will of his father. This is not seen as the father's "privilege" to impose his will on the son, but rather as the proper and natural way for sons to relate to fathers. Why is it not primarily a privilege? Because the reason the father's will prevails is that his obligation to raise his child properly, to educate his son (again today this holds females be they mothers or daughters) is one not taken lightly. The father is responsible for teaching his son/s right and wrong, imparting survival skills as well as intricacies of li (rituals) so that he can enter into society productively, etc. So the authority of the father is not a blank check any more than the ruler's authority over the subject. Both must conform to the eternal way (Tao) which means that various feelings, motives and intellectual understandings must be present in both parties of the relationship. This is true of husband and wife and siblings as well. To the extent that the behavior and underlying emotions and motives deviate from the Tao, to that extent the father, son, brother, wife, mother etc. is only a father, son, brother etc. in name. A father in name only is not a real father any more than  a deviant ruler is a legitimate governor.  So, far from being a superficial doctrine, filial piety (the core of our sociality and of our polities) are classed either as being real or merely nominal.  A merely nominal leader does not enjoy the Mandate of Heaven, and Mencius (a Confucian who wrote  about 150 yrs after Confucius died) fleshes this out by providing an argument that allows for the overthrow of merely nominal leaders (e.g. emperors in name only who do not live up to their obligations to those they rule, starting with adequate food for the peasants).

Here we arrive at one of the most important doctrines in Confucianism which is known as the "Rectification of Names." When Confucius is asked by a student what he would first do if he gained power in a state to set things right, he answered, thus:

"What is necessary is to rectify names, is it not?...If names are not rectified, then  words are not appropriate. If words are not appropriate, then deeds are not accomplished." (17:3)

What does this mean, exactly? Well, lets take the example of a father who behaves like a so-called "dead-beat dad" by shirking financial obligations to the family, spending nights drinking with bar-friends and who does nothing to help his son/s to be prepared for school assignments. Unless all of these deficiencies are addressed, the father is not behaving like a good father, and for Confucius the point of being called by the name, "father" is to capture in language certain properties  that are implied by the definition of that term. Confucius is not referring to biological facts alone, but as always, the socially expressed traits that hold societies together  and reveal good character. He uses the term "father" rather as a family psychologist might, taking note of the necessary traits of a "good father" or, at the very least, a "functional father."  When the name "Father" is used widely in a society that lacks a large number of functional or good fathers, the word and the referent of the word no longer correspond to one another.  This may be a linguistic problem, but it is also an existential and societal one. It means that men who don't behave like fathers are able to pass themselves off as genuinely good or functional fathers. This divergence of word and referent in the area of fundamental roles and relationships is a sure sign of social decay or the decline of crucial virtues, norms and rituals needed to uphold a stable and decent society.

This is even more problematic if political power is arrogated by warlords or other leaders who have a great sense of privilege and power with little or no corresponding sense of obligation to those they rule. Names like "King" or "Emperor"  carry certain dignified meanings that derive from the sincere enactment of obligations such as not overtaxing the poor, and providing infrastructure so that the quality of life for citizens is not allowed to lapse into a state of abject filth and decrepitude. Again, under certain conditions of neglect, Confucians (esp. Mencius) will argue that the irresponsible leader has forfeited the mandate of Heaven, meaning that a rebellion or coup can be looked upon as just and proper.

The upshot of all this is that the basic relationships, and the intricately interwoven rituals through which they unfold are not to be understood in terms of blind conformity to those with power-- though, like any system, Confucian thought can be abused resulting in corrupt behavior. The Confucian outlook prioritizes a state of affairs in which as many people as possible in all sectors of society understand and feel at home with their various roles and responsibilities, and expect others to be similarly situated within what is experienced as a hierarchical but highly ethical cosmos in which the will of Heaven is made manifest on Earth by means of the sincere and deeply internalized moral codes and rituals that are social aspects of the eternal Tao governing the cosmos (Heaven and Earth or Tanxia-- lit. "all things under Heaven."



References and Suggested Reading: 

-Confucius: The Analects: trans. Raymond Dawson, Oxford Press, NY, 1993


-A Short History of Chinese Philosophy  by Falun Yu-Lan: Free Press, 1976

-Introducing Chinese Religions by  Mario Poceski: Routledge, 2009

-Introduction to Classic Chinese Philosophy by Bryan van Norden: Hackett Press: 2011

-Beyond The Secular West: ed. Akeel Bilgrami: Columbia U Press: 2016
 
-Disputers of The Tao by A.C. Graham: Open Court Press: 2003~

-The Book of Songs: trans.  Arthur Waley, Grove Press:  1960

-Sources of Chinese Tradition (Volume I): compiled by Wm. Theodore De Barrhy, Wing-Tsit Chan and Burton Watson: Columbia Univ. Press, 1960

Question: How does the early Confucian ethical world view differ from that of Western philosophical and religious conceptions of ethics and the good life?

Moral Relativism

Social and political disagreements both online and elsewhere often take on a moralistic tone in which accusations of "immorality" or even "evil" get thrown around. In recent years, some have invoked "science" to ground the objectivity of their positions. The desire to do so is understandable now that ethics is largely discussed within a secular context and in the absence of a commonly shared theology or  metaphysics that leaves much room moral realism (the idea that we don't invent but discover moral properties like good and bad which exist objectively, independently of minds and cultures). Whatever the emotional appeal of such arguments, they are generally conceptually weak.There are many long and complex books on this topic. Here I thought it might do to quote excerpts from a short article by philosopher, Jesse Prinz,  that argues for anthropological relativism, or the idea that, as the title of the articles has it, morality is culturally conditioned. 

Though the article goes on to argue for a moral theory called "sentimentalism," associated with David Hume,  I'm only quoting those excerpts that lay out what seems to be a clear and daunting challenge to the would-be moral realist. It does not follow from cultural relativism that all moral deliberation is non-rational nor that we are ever the "slaves of passions," as sentimentalism would have it. There are good and bad rational arguments in ethics as in other cultural domains, including courts of law. But as with the latter, the basic rules and norms appealed to are already in play culturally and socially when the arguments are made. Further, it is historically the case that many such norms and rules become sources of  conflict when they differ dramatically between 2 or more societies, cultures or sub-cultures that interact with one another. With all this in mind, this is a relatively straightforward (if not  particularly original) argument based on the facts of the matter, i.e. the extent and type of variation in morality cross-culturally and over historical time. The following excerpts are taken from philosopher, Jesse Prinz' article, Morality is a Culturally Conditioned Response (which originally appeared in Philosophy Now; Issue 82).

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Relativism has been widely criticized. It is attacked as being sophomoric, pernicious, and even incoherent. Moral philosophers, theologians, and social scientists try to identify objective values so as to forestall the relativist menace. I think these efforts have failed. Moral relativism is a plausible doctrine, and it has important implications for how we conduct our lives, organize our societies, and deal with others.


Suppose you have a moral disagreement with someone, for example, a disagreement about whether it is okay to live in a society where the amount of money you are born with is the primary determinant of how wealthy you will end up. In pursuing this debate, you assume that you are correct about the issue and that your conversation partner is mistaken. You conversation partner assumes that you are making the blunder. In other words, you both assume that only one of you can be correct. Relativists reject this assumption. They believe that conflicting moral beliefs can both be true. The stanch socialist and righteous royalist are equally right; they just occupy different moral worldviews.



Morals vary dramatically across time and place. One group’s good can be another group’s evil. Consider cannibalism, which has been practiced by groups in every part of the world. Anthropologist Peggy Reeves Sanday found evidence for cannibalism in 34% of cultures in one cross-historical sample. Or consider blood sports, such as those practiced in Roman amphitheaters, in which thousands of excited fans watched as human beings engaged in mortal combat. Killing for pleasure has also been documented among headhunting cultures, in which decapitation was sometimes pursued as a recreational activity. Many societies have also practiced extreme forms of public torture and execution, as was the case in Europe before the 18th century. And there are cultures that engage in painful forms of body modification, such as scarification, genital infibulation, or footbinding – a practice that lasted in China for 1,000 years and involved the deliberate and excruciating crippling of young girls. Variation in attitudes towards violence is paralleled by variation in attitudes towards sex and marriage. When studying culturally independent societies, anthropologists have found that over 80% permit polygamy. Arranged marriage is also common, and some cultures marry off girls while they are still pubescent or even younger. In parts of Ethiopia, half the girls are married before their 15th birthday.

Of course, there are also cross-cultural similarities in morals. No group would last very long if it promoted gratuitous attacks on neighbors or discouraged childrearing. But within these broad constraints, almost anything is possible. Some groups prohibit attacks on the hut next door, but encourage attacks on the village next door. Some groups encourage parents to commit selective infanticide, to use corporal punishment on children, or force them into physical labor or sexual slavery.

Such variation cries out for explanation. If morality were objective, shouldn’t we see greater consensus? Objectivists reply in two different ways:

Deny variation. Some objectivists say moral variation is greatly exaggerated – people really agree about values but have different factual beliefs or life circumstances that lead them to behave differently. For example, slave owners may have believed that their slaves were intellectually inferior, and Inuits who practiced infanticide may have been forced to do so because of resource scarcity in the tundra. But it is spectacularly implausible that all moral differences can be explained this way. For one thing, the alleged differences in factual beliefs and life circumstances rarely justify the behaviors in question. Would the inferiority of one group really justify enslaving them? If so, why don’t we think it’s acceptable to enslave people with low IQs? Would life in the tundra justify infanticide? If so, why don’t we just kill off destitute children around the globe instead of giving donations to Oxfam? Differences in circumstances do not show that people share values; rather they help to explain why values end up being so different.

Deny that variation matters. Objectivists who concede that moral variation exists argue that variation does not entail relativism; after all, scientific theories differ too, and we don’t assume that every theory is true. This analogy fails. Scientific theory variation can be explained by inadequate observations or poor instruments; improvements in each lead towards convergence. When scientific errors are identified, corrections are made. By contrast, morals do not track differences in observation, and there also is no evidence for rational convergence as a result of moral conflicts. Western slavery didn’t end because of new scientific observations; rather it ended with the industrial revolution, which ushered in a wage-based economy. Indeed, slavery became more prevalent after the Enlightenment, when science improved. Even with our modern understanding of racial equality, Benjamin Skinner has shown that there are more people living in de facto slavery worldwide today than during the height of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. When societies converge morally, it’s usually because one has dominated the other (as with the missionary campaigns to end cannibalism). With morals, unlike science, there is no well-recognized standard that can be used to test, confirm, or correct when disagreements arise.

Objectivists might reply that progress has clearly been made. Aren’t our values better than those of the ‘primitive’ societies that practice slavery, cannibalism, and polygamy? Here we are in danger of smugly supposing superiority. Each culture assumes it is in possession of the moral truth. From an outside perspective, our progress might be seen as a regress. Consider factory farming, environmental devastation, weapons of mass destruction, capitalistic exploitation, coercive globalization, urban ghettoization, and the practice of sending elderly relatives to nursing homes. Our way of life might look grotesque to many who have come before and many who will come after.

Group Reading: Buber: I & Thou (Part 2)

Notes/Remarks on I and Thou     (Part 2: pp. 37-72)

I and Thou is divided into 3 parts, each of which addresses a different aspect of the I-YOU and I-IT modes of relationship. Part 1 (which we discussed last week) is mainly concerned with establishing and expounding the I-YOU/I-IT distinction in terms of human relationships. Since Buber also wants to lay out the scope of the overall book there, he briefly discusses differences between an I-YOU and I-It relationship with a tree. So we know already that Buber is interested in the natural world in which the primary relations unfold. This natural world, its history, and the successive civilizations that have appeared and disappeared within it are the subject of Part 2 of the book. What is it to be in the world? What is the difference between being in the world when relations are predominantly of an I-IT kind as opposed to an I-YOU kind?  Buber speaks of "the world of It" in stark contrast to "the world of YOU/Thou." I will simply refer to "The It-World" vs. "The YOU-World."

Characteristics of the It-World:

When one lives predominantly in an I-It mode of being, s/he will often feel safe, largely in control of objects and events which are familiar, rationally understood and thus reliable. Towards the end of Pt. I Buber begins to set up this "It-World." A human being in this world:

"[P]erceives an ordered and detached world. It is to some extent a reliable world,...its
organization can be surveyed and brought out again and again; gone over with closed eyes, and verified with open eyes...It is your object...[b]ut you cannot meet others in it. You cannot hold on to life [survive] without it, its reliability sustains you; but should you die in it, your grave would be in nothingness." (p. 31)

Because the contours of this It-World will become much darker, even nightmarish in part 2, it's worth pointing out that when he first describes it, there seems to be much of value in it, even if it is devoid of ultimate meaning (you die there in vain; "in nothingness"). I want to emphasize these values because later it's easy to think "You world = Good/ It-World = Evil" as he will liken the latter to an 'incubus,' a 'nightmare,' a 'fever,' and make its spokesman Napoleon in Part 2. Some reasons to value the It-World include:

>>>Survival value: Buber states "you cannot hold on to life without it" for good reason. Without analyzing, comparing and identifying events and objects and classifying them under general terms we cannot do so much as effectively hunt and gather, much less create complex civilizations with economies, written language, religions, philosophy, art, politics or much of anything else that is presupposed for any relationship to occur in the first place. No survival, no relationship.

>>>It provides a shared or common context for interaction, however superficial Buber takes it to be. One must start somewhere, and as he himself states on p. 32, the It-World is "ready... to be an object common to you all."[emph. added] I find interesting, maybe even telling his choice of the words "you all" rather than "all of us" or "all beings." Is he (un)consciously excluding himself from what already is said to be necessary for survival?

Buber now begins to move from an IT-World/YOU-World distinction to an IT-World/YOU-World dichotomy. In the mystical YOU-World:

"Measurement and comparison have disappeared...It cannot be surveyed, and if you attempt to make it capable of survey, you lose it....It does not help to sustain you in life, it only helps you to glimpse eternity." (pp. 32-3)" 

So, while the It-world, he continues, is set in space and time, the YOU-world is not.  The It-World is the one within which we have to live. We mark time, categorize things and events, deploy human skills to alter conditions based on knowledge through which we objectify the world-- thus seeing it as a "graph of place [and] events in time" (p. 31), i.e. as an object of rational and useful knowledge. In making it an object of this kind, we drain it of rich interpersonal meaning  (which can only emerge in I-You relations) and of intrinsic value. It is only when the unfamiliar YOU (that which we can't make fully familiar because it is spontaneous and not predictable just as all deep relationships are) appears that our deepest need for value and meaning can be fulfilled. THOU enters the it world in the form of "strange, lyric and dramatic episodes, seductive and magical, yet tearing us away to dangerous extremes, loosening the well-tried context [and]...shattering security. p. 34) Life in the YOU-world is ever-new, always present-- the "eternal now" as some have put it. This is not the eternity of the everlasting in time, but that which however fleeting has a "timeless" quality, as when rapt in ecstasy one may "lose track of time."

Buber knows we can't live in a world like this for long. It's not "secure" or predictable, but it replenishes the being who would greet YOU with open arms during "strange, lyric...episodes." The familiar It-World cannot be "Present," meaning fully present with you as in I-You relations, but also meaning in the "here-and-now" of the present moment, which is not predictable or familiar but always poised at the threshold of something new, of the not-yet.  It is the ability to be-with-others in the world in the Present that sets us apart as being human. So, the IT-world is necessary to live, but "he who lives with IT alone is not a man."


History of the It-World:


Much of Part 2 is taken up by positing a historical process in which the IT-World becomes ever more prevalent and the YOU-world diminishes to the point of leaving modern people in a confused, nihilistic situation. Much of this tracks the thought of Nietzsche, Weber, and Buber's former teacher Georg Simmel -- all of whom discussed modernization, urbanization and secularization as the stripping away of ultimate values, and  loss a sense of being part of a vast, meaningful and spiritually vibrant cosmos.  Max Weber famously calls this the "disenchantment" of society that goes along with increased utilitarian rationality and secularization.  Buber's nightmarish description of the modern world as one too firmly in the tyrannical grip of the IT-World carries with it much of the German pessimism of post WW1  art and philosophy. If the growth of IT-World is described somewhat melodramatically in this book, he was more nuanced in later essays. That said, we should try to understand Buber on his own terms in I and Thou.  Buber writes:


"The sickness of our age is like that of no other." (p.55)

"AS POWER OVER THE INCUBUS [sic] is obtained by addressing it with its real name, so the world of It... is bound to [reveal itself to] the man who knows it for what it really is -- severance and alienation...But how can the man in whose being lurks a ghost, the I emptied of all reality, muster the strength to address the incubus by name?(p. 58)

While the YOU-world is spontaneous, open and thus free from the chain of relentless cause-effect sequences, the modern mechanistic vision is deterministic. All talk of individuality and freedom fails to make sense in terms of a rational vision of a completely ordered universe in which fixed laws govern all that occurs. Perhaps soon we'll all believe that the behavior of neurons in the brain "determines" what we do, who we love and what meaning (if any) we may find in the eyes of our neighbors and the swaying of trees against the skyline.  Many believe this already. If "freedom" is reduced to "getting my way" (even when 'my' desires are fated by nature and nurture); if it's reduced to fulfilling arbitrary desires, then we are not "free" but determined. Buber says we (modern western civilization which he calls "sick")  are more fatalistic than any other culture that has existed. In the past, there was "destiny" which was unknown to us, but in which we felt ourselves to be active participants. Now the cosmos and society are reduced to meaningless "things" and forces" obeying "laws." We seek to eliminate the mystery of the Present (the here-now which brings us into potentially new and unknown territory) by mapping and engineering all outcomes with our day-planners, technological instruments, social/political policies, and abstract explanations for every concrete event. We're not open and vulnerable before the mystery of being, but arrogantly deluded into thinking that we can master all beings as though they were just so much putty; as if nature and persons would readily conform  to the arbitrary will of the engineer or tinkerer without protest. (Note: if viewed this way, anthropogenic global climate change is an example of the delusion that we can "master" nature to fit our wants -- even more telling is the failure to take the scientifically established threat seriously enough to actually respond to it. How can we "control nature" when we can't even control our own behavior?)

"[In the YOU-World] freedom and destiny are solemnly promised to one another and linked together in meaning; [while in the It-world] arbitrary self-will and fate, soul's spectre and world's nightmare, endure one another living side by side and avoiding one anoher without connection or conflict, in meaninglessness--till in an instant there is confused shock of glance on glance and confession of their non-redemption breaks from them."(p. 59

Only when, in crisis, we "confess" or admit our confusion and failure to redeem our humanness (i.e. find "redemption,")-- only then is there a possibility for modern society to take a turn toward "health" from "sickness." Only then will the scales of the It and You worlds cease to be so "nightmarishly" weighted to the side of "IT," in which what is most human and intimate is experienced as  some-THING to be enjoyed, enhanced, altered, controlled, improved ad inifinitum. A world of things and not PERSONS.   A world in which it is seldom possible to enjoy the unknown and spontaneous, and to listen to the other from one's innermost depths.


The It-World is populated by "individuals" who compare themselves to one another to feel unique, special, "distinct." Nietzsche had  spoken of this modern "striving for distinction" and principle of individuality, as did Buber's teacher Georg Simmel.  Individuals of this kind do not really connect with one another or enter into authentic relationships because they are too busy engaging in comparisons, noticing differences to boost self-esteem, and manipulating others.

"The I of the primary word I-It makes its appearance as individuality and becomes conscious of itself as subject (of experiencing and using)....The aim of [this] self-differentiation is to experience and to use, and the aim of these is "life" that is [really] dying that lasts the span of a man's life. (62-3)

Life, under the tyranny of the Modern It-World, requires to be put in scare quotes! "Life" is really just a long dying relieved only by actual death.  In stark contrast we have the YOU-World which only scattered human beings in modern Western civilization know well. The YOU-World is the world of the Person, not the "subject of experiencing and using." The I-YOU mode is one of sharing, not labeling, analyzing and manipulating persons as though they were things.

"Where there is no sharing there is no reality." (63)

Yet the detached, alienated and lonely self of modernity still contains the "inner seed" which can be realized only through relationships untainted by capricious desires, self-interests and utility maximization. We must learn to see each other as "whole beings" as persons, not just objects of experience and use value. We're a society of users and consumers. Experience has become consumption, interaction mutual exercises in "influencing one another." It isn't every age that produces perennial best-selling books called "How To Win Friends and Influence People," but Buber would not be surprised that such a book is cited by our current president as a great influence on his life and character.  Sociologist and psychoanalyst, Erich Fromm distinguished "having" from "being." It's much the same as Buber's You and It-worlds. Most of us relate to the world on the basis of a possessive attitude. I "have" friends; I "have" a house; I "have" good qualities; I "have" a beautiful spouse; I "have" lots of fun, etc. etc.  But few know how to BE where that means existing openly, without defining everything, especially myself and my well-counted assets and liabilities. I think George Harrison had something like this distinction in mind when he railed against the common fixation on "I, Me, Mine" in the song bearing that title. Those pronouns are pulling away from others and deep connections in which life is shared. We become fragments in the void.

The person looks on his Self, individuality is concerned with its 'My'-- my kind of race, my creation, my genius....Individuality niether shares in nor obtains any reality. It differentiates istself from the other, and seeks through experiencing and using to appropriate as much of it [i.e. the other] as it can.  This is its dynamic..."(64)

Following this passage, there is a rare moment of nuance in this otherwise Manichean chapter. Refreshingly, Buber states that if the YOU-World is the necessary context for the emergence of whole and authentic PERSONS, and the It-World for fragmented and alienated Individualists, then no actual human being is exclusively one or the other. In a short passage he seems to walk back the strict dichotomy, the either/or tone of the chapter describing IT and YOU as opposed and mutually exclusive modes of being. On page 65 he admits that:

"No [actual] man is pure person and no man is pure individuality. None is wholly real, and none wholly unreal. Every man lives in the twofold I. But there are men so defined by person ( You-world] that they may be called persons, and men so defined by individuality [It-world] that they may be called individuals. True history is decided in the field between these two poles."(65)

Though Buber appears to recognize the reality of many intermediate modes of relating between the "Pure Types" of I-It and I-You, he does little to describe any of these mixtures and variations between the extremes. Having written most of the book in terms of an either-or dichotomy of IT- and Thou, Buber reveals, however fleetingly, an awareness of ambiguity and nuance in real life. However, in this book he does little to develop this awareness as a theme. Indeed he reverts almost immediately to the language of dichotomies, even allowing the It-World to become "demonic" (perhaps Evil?) and the You-world divine and uniquely good. I started by noting some of the good or value that I believe Buber has already established (e.g. survival value, reliability, provision of a world of common objects and words to describe them, etc.) Now, I am suggesting that in his-- perhaps legitimate-- worries about the direction of history, he falls into a Manichean, either/or dichotomy, despite briefly acknowledging the subtler realities and mixed attributes of real human beings. This is worth considering so that we don't simply ignore Buber's warnings about the direction of history  just because he exaggerates and creates stiff dichotomies where there may be more fluidity. He may be generally correct despite the melodramatic wrappings of his style, and the lapse into seemingly absolutizing "It and You-worlds" even after admitting nobody is a pure example of either, but always a mixture of the "twofold." The distance between YOU and IT is described in a way, often, that makes them appear unbridgeable. But this one paragraph betrays an awareness of much that lies "between these two poles." (65).

Almost as if he never wrote that paragraph, Buber resumes the dichotomous descriptions of It and You worlds, and he  tries to bring the dichotomy of the YOU and IT worlds to a level of concreteness that can't be missed even by the casual reader. He does this by giving historical examples par excellence.

The YOU-World,  with its 3 facets (people, the natural world, the divine) is exemplified by Socrates (realm of people), Goethe (realm of nature) and Jesus (realm of the spiritual). What exemplifies the It-World? Only one historical person is named and discussed-- Napoleon!  "Indeed the lord of the age [Napoleon] manifestly did not know the dimension of the Thou. [sic](67) Rather, "he was for millions the demonic Thou; the Thou that does not respond..." (ibid)



It is only the realization that we are alone, cut off, frightened and not whole that prepares us as a society to build a culture that prioritizes genuine relationship and not just use-value, consumption and mastery over others and nature.

"At times the man shuddering at the alienation between the I and the world comes to reflect that something is to be done. As when in the grave night hour you lie, racked by waking dream--bulwarks have fallen away and the abyss is screaming-- and note amid your torment; there is still life, if only I get through to it-- but how, how?" (70)

Are we really in such a situation? And is it only dread and angst that can wake us up as a society and culture? Sure, says Buber, some individuals are fully alive to the world, but no thanks to the mass-culture that has swallowed millions in its heartless machinery.

Is this dichotomy between the authentic/YOU-world and the inauthentic, even demonic It-world overplayed? Melodramatic? Filled with post WW1 period angst (written both during and after that war which in the beginning Buber thought might produce solidarity and  unity), it is easy to dismiss as the mystic poet's hyperbole. But though I think (as I'll discuss at the end of the reading) the dichotomy is too strict, and allows little ambiguity, the subsequent history is not reassuring. There followed the rise of Fascism, World War, the  Holocaust, the advent of a maddening Nuclear Arms race (which continues with the doomsday clock still set at 2 minutes before midnight https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/  ) and the grim possibility, indeed likelihood, of global catastrophes following an an I-It way of relating to nature. Buber began by conceding that the I-It mode is indispensable for survival and civilization. But in section 2 he describes a pathological process in which "IT" has captured culture itself, and made of the multitudes something less than fully living and responsive human beings. Can we afford to dismiss all of  Buber's grave concerns? What do you think?

 

Group Reading of Martin Buber's I and Thou

This page is for anybody who is interested in reading and discussing I and Thou by Martin Buber.  Welcome!

First things first. Here's a link to the book.   https://ia800206.us.archive.org/16/items/IAndThou_572/BuberMartin-i-and-thou.pdf

I've written an intro to clarify--- as best I can-- some of Buber's obscure concepts and terms to make the book a bit more accessible. I've also included philosopher, Ran Lahev's very short video clip introducing the book and its meaning. But first, a few words on the the group reading.
 

I thought about how to coordinate this, and here's the tentative plan (if anybody has alternative suggestions I'm open to hearing them). The book is 120 pp. and divided into 3 sections.

I propose that we leave comments pertaining to passages from Section 1 (p. 3-34) for the first week (i.e. from today til Tuesday, 10/1/19. Hopefully these comments will get each of us to think of things from different angles, and enter into discussions about section 1. (Note: I'm not suggesting that you read only section 1. How much or little you read, and at what pace is entirely up to you. However, the writing is difficult, and I think it's best to break the discussions up just as Buber broke the book up into the 3 parts.)

If week one goes well and all or some of you want to continue, then we would leave comments pertaining to passages from section 2  (pp.37-72) for the second week (i.e. from Tuesday 10/1 to 10/8).

If all goes well again, we would do the same for the 3rd part of the book during week 3.  (Section 3: pp. 75-120)

After that comments would be open for discussing the book as a whole in any way you wish to do so.

In general, I don't like to structure things too much as far as discussions go.. So write about the sections and then the entire book in whatever way you see fit.  Comments might include, for example,  thoughts about quoted passages, questions about the meanings of certain words/terms and phrases, examples of how Buber's writing does or does not jibe with  your own life experience, thoughts on how it might apply to daily living in various settings (home, work, school, leisure activities, etc.) and just about anything else that the book brings to mind. If you have comments or questions about this post, that's fine. But remember, this post is only an attempt to help you understand Buber. It's not about what I think or believe.  It is my hope that your  comments and questions  will elicit replies/responses from other readers. Hopefully my own input by way of comments will have some value as well. 

I know that 3 weeks for a little book seems like a long time. But I think  it's just about right for a book that so many readers have called "cryptic" and "obscure." It is philosophy, but it is not written as discursive philosophy but in a style that one philosopher has called "descriptive evocation." Through poetic aphorisms, Buber tries to evoke experiences and insights that are almost ineffable. Nietzsche had a profound influence on him in that regard, but since Buber's work has a mystical dimension, it is often difficult to understand.  It has perplexed many readers to the point that Buber felt compelled to write a postscript in 1957, 35 years after its publication to help clarify some of the issues that had caused confusion. (The postscript is not in the free online version that I have provided a link to) In that postscript of 1957 he writes:

     "Again and again readers have turned to me to ask about the meaning of this and that. For a long  time I answered each individually, but I gradually realized that I was not able to do justice to the demand laid upon me...So I have had to set about giving a public answer, first of all to some essential questions which are bound together by their meaning." (Buber: p. 124)

Having read it, I'm not convinced the postscript clarifies the meaning of the text as much as Buber had hoped.  In the rest of this post, I'll do my best to shed some light on the unusual terms and concepts employed in the book. I'll also leave links to reliable secondary sources available for free online, such as the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for Buber, which has a pretty clear summary of the book, as well as some of his other work and his biography. So with that, I'll jump right into the main theme/s and concepts you will come across in section one.

_______________________________________________________________

Introduction to I and Thou (concepts, terms and themes)


Following many interpreters in philosophy,  I will use the word YOU in place of THOU, primarily because the latter is archaic and is not used in real encounters in our society. Because Thou is used in religious contexts ( e.g. religious services, readings of the Bible) it was used in the translation we're using. Later translations (e.g. that of Walter Kaufmann) have dropped it. What's important is to understand what Buber means by "You" or "Thou" which is very different from most traditional understandings of either word. For example, on page 9, Buber begins describing an "I-You" relation between a human being and a tree. Most of us don't routinely address trees with the pronoun, YOU, which means that this ordinary word YOU (Thou in the 1937 translation) is being used in a very unusual way.

Buber starts the book with a compact aphoristic passage that turns out to state some of the major premises of the book. The opening lines  must be at least somewhat  clear in order to understand what follows.  He writes:

     "To man [i.e. all people] the world is twofold, in accordance with his twofold attitude. The attitude of man is twofold in accordance with the primary words he speaks. The primary words are not isolated words. The one primary word is the combination I-Thou. The other...is the combination I-It; wherein without a change in the primary word, one of the words, He and She can replace It. Hence the I of man is also twofold. For the I of the primary word I-Thou is a different I from that of the primary word I-It." (Buber: p. 3)

Also on the first page we find 2 very important statements:

>>"The primary word I-YOU can  only be spoken with the whole being." and


>> "The primary word I-IT can never be spoken with the whole being" (ibid)

I'll try to convey a sense of what he means when he speaks of "the whole being" by way of examples. But for now I just wanted to flag the term "Whole Being" or "Whole Person." These terms and the  ways of living and being that they stand for are central. Put in abstract, intellectual terms, we are made "whole" only in relationships with other people, nature or God. Hopefully that will become more clear below.

Another thing to notice is that when Buber uses the term "primary word" he isn't talking specifically about language in the usual sense of words and symbols. Rather, he means by primary, that which is most basic metaphysically. It's common to believe that the most basic reality in the human realm is individual consciousness, the self or the "I." But according to Buber, the "I" doesn't really exist without relationships.  While many philosophers and psychologists start out from the principle of the individual ego or self, Buber says you only become an individual through relationships with others.

"In the beginning is relation." (Buber: p. 18)


"There is no I TAKEN IN ITSELF [sic]..." (Buber: p. 4)
     


We can't take these statements at face value or we'd be lost in a forest of pronouns. Yet they are stated as axioms. That is, he does not present arguments to prove their truth, but simply states them as though they are obvious facts that must be presupposed to make sense of life.  So, how should we interpret these words, and what is their status? I interpret them statements of what Buber thinks are profound metaphysical truths. Metaphysical truths are those alleged truths that  claim to go beyond our personal perspectives and ordinary experiences (the way things appear to us)
in order to reveal the truth of the way things really are (which usually differs from ordinary or everyday understanding). Just as optical illusions can lead us to "see" things in a distorted way (e.g. 2 lines of equal length can appear to have very different lengths), ordinary understanding of the world and the place of human beings in it can be distorted by  concepts and  attitudes we adopt towards other beings (both humans and beings  in nature including animals, trees, etc. ).

For most of us, and for most modern philosophers, "I"  experience myself as the locus of consciousness. Experience is, we tend to feel, happening "in here/ in my head."  Each of us appears to be independent or separate from all others mentally and emotionally.  Each of us would probably consider it to be trivially true that we can describe our experience accurately by saying things like: I interact with others; I bond with them , I break relations off from them, I think about them, love, hate, like, dislike, or respond neutrally to them, I make plans with them, I work with or for some of them, and so on.

We say such things without any sense of mystery, feeling it to be obvious. After all, it was hundreds of years ago that the early modern philosopher, Renee Descartes provided a solid foundation for the existence of the independent subject or self.

 I think therefore I am/ Cogito ergo sum.

So this self-evident assertion of the individual as a thinking subject is the basis of most modern Western philosophy and predominates culture, as I stated above.  But despite our experience of ourselves as separate beings, Buber says this understanding is something like the philosophical equivalent of that optical illusion I mentioned. It appears to be true, but in Reality the individualistic outlook is not the most basic one, but a warped version of the metaphysical truth as he understands it. Buber holds that the most basic  reality is  the way we relate to others (be it You, He, She, or It). My sense of being a self only arises after I've been in relationships with others.  From a theoretical standpoint we can understand this outlook when we consider the fact that babies don't have language, concepts of "self" or "identities." Those things come with socialization.

Buber say that ultimately there are  two basic ways of relating, and each is governed by a basic underlying attitude toward that to which we are relating at any given time.



"To Man the world is twofold in accordance with his twofold attitude." (p.1)

This duality of human nature in terms of basic attitudes is broken down into the two most basic poles of experience.

A) The I-YOU mode of relating
and
B) The I-IT mode of relating. 


Because we are almost always living in the I-IT mode of relating, I will start there. When I relate to others (be it people or other beings in nature) I experience them in terms of an attitude that emphasizes "my" thoughts, impressions, feelings, desires, interests, curiosities, etc.( p. 4) where Buber writes:

" I perceive something. I am sensible of [i.e. I sense] something. I imagine something. I will something. I  feel something.  I think something....This and the like establish the realm of IT." (Buber: p. 4)

All of these examples have in common the fact that I am concerned with various objects of my selective attention.

The world  of  I-IT relations is divided into the thinking subject ("I') and all those "somethings" (thoughts, experiences, , memories, plans)  which become intentional objects of "my"  thoughts, desires, sensations plans and the like.  This is not to say the I-IT mode is "bad." It is actually necessary for everyday life, and within it there are various gradations of  relating some of which approximate the I-YOU more than others (Buber discussed this aspect of his thought in later works, see Sarah Scott link below). 

In the I-YOU mode of relating I experience others (in society, nature or the realm of spiritual , life) as undivided, whole beings that can't be dissected or  broken into parts without losing the connection with the fullness of the Other person.  Usually 'I' relate to others in terms of partial or selective aspects in which I am interested. When riding the bus I experience the person at the wheel only-- or at least mainly-- as a "bus driver" ( an occupational role) which is only one role s/he plays in life. I don't ENCOUNTER  THE OTHER AS A WHOLE BEING  but as an assemblage of parts to which I selectively attend, focusing on some particular aspect/s of the being    (such as personality, looks, intelligence, career, hobbies, fashion sense et. al) and ignoring others according to my partial interests and goals. The person who lectures in the classroom is the "teacher" to me. Only rarely do I meet that person and encounter them as a full human being with an irreducible uniqueness and wholeness. Much, perhaps most of life is lived in the context of selective attention governed by our conscious and unconscious desires, beliefs,  biases, memories and plans

Examples of I-It relations:

>>>I walk onto a bus and barely notice the bus driver. I notice her quickly and perhaps don't exchange any words. Nevertheless I rely on bus-drivers routinely to get around. Here the encounter between me and other is almost entirely absent. The other is experienced mainly as a means to an end; a tool to get a job done.  A thing to transport me from A to B. He or she is thus objectified.

>>> I notice an acquaintance from work on the same bus and strike up a conversation. We make "small talk" recognizing each other by means of talk about work, what other people we know are like, movies and TV shows we might like or dislike, sports events, music, etc. We might also try to get a bit friendlier by asking questions about the other (curiosity) or wondering what they might be thinking about us, or asking them if they care to go out to a movie sometime, etc.  All of this is totally normal, and we take all of this for granted. It's how we are even as we get to know people really well.

>>> I see a stray cat and feel a strong desire to get it to a shelter for strays or a vet. I care about the cat. The attitude is still dominated by the attitude of me being a separate being who might "do something about" a situation that disturbs me. It's a kind of emotionally laden trouble-shooting. It's a very good thing we can notice the misfortunes of others, reflect on it and be motivated to intervene, but it's still an experience not of the cat as a whole being, but as a "cat-in-trouble." We're still feeling separate from the being and slapping labels on it to figure out how to control the situation-- indeed for the better in this example. But the focus here is not ethics. It's basic attitude toward that to which I'm relating. And at the moment I'm only noticing things about the cat that require intervention.

The key insight is that all of these examples reveal a sort of practical attitude in which I'm not really with the other person or being as a "Whole Person" (Buber) but rather my way of relating is "partial." The root word of partial is part, and we break ourselves and others into parts all the time to communicate and function. In the first case it's most obvious. Here is a human being capable of being with others in a rich variety of ways. But for the moment I notice them (if at all) merely as a fraction of their wholeness. I abstract everything from the human being except for one little role called "bus driver." That's it.

In the the second example, it may seem that I am relating to the whole person, but as is normal most of the time, I'm categorizing them and myself thus breaking them down into parts. I take the attitude of co-worker, acquaintance and prospective friend. I try to figure out what to say next that might make the conversation go smoother. To do that, I categorize more (e.g. I think s/he's a movie buff, or so I heard, so I'll ask them if they'd like to hang out and see a movie some time. Maybe that'll break the ice." ) all of this has to do with what philosophers call instrumental reason. We see others as means to ends. This can be either morally good or bad, enriching or debasing, fun or tedious. The point isn't to judge but to see  beneath the illusion that we're usually encountering others as Whole Beings.  The cat, based on anything I wrote, is experienced as a perhaps lovely, but endangered animal that needs to be moved to another situation for help. This again is instrumental thinking. It's about means and ends. "How can I get this cat to a shelter for strays? Let's see, do I have enough for a cab? Let me dial 911." etc.  This is all great, but it's not a spiritual encounter with what Buber calls the Being of the other, that is I am not "fully present" with the cat, but experiencing him/her through a filter of selective attention governed by the attitude of means-to-ends thinking. We spend most of our lives -- even with lovers and spouses-- in such a mode of being, according to Buber.


Examples of I-YOU relations:

Now lets take very similar situations but emphasize what Buber sometimes has called a "gestalt-shift" during which my attitude changes from that of the I-IT mode to that of the I-YOU mode of being.  Maybe then the concept of "encountering the other as a whole being" will begin to make sense.

>>I notice the same friend I ran into on the bus; this time in the a park where we walk and talk together.  Though at first things are pretty much the same as last time (chatting and becoming friendly) something happens unexpectedly. Two dogs start barking at each other aggressively, and the owners are pulling them back to keep them from fighting. But suddenly, out of the blue, one of the dogs for no clear reason turns around noticing me and my friend. He lets out the weirdest sound, not a bark, but some kind of unique yelp that I've never hear but it sounds absurd and funny in the situation. The dog is also making the most uncanny face, an expression that immediately, along with the yelping sound, makes both me and the friend break out into hilarious laughter at the same time.We are laughing without any cares, without self-consciousness of any kind, we aren't judging or categorizing one another. I'm not wondering whether my friend likes dogs generally or not. I might ask that later on. For now we are, and I can't stress this word enough, together. The thing about togetherness is it can't be broken down into "parts."  Laughing-with-YOU  is a spontaneous, here-and-now unfolding which is unencumbered by plans, memories, wishes, regrets. The absurd  sometimes can jerk us out of auto-pilot and transport us into a mode where I am simply "receiving" a person and/or dog or both in a totally open way that has nothing to do with changing them or changing my self, or achieving any goals (means-ends instrumentality).  Hilarity of the absurd is one way of inadvertently undergoing a gestalt-shift from the usual mundane attitude of relating to an I-THOU. My friend and I experienced each other outside of any social roles, norms or judgments for a minute or so. Being transported outside of myself, or being literally "beside myself" as in stepping outside my usual identity or ego, is called ekstasis in Greek  , which is where we get the mystical-sounding word "Ecstasy." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecstasy_(philosophy)   An I-YOU experience has an ecstatic quality in the sense that while I'm right in the midst of others in this world (nothing other-worldly going on here)  yet I'm transported by way of a transient but vital connection with beings that I exist together with in a situation.

The laughter may have been side-splitting, but it subsides. Yet now my friend and I have (without planning or seeking anything) bonded in a truly authentic way. Nothing about either of our responses was a put-on. Nothing was done for the sake of "making the right impression." What happened unfolded with a Zen-like simplicity and ease. And when it was over we returned, perhaps, to our conversation, but we were not the same. We had looked into each other's eyes during the shared hilarity, seen each other's expressions and that of the dog, taking all of it in without thinking about any of it,  but just enjoying this being-together in the moment that was so absurd to  both of us. This I-THOU encounter, this irreducible togetherness can occur uninvitedly or during a dance, or while making love (though self-consciousness can hinder the openness in those circumstances) or just holding hands quietly on a bench with one's spouse of 40 years, feeling that bond and togetherness with nothing awkward in the silences. All these and others (Buber talks about a Tree on p. 9 ff) may not last, but they sustain us in an afterglow of truly feeling that life is not alone; that I am not cut off or apart; that the game is worth the candle because I can become fully present with other people and nature, and thus find a kind of wholeness that allows me to feel at one with others (which is togetherness). This isn't done in the "astral realm" or "heaven" or anything like that, rather the spiritual mystery that Buber calls God is found here and now in the middle of our everyday lives. In philosophical terms, God is immanent or present in all beings if we would open our eyes  and hearts.

Buber knows that atheists and agnostics read, and often got something out of the book. Because Buber has a pantheistic tendency, or at least a view that God is immanent in all personal,  social and natural beings*, it's possible to say without a belief in any particular theology, that there is a spiritual wholeness that can be felt at times. That the world seems more vivid at those times, as if it were aware along with us.

Anyway, this is an attempt using anecdotes, analogies, metaphors and examples to communicate the differences between I-IT living and I-THOU living; and to attempt a description of how we can and do transition from one to the other and back in ordinary situations. Most of all, this is not a mysticism of retreat from this world to another "higher" or "purer" one. Buber's mysticism can appeal to the nonreligious person  who can open up and simply appreciate being-with-others.**

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Notes:

*Buber describes his pantheism in the postscript of 1957,  which isn't contained in the free online pdf. He compares his views to Spinoza.  Spinoza said that we can find God in 2 different realms: that of "spiritual being" and "natural being." Buber emphasizes a third realm which he calls  *personal being.* It is there that we may find God or spiritual "presence"  not only through our I-YOU relations with   people, but in relation with God understood as, in his own words, "The Eternal You" ("The Eternal Thou" in our translation). Philosopher Sarah Scott claims that Buber stated that he found God, The Eternal You, in his wife. God is not "up there" or only approachable through esoteric yoga exercises and such. Those are fine too. But Buber wants to stress that we are already intimately involved with all kinds of beings that-- given a fundamental change of attitude-- might become for us The Eternal You. (Buber: p.135)


**Being-with-others is Heidegger's phrase, but it seems apt here, and I suspect he was influenced to some extent  by  Buber's I and Thou, as was his one-time student, Emmanuel Levinas).

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Here's an excellent  7 minute intro to I and Thou by philosopher, Ran Lahev.  If you find it helpful, there are 2 others by him that follow this one. If you go the Lahev's channel you can find them there.

Links and Online Resources:

>>This online encycolpedia of philosophy entry on Buber is quite informative and contains a summary of I and Thou.  
https://www.iep.utm.edu/buber/

>> Interesting article about  Philosopher and ethicist, Sarah Scott [who wrote the IEP article referenced above] playing Martin Buber at the Jewish Museum,  in a theatrical reading Buber's writings, as well as mock interviews and spontaneous conversations with audience members after the show. Interesting article about what must have been an interesting event:

https://stories.thejewishmuseum.org/why-do-we-hold-these-talks-if-we-dont-expect-that-in-some-way-they-will-change-us-wish-you-were-here-39a3158642ff
 

The Necessary Qualities of a Good Political Leader: Weber's Politics as a Vocation

In January of 1919, Max Weber gave a now-famous lecture on the nature of politics in the modern Western administrative state called Politics as a Vocation. It was particularly focused on the qualities that leaders (such as PMs or Presidents) must have if stable and reasonable conditions would prevail. When he wrote the lecture, Germany had lost WW1, and Weber had attended the Peace Conference in Versailles where a damning"guilt clause" with impossibly large fines was imposed on Germany. Like Keynes, Weber warned that it was an unwise and vindictive settlement that might cause a backlash. Meanwhile, within Germany, radical leftists, various reformers, liberals and conservatives were descending in a vortex of intellectual and physical violence against one another. In that climate, Max Weber-- then the most prominent public intellectual in Germany-- was much sought after in the role of an advisor during the chaos. What should we do? Which party should we support? Students, intellectuals,  journalists and politicians wanted to know.

At first Weber turned the invitation down. He believed strongly in the ideal of keeping one's personal views out of respectable Political Sociology, the field he did much to invent. But for whatever reason, he ultimately accepted the invitation by the liberal Student's Union that invited him to give the lecture. Weber warned that it would probably disappoint those who had come for practical advise regarding the "issues of the day." But though Weber did an end run around mere political advocacy of this or that party or ideology, he spoke to more enduring themes he clearly thought were the source of the political divisions and chaos in 1919 Germany (and elsewhere in that era). The lecture, and the essay it became, is broad ranging but famously centers on the question, "What makes a political leader a good political leader?" The main question is thus one of ethics and character vis a vis powerful political leaders in modern nation-states.

After a fairly in-depth summary of his pioneering work in comparative political and historical studies (some of which is discussed in a short supplementary video below), Weber focuses on modern administrative states of a kind we might loosely call 'democratic' or 'parliamentary' systems with  powerful leaders at the top (PM or President for example). Such states (like our own) are based on legal-bureaucratic authority  (the rule of law) which, however, can get stuck in a mechanical mode when changes are required to meet the problems that arise contingently (e.g. when challenges to the Law of the Land were made by civil rights activists in the 60s). At such times, and other critical ones, such as Germany's post WW1 crisis, Weber thinks we are likely to see the emergence of  charismatic leaders (e.g. Churchill, Roosevelt, Hitler) who rise up from within the system yet initiate actions that challenge or deviate from some of the existing legal and bureaucratic procedures-- particularly during times of trouble. While Weber thinks strong charismatic leaders are necessary to counterbalance the largely mechanical behavior of career politicians in parties and organizations, he is aware that this can result in demagogues, would-be tyrants, and dictators if those with charismatic appeal turn out to be unable to live up to certain ethical criteria that should be carefully evaluated during the selection or election of political leaders.  How can we separate out merely charismatic leaders from good charismatic leaders?

He notes that politics in the West has increasingly become a profession but not necessarily a vocation. A vocation is a job, of course, but also retains the sense of "a calling." A good politician can only be such if s/he is not simply"living OFF their job but FOR it." to paraphrase Weber's distinction of "living FROM vs. living FOR politics." (Weber: p. 318) So, according to Weber,  politicians must be passionately committed to their ultimate convictions, and not just employees of the State. This "passion" must be in play for serious and plausible leaders in an age of relatively petty partisans and bureaucrats fighting each other for their own limited interests. There must be someone who feels called upon to mediate all of that; someone-- yes-- with vision but with a cool detachment enabling reasonable compromise as necessary. This balance of passionate commitment to an ultimate vision (i.e. Weber's "ethic of ultimate ends/convictions") and sense of responsibility for the grave impacts of all decisions for society and history ("ethic of responsibility") is ultimately something that involves a sober-headed ability to reason --i.e. to engage in mature rational assessment even of one's own strongest convictions,  desires and one's vision if necessary in order to stay in touch with the obligations of having the awesome powers conferred on leaders of nation-states (PM's, Presidents and the like).

What he's really worried about is the intoxicating effect of political power on anything less than a disciplined, judicious and appropriately detached individual. He's trying to describe what might be called political integrity, though he didn't put it in those exact words. The "2 fatal flaws" of political leadership, he says, are "a lack of objectivity" [rd. detached perspective, ability to rise above the passions of the moment] and  "vanity, the need to thrust oneself as far as possible into the foreground" [perfectly embodied in politicians like Trump and many demagogues]. Weber argues that it is the ethical makeup of a leader that is decisive over and above the exact ideology or party that happens to rule. He was lecturing as a venerated public intellectual to an audience that expected him to endorse the socialists or the conservatives or liberals, all of whom were fighting  each other for power (literally, assassinations--such as that of Rosa Luxenburg-- were occurring throughout Germany as he lectured). Instead of concentrating on party and ideology,  he said that the real need was for someone who can rise above the fray.  Someone who is spirited, yes, but can reign in the passions of the heart when necessary, and certainly restrain the lower instincts for petty gains and the lust for grandeur.This entails applying a cool, measured reasoning that never loses track of the fact that leaders of nation-states have the ability (for better and worse) to change the course of history. This awful responsibility must always be a decisive and humbling factor in keeping the leader well above rash and emotionalistic indulgences which we see in so many leaders-- especially demagogues.

So this is nothing less than an ethical evaluation on Weber's part, after years of study in comparative politics and history, of what the ideal traits, or character structure of a good political leader in the modern nation-state might look like. Though I hope this short summary of W's thought on political leadership is reasonably good,  I am posting an excerpt from the lecture/essay. The following is taken from what I believe to be one of the most important sections of Politics as a Vocation, and it is deservedly famous.

As we contemplate the question of just who should take the political position of perhaps the most powerful person on the planet, the president of the US, we could do worse than to consult Weber's answer to the question of just what kind of human being has what it takes to wield such power in a passionate yet responsible manner-- ever balancing core convictions and clear-headed responsibility to the citizens.

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Excerpt From Politics as a Vocation

by Max Weber

What kinds of inner joy does politics have to offer, and what kinds of personal qualifications does it presuppose in anyone turning to this career?

Well, first of all, it confers a feeling of power. The professional politician can have a sense of rising above everyday existence, even in what is formally a modest position, through knowing the he exercises influence on people, shares power over them, but above all from the knowledge that he holds in his hands some vital strand of historically important events [emph. added] But the question facing such a person is which qualities will enable him to do justice to this power...and thus to the responsibility it imposes on him. This takes us into the area of ethical questions, for to ask what kind of human being one must be in order to have the right to seize the spokes of the wheel of history, is to pose an ethical question.

One can say that three qualities are preeminently decisive for a politician: passion, a sense of responsibility, and judgment. Passion [is] the sense of concern for the thing itself  [i.e. the issue or matter at hand]  or the passionate commitment to a 'cause.'[This is not to be confused with]... what my late friend Georg Simmel called 'sterile excitement' [such as that we see]... amongst our own intellectuals at this carnival being graced with the proud name 'revolution; it is the 'romanticism of the intellectually interesting' directed into the void, and lacking all objective [sachlich] sense of responsibility. [This refers to the intellectual and quasi-military violence between socialists, liberals and conservatives fighting for control of the state in 1919 Germany. Many intellectuals, for example on the left, called themselves "revolutionaries" while Weber saw mainly a tragic loss of the ethic of responsibility for the fate of the country on all sides. He also mentions "many though by no means all Russian intellectuals" of the late 19th and early 20th century, and, of course, during the revolution and subsequent civil war that was raging in Russia as he lectured - ed.]. Simply to feel passion, however genuinely, is not sufficient to make a politician, unless in service to a 'cause,' responsibility  for that cause becomes the lode-star of all action. This requires (and this is the decisive psychological quality of a politician)  judgment, the ability to maintain one's composure and calm while being receptive to realities, in other words distance from people and things. A lack of distance [i.e. critical distance, capacity for cool, detached reasoning when everyone around you is inflamed or carried away by emotion- ed.] is one of the 'deadly sins' of the politician, and...will condemn our future intellectuals to political incompetence if they cultivate it. For the problem is precisely this, how are hot passion and cool judgment to be fused together in one soul? Politics is an activity conducted with the head, not with other body parts or the soul. Yet if politics is to be meaningful action rather than some frivolous intellectual game, dedication to it can only be sustained by passion.   Only if one accustoms oneself to distance...can one achieve that powerful control over the soul [i.e. self-restraint in the heat of the moment] which distinguishes the passionate politician from the mere 'sterile excitement' of the political amateur. The strength of a political personality means first and foremost the possession of these qualities

Every day and every hour, therefore the politician has to overcome a quite trivial, all-too-human enemy which threatens him from within: common vanity, the mortal enemy of all dedication to a cause and of all distance-- in this case, of distance to oneself

Vanity is a very widespread quality, and perhaps no one is completely free of it. In academic and scholarly circles it is a kind of occupational disease. In the case of the scholar, however, unattractive as this quality may be, it is relatively harmless in the sense that it does not, as a rule, interfere with the pursuit of knowledge. Things are quite different for the politician. The ambition for power  is an inevitable means with which he works. 'The instinct for power,' as it is commonly called, is thus indeed one of his normal qualities. The sin against the [metaphorically] holy spirit of his profession begins where this striving for power becomes detached from the task in hand and becomes a matter of purely personal self-intoxication instead of being placed entirely at the service of the 'cause.' For there are ultimately just 2 deadly sins in the area of politics: a lack of objectivity...and a lack of responsibility. Vanity, the need to thrust one's person as far as possible into the foreground, is what leads the politician most strongly into the temptation of committing one or other (or both) of these sins, particularly as the demagogue is forced to count on making an 'impact', and for this reason is always in danger both of becoming a play-actor and of taking the responsibility for his actions too lightly, and being concerned only with the 'impression' he is making... For although, or rather precisely because power is the inevitable means of all politics, and the ambition of power therefore one of its driving forces, there is no more pernicious distortion of political energy than when the parvenu boasts of his power and vainly mirrors himself in the feeling of power-- or indeed any and every worship of power for its own sake. The mere "power politician" , a type whom an energetically promoted cult is seeking to glorify here in Germany as elsewhere, may give the impression of strength, but in fact his actions merely lead into emptiness and absurdity. On this point the critics of 'power politics' are quite correct. The sudden inner collapse of typical representatives of this outlook has shown us just how much inner weakness and ineffectuality are concealed behind this grandiose but empty pose. It stems from a most wretched and superficial lack of concern for the meaning of human action, a blase attitude that knows nothing of the tragedy in which all action, but quite particularly political action is, in truth, enmeshed (Weber: 1994,  pp. 352-5)

Source:
Max Weber: Political Writings, ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs
Cambridge U. Press, New York; 1994, pp. 318-20 and 352-355

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The following 6 min. video focuses on Weber's conception of power (macht) and the manner in which it becomes legitimate authority (herrschaft). In the modern era the focus, thinks Weber, will be on the need to balance charismatic leaders with the impersonal rule of law or "legal-rational authority." This may help to situate the above passage from Weber. In the long lecture, Weber discussed many other things including types of power and authority. Since there isn't room for everything in the post, this video may be useful, particularly the closing comments on the "comeback" of Charismatic Leaders in times of crisis and social disunity in modern law based states. ( see 4:59 ff).

Possible Questions/Topics: 

-Does Weber's assessment of leadership in the modern state seem relevant to the current situation in the US (or for that matter the UK and other nation-states currently characterized by disunity bordering on crisis)? If so, discuss. If not, then why not?

-Sometimes pundits in the media talk about the "character" of political candidates and/or leaders. Weber's emphasis is largely on the moral character of the politician and the virtues which constitute it. How important to you are the characteristics he describes in candidates and/or leaders for whom you might (or did) vote?

-Weber (himself known as a liberal at the time of the lecture) chose not to "take sides" or support any of the parties that were engaged in sometimes-violent fighting. He refers to the struggle for power around him as a "carnival"(see above) and discusses the qualities of leadership he thinks none of those around him possess but need to understand. Was this a "cop-out" or do you think Weber goes beneath the self-proclaimed ideologies to address a deeper crisis of ethics? How important are ideology and party? How important are ethics?

(Note: These are merely a suggestions. Please write whatever seems important to you in relation to the post.)

Martha Nussbaum on the question, "What does it mean to be human today?" (With critical response)

Today's New York Times includes a mini-essay by philosopher and legal scholar, Martha Nussbaum. [Note: this post first appeared on 8/20/18 on a now-defunct Disqus channel] Ir is the latest in a series of philosophical responses to the question, "What does it mean to be human today?." https://www.nytimes.com/spo... Nussbaum is a prodigious philosopher whose writings since the early 80s have, by turns, focused on Classical Greek philosophy, Stoicism, Feminist Theory, Human Rights, Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, legal theory, quality of life in developing countries, "political emotions," and much more. I have great respect for Nussbaum, whose books and lectures are almost always interesting, and not infrequently quite original and insightful. I didn't have that response to her Times piece this morning, though. The topic she takes on and the issues she addresses in her essay are, however, important not only for philosophy but the future of humankind and the biosphere as a whole. What follows is Nussbaum's mini-essay followed by a very short response which I wrote for the NYT comments section earlier. Hopefully, the essay and response will generate a constructive discussion on the very timely issues involved.

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What Does It Mean to Be Human? Don’t Ask: (We don’t see the problem with our self-importance because our narcissism is so complete.)

by Martha Nussbaum 8/20/18
Source: NY Times

Over time, the idea of “being human” has surely meant — and will continue to mean — many things. There is and has never been just one answer. But surely one thing it ought to involve today is the ability to recognize that the question itself is a problem.

We humans are very self-focused. We tend to think that being human is somehow very special and important, so we ask about that, instead of asking what it means to be an elephant, or a pig, or a bird. This failure of curiosity is part of a large ethical problem.

The question, “What is it to be human?” is not just narcissistic, it involves a culpable obtuseness. It is rather like asking, “What is it to be white?” It connotes unearned privileges that have been used to dominate and exploit. But we usually don’t recognize this because our narcissism is so complete.

We share a planet with billions of other sentient beings, and they all have their own complex ways of being whatever they are. All of our fellow animal creatures, as Aristotle observed long ago, try to stay alive and reproduce more of their kind. All of them perceive. All of them desire. And most move from place to place to get what they want and need. Aristotle proposed that we should strive for a common explanation of how animals, including human animals, perceive, desire and move.

We know Aristotle as a philosopher, but he also was a great biologist who studied shellfish and other creatures large and small. He encouraged his students not to turn away from studying animals that don’t seem glamorous, since there is something wonderful in all of them, not least the sheer fact that they all strive for continued life.

This sense of wonder, which should lead us to a fuller ethical concern, is a deep part of our humanity. But wonder is on the wane, and we humans now so dominate the globe that we rarely feel as if we need to live with other animals on reciprocal terms.

Domesticated animals occupy a privileged sphere, but even they are often treated cruelly (think of puppy mills, or abandoned feral cats). The factory farming of pigs, chickens and other animals is a relatively new form of hideous brutality. As for the creatures in the “wild,” we can see that our human crimes are having a devastating effect on them: the damages that come from lab research using animals; the manifold harms endemic to the confinement of apes and elephants in zoos; the depletion of whale stocks by harpooning; the confinement of orcas and dolphins in marine theme parks; the poaching of elephants and rhinoceroses to benefit the international black market; the illicit trafficking of African elephants to American zoos; the devastation of habitat for many large mammals that is resulting from climate change. It is now estimated that human activity has contributed to the extinction of more than 80 mammalian species. https://vcresearch.berkeley...
New issues arise constantly. The world needs an ethical revolution, a consciousness-raising movement of truly international proportions. But this revolution is impeded by the navel-gazing that is typically involved in asking, “What is it to be human?”

Let’s rekindle and extend our sense of wonder by asking instead: “What is it to be a whale?” Then let’s go observe whales as best we can, and read the thrilling research of scientists such as Hal Whitehead http://whiteheadlab.weebly.... and Luke Rendell http://biology.st-andrews.a... Let’s ask about elephants (my own most beloved species), and if we can’t go on safaris, let’s watch films of elephants simply living their lives, exhibiting communal devotion, compassion, grief anda host of other complex attitudes that we humans tend to believe belong to us alone.

And let’s do much more philosophical and legal work on theoretical approaches to protecting other animals and developing more reciprocity with them. We have gathered so much scientific information about the complexities of animal lives. Now let’s put it to use philosophically. Will Kymlicka http://post.queensu.ca/~kym... and Sue Donaldson https://philpapers.org/s/Su... have already done wonderful work on reciprocity and community with domesticated animals, but there’s more to do.
In the world of philosophy-influenced policy, the most significant general approach to animal entitlements until now has been that of the British utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, https://plato.stanford.edu/... courageously and ably developed by the philosopher Peter Singer https://plato.stanford.edu/... . This approach continues to have great importance because it focuses on animals’ suffering. If we were to simply stop inflicting gratuitous pain on animals, that would be a huge step forward.

We now know that animals need many things that don’t always cause suffering when they are absent: the chance to associate with others of their kind in normal groupings; the chance to sing or trumpet in their characteristic ways; the chance to breed; the chance to move freely through unobstructed space; the chance to pursue curiosity and make new discoveries. So we also need, I believe, an approach that focuses on a plurality of distinct “capabilities,” or freedoms, that each species requires to live a flourishing life.

I’m now writing a book that will use my prior work on the “capabilities approach” https://plato.stanford.edu/... to develop a new ethical framework to guide law and policy in this area. But mine is just one approach, and it will and should be contested by others developing their own models. Lawyers working for the good of animals under both domestic and international laws need sound theoretical approaches, and philosophers should be assisting them in their work. And there is so much work to do.

So let’s put aside the narcissism involved in asking only about ourselves. Let’s strive for an era in which being human means being concerned with the other species that try to inhabit this world.

Martha C. Nussbaum is the Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago Law School.

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A Short Response:

There seems to be a false dichotomy at work here. Either we ask about our own species (narcissistic) or we cultivate a greater sense of wonder and ethical interest in the myriad of animals and life-forms all around us (expansive/mature). Yet we can concern ourselves with both, and indeed they are interrelated more than ever in the current age in which human beings exercise tremendous influence on the fate of the environment and all the animals that she mentions. What matters, I think, is how we inquire into these things. It can be done in a self-congratulatory or narcissistic way, as Nussbaum fears, but it needn't be so.

I don't see how we can explore other animals and nature in light of ethical responsibilities without first exploring 'the human condition' which is part of nature and the biosphere. To ask who and what we are and may become has been basic to philosophy from Plato, Aristotle,Augustine,Kant, to Nietzsche, Sartre,Simone de Beauvoir, et al. Not a bad pedigree! It's interesting to read Nussbaum lauding Aristotle for sidestepping the "narcissism" that theories of human nature and purpose imply on her view. As a sometimes-classicist, she must know Aristotle's ethics and politics attempt to describe, even define, human nature. For Aristotle, we're political animals (zoon politikon), our function (ergon) is rational activity, and our ultimate end (telos), is to actualize our potentials and achieve well-being (eudaimonia) that is conducive to a harmonious society/polis.

But such answers, as intellectually valuable as they are do not give guidance for "human beings today," which is the topic of the series of essays in the NYT . With all the powers we now have to destroy life on earth, we must ask "who" we are and what we want afresh.
-PD

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Questions:

-Is it possible to radically alter the way we perceive and treat other animals without, in so doing, asking questions about our place in nature, our needs, desires and ethical responsibilities?

-Must questions about human nature take the form of "navel gazing," "narcissistic" self-importance, as Nussbaum claims?

-The title of the essay includes the exhortation, "Don't Ask" in response to the question, "What does it mean to be human today?" (that's the NY Times' "big question for the series with the word "today" included). If we "don't ask" what it means to be human beings in the world today, how might we change "who" we are and what we do to be more compatible with the needs, or perhaps rights, of
other beings and the environment?