The Concept of Liberal Democracy

Today it is customary to talk about Liberal Democracy as if the component concepts-- liberalism and democracy-- have some kind of natural affinity or fit.  But both concepts are ambiguous in themselves,  and their historical convergence in the form of the unit-concept, "Liberal Democracy," is, at the very least, problematic if not somewhat incoherent. The history of the terms "democracy" and "liberalism" reveals separate strands that only later appear to hang together, but originally were quite distinct. Democracy now seems to go together  with liberalism, but liberalism (based around toleration and freedom to live the kind of life one wants without interference) had nothing to do with Athenian Democracy or Civic Republicanism in Rome (which influenced the American founders greatly). 

Athenian (direct) democracy had nothing to do with protecting "individual rights" or allowing people to live and express themselves as they wished. Far from it. Every year the people (demos) would vote to ostracize any one citizen they most disdained without regard for that citizen's "rights." In other words, any citizen might be thrown out of the Polis,  or even put to death, for no reason at all except for  their unpopularity. Further, the liberal conception of a private sphere in which we may choose to participate in government or choose to abstain from political life didn't exist. While slaves, who far out-numbered citizens,  kept the silver mines running, citizens were forced to participate based on choice by lot. The lots revolved on a yearly basis, but as with conscription there were few exemptions. Thus rule by the people  (demos = people; kratia = rule) was literally the order of the day for those adult males defined as citizens-- a minority of the total population. Many who lived in Athens but came from other Poleis (known as "metics" or foreigners) lacked citizenship. As for the citizens,  not all  were equally well-educated, wealthy and so forth. As a result the system was vulnerable to tyrants*  and demagogues who came to exercise outsized power on often poorly informed and impressionable citizens. So, individual rights, privacy, autonomy, the inherent dignity of the person-- all these familiar (to us) concepts associated with democracy were not in play. 

During the Enlightenment and, in the American era of the founders, democracy was, for the most part,  a dirty word that signaled the danger of "mob rule" or the "tyranny of the majority," consistent with Plato's critique. Though there were elements of democracy in the constitution, these were understood as being much closer to the tradition of Civic Republicanism, a mixed form of government that is based a) on citizen virtues and b) institutional guardrails to prevent "factionalism" and rule by majority (checks and balances, appointed officials, indirect elections et al.) It wasn't until the 20th century, for example, that American citizens were able to vote directly for Senators-- and this was before universal suffrage. The word democracy started to be used in a non-pejorative sense only in the mid 19th century. The radicals of the  French Revolution promoted Rousseauian democracy (more on which below), but this ended with Napoleon, and after his defeat,  memories of the Terror that resulted in reactionary movements that led to the restoration of  the monarchy. Democracy in France was not embraced during most of the long 19th century. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/France_in_the_long_nineteenth_century

What about "Liberalism?" It too is a cluster-concept in which various historical strands eventually converged in the 19th century-- some more closely interrelated than others. But the assemblage of these strands as a unitary concept, "liberalism," was historical, political and thus contingent. Some of these historical strands include a) religious toleration (esp. vis a vis Protestantism) b) subsequent and gradual generalization of the principle of toleration to secular sphere  c) fear of excessive power concentrated in the central state d) the idea of voluntary power having priority over coercion/force c) the centrality of the individual over the group e) laissez-faire economics, et al. As JS Mill discussed, these core elements sit uneasily with democracy. If the "will of the people"is taken to mean what most enfranchised citizens want, as expressed in electoral outcomes and public opinion, then it would seem to leave little room for individual dissenters and minorities. Further, Mill, like many others in the 19th century, was concerned to make sure that the demos (people) was not simply reduced to a numbers game, with majority being identified with right. His proposed solution was to argue for an "educated democracy" in which all men and (yes) women would get the vote, but only after receiving mandated secondary education was achieved,  so that their input would be based on knowledge and reason rather than passions and popular opinion. This resembles current discussions of "epistocracy" in the sense that the outcome of elections is only a solid basis for governance if citizens are well informed, and have mastered some critical thinking skills.  Mill, in many ways the father of modern liberalism, wants to protect minority rights, minority opinions, as eloquently laid out in On Liberty. But in the end he is also concerned that free expression be "educated" and not vulgar ("It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied" he writes).  This notion of the  "better" state of being is a moral judgment irreducible to the calculus of elections and opinion polls per se. The identification of "better" arguments and opinions will become a hallmark of later attempts to preserve individual liberty and mass participation without ending up with the long feared form of democracy the founders called "tyranny of the majority." Even Justice Oliver Wendell Homes, a champion of free expression, once half-joked that "democracy is what the mob wants."    

Aside from the tension between majoritarian calculus and qualitative standards of rationality and morality (as expressed by Tocqueville and Mill who fear mass conformity to  public opinion and a corresponding "dumbing down" of culture ), there also exists a tension  between the heterogeneity of liberalism (encouraging diverse and potentially incompatible ideas, beliefs and forms of self-expression) and the homogeneity implied by concepts like "popular sovereignty," "The will of 'The People" etc. Such concepts suppose the homogeneity of agreement, of a unitary sovereign                    will and not heterogeneity at its core. This comes out forcefully when we look at  Rousseau's vision of a direct democracy of free and rational beings. The insistence on unanimity and universal principles and the related idea that majoritarian processes result in good and fair outcomes, seems to clash with the claim that all citizens qua individuals are genuinely autonomous and thus free. Rousseau's notion of freedom is obviously not one that protects minority opinions, as dissenters may be, in his (in)famous phrase,  "forced to be free" if their views depart from what is allegedly the rational, moral and universal set of guiding principles expressed by the "General Will"--the unitary and sovereign will of "the people". (Bertrand Russell once quipped that on Rousseau's terms, in which we can be forced to be free, we all enjoy "the right to obey the police.")

During the 19th and 20th centuries,  liberalism and democracy were gradually combined in an attempt to balance individual rights and the rule of "the people" (popular sovereignty)-- in truth a problematic category that assumes overarching agreement when in reality we have a multitude of competing interest groups duking it out (what the founders feared as "factionalism;" see Federalist 10). The idea of "we the people" or popular sovereignty (akin to Rousseau's "General Will") has long since been problematized by political scientists who instead discuss concepts of pluralism, cross-cutting cleavages, and more recently "agonistics" and other markers of conflict and competition which does not add up to an identifiable "general will." 

We have seen that Mill recommended competition of discrepant views in what we now call "the free market of ideas" (Supreme Ct. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' term https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marketplace_of_ideas   ).  Mill had great faith in the process of such discourse only after mandatory education at the secondary level had time to "refine" public opinion. (Crick: p. 10) Just why we should suppose that a system of education will overlap with "refined" views of the moral and political, views that are more like Socrates than a "fool" in his words, is far from clear. We know that many of the best educated citizens in England also had views on topics like colonialism and race we now frown upon.  Mill himself did not think Indians were qualified for self-rule or participation in politics in the Empire at any significant level. So the concern with popular opinion converging on morally and rationally defensible outcomes is not solved by the mediation of mandatory public education in and of itself.

In later theories, this merger of democracy and liberalism in which we have freedom of expression, but accept the ideas that win out in the "free market" morphed into an idea that moves back towards the homogeneity we see in Roussseau's vision. (Note the tension between individuality and unanimity or at least majority opinion through all these attempts to reconcile liberalism and democracy). What emerges more and more in liberal democratic theory is the valorization of a) neutrality and b) consensus. Rather than hoping that the ideas that win out in the free speech market are good and true, theorists begin to move toward a procedural view of rational deliberation in which the process of dialogue or conversation is both  fair and free, and in which the outcome is a consensus that converges on some notion of the public good. Now it is not education alone, but "free and fair discussion" or deliberation that is hoped to bridge disparate and free individuals and defensible outcomes that reveal the will of the people.

An example of the neutrality/fairness claim can be found in Rawls notion of policy makers drawing up their plans under the "veil of ignorance." Put simply, the idea is that these deliberators can and should bracket their actual empirical interests, and imagine that they don't know where they will end up in terms of socio-economic position, prestige, power etc. This "neutral" perspective (one not tied to any actual or empirical self-interests since you could end up at the bottom of the barrel in principle) is thought to insure an unbiased,  hence neutral  decision-making procedure aimed at rational consensus and the public good.  

In Europe, Jurgen Habermas, has long been developing a theory of deliberation occurring under optimal conditions he has called "the ideal speech situation," one in which all participants operate in a free and unconstrained set of interactions he calls "communicative rationality" or "discourse." He has tried at once to defend universal values while denying any commitment to absolute foundations. "Ideal Speech" is supposed to be  enough to generate substantive universal values for a democracy which are rationally defensible. I cannot go into detail here, but rather I mention it (like Rawls) to show how theorists deal with the problem of mixing individual rights, individual differences autonomy and other liberal values with democratic governance which involves a tendency towards the unitary "will of the people"/"We The People" etc.  Consensus and neutrality are two pivots on which the fusion of liberal values and democratic practices and commitments often turns. Consensus has a long history of being treated as a basis for legitimacy in the proto-liberal tradition of contract theory (e.g. the "consent of the governed" and "tacit vs. express consent" et al.)


It is often assumed that consensus is the best basis for legitimacy rather than arbitrary power/authority. Tied to consent and also fairness/justice in modern liberal theory is the idea that consensus is the product of the "force of the better argument" in rational deliberation. While I don't mean to suggest that coercion is better than agreement or cooperation, the reification of "consensus" as binding universal principle needs to be examined. If you claim that, for example, all legitimate societies rest on the "consent of the governed," you will run into societies that are legitimate in the eyes of those inhabiting it, but which are not based on anything like a rational consensus. Right now, for example, Putin's authoritarianism is legitimate, even popular in Russia. But Putinism did not emerge as a product of rational deliberation and consensus, and it makes no universal claims, but rather nationalistic ones. Putin's regime is widely accepted by Russians,  and only in that sense it has (to a large degree) the "consent of the governed." So consensus there is not what generates the values and policies as in liberal democracy, but is just a contingent sign of public approval after the fact. The people themselves have little input in generating consensus; it is entirely passive.

So does consensus, of itself, insure "rightness" or the public good? Well, if we mean concrete consensus where people agree on X or Y, then no. People agree on all kinds of things, be they helpful, harmful, true, false etc.  Elevating the idea of consensus to a transcendental status  where it is taken as a "necessary condition of the good society" (e.g. Habermas) seems to be an instance of overreach. Various theorists take a concept (consensus)  that may work well in some cases and not in others, and then generalize until we lose sight of the granularity of politics.  One result is that conflicts can be glossed over by overemphasizing consensus. For example, Manifest Destiny represented a consensus on the part of most American citizens in the 19th century, but not on the part of Amerindians. Why should the "consensus" on the 'rightness" of the Monroe Doctrine (US hegemony over all other populations in the Americas) override "rationally"  the various responses to this consensus-based policy on the part of American Indians, Central and South Americans? How and when can we say that a "consensus" represents an alleged "Universal Moral Principle?" When can we even say it represents "the best practical outcome" in a particular political context? Just where do we find the conceptual link that ties consensus to that which is deemed to be "good" and "right?" Liberals and theorists of liberal democracy have often fetishized consensus formation as an intrinsic good. It needn't be jettisoned; only put into a more empirical and  historical perspective that lacks the transcendental pretense of the theories I've mentioned and others like them.


I believe, in light of the above,  that there is no getting around  value-conflicts that are not resolvable in terms of a 'universal principle' of an ethical/political nature as promised by Liberal Democracy with its talk of universal rights, freedoms and truths. As rhetoric it has been valuable for various groups at various times (e.g. natural rights and dignity claims on the part of various minorities in the past, and more recently appeal to abstract universal "human rights" by any number of identity-based groups). But as much as I agree with the goals of many people invoking human rights, the concept doesn't rest on anything that is "universal" or "self-evident." The concept is a residual one which rests on theology and natural law metaphysics. In fact, it is now customary to refer not simply  to "Human Rights"as universal entities,  but to  "Human Rights Discourse." https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/43822 This at least leaves open the question of whether or not the concept refers to anything beyond the goals and struggles of various  populations (people of color, various ethnic and religious groups,  the impoverished, LGBT, etc.)  The idea of such rights traces back to the liberal, not democratic lineage of ideas. 

In reality the "rights" of these minorities has been anything but "self-evident." Long and often bloody struggles (not rational deliberations) were the main catalysts of change. Documents enumerating alleged human rights (like that of the UN charter) certainly allowed the various groups seeking change to utilize the discourse as a potent rhetorical appeal. But the rhetoric alone neither demonstrates the existence of said rights nor does it insure that they will be recognized in any given context. People within and between different societies continue to disagree on whether or not X or Y is in fact a human right, and even whether human rights exist outside of socially defined discourse (i.e. Human Rigihts Discourse or HRD).  So liberal ideas of "neutrality" and the rational generation of consensus (in this case the alleged consensus manifest in the Declaration of Universal Human Rights at the UN)  block from view the social and historical contingencies, struggles, conflicts and coercive agencies that have been used to advance or suppress the projects of various contesting groups  (e.g. Palestinians, Transgender activists, advocates of same-sex marriage in Russia and other societies that claim allegiance to "traditional values" to say nothing of those East Asian societies that claim human rights is incompatible with Confucianism-- see The East Asian Challenge For Human Rights https://books.google.com/books/about/The_East_Asian_Challenge_for_Human_Right.html?id=p5wt8hUagc8C . 

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I may personally value many of the products of liberalism and democracy. But none of these things, in my view,  are etched in the ether as "good and true." These are forms of life among many others in the run of human events. The quest for certainty and "foundations" in liberal democratic theory and rhetoric has, I think, led to a smug sense that we in the modern west know best and enjoy the epistemic advantages of something called "progress." I think we can function without these conceits, admitting that ultimately our values are based on personal, interpersonal and socially established ideas about how we might best organize society and live. Political theory is more continuous with creativity, imagination and praxis than air-tight logical arguments. Of course logical rigor has an important place in all theorizing, but there are always loose ends and lacunae when theory and actual conditions are juxtaposed.. This may not be a failure so much as an index of the untidy and incomplete nature of individual and social life.  It's not that there's no rationality or logic involved, but the insistence on knowing what is good universally is a case of overreach and hubris. 

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References and Related Readings: 

-Bernard Crick: Democracy: A Very Short Introduction: Oxford U Press:  2006

-John Dewey: The Public and its Problems: Ohio U Press 1988 (orig. 1927) (reasonably good wikipedia summary here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Public_and_its_Problems

-Michael Freedon: 
1)  Rights, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 1991
2) Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction; OxfordL 2015

-Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson: Liberal Beginnings: Making a Republic for the Moderns: Cambridge U Press: 2008

-Christopher Lasch: The True and Only Heaven:  Progress and its Critics: WW Norton: 1991

- Edmund S. Morgan: Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America: WW Norton: 1988

- Michael Sandel (ed.): Liberalism and its Critics: NYU Press: 1984

-David Stockton: The Classical Athenian Democracy: Oxford:  1989

Positive and Negative Conceptions of Freedom

Isaiah Berlin famously distinguishes 2 conceptions of freedom that he thinks have been the main variants found in socio-political theories-- viz., negative and positive liberty respectively.  Here I will, following some of Berlin's critics (1), try to show that this distinction is a) not exhaustive and b) his conclusion in favor of negative liberty is not satisfying for those who would see freedom as including powers, capacities and capabilities to achieve personally valued ends in view.

Negative Liberty is simply the absence of coercion and/or external restraint applied to an individual human being. If I am hand-cuffed and detained at the county jail I am unfree. Once my cuffs are unlocked and I am released I have negative freedom; I'm left alone to do as I will. This is the kind of freedom Berlin, like most liberals in the traditional sense, is interested in as the basis for an "Open Society." Traditional liberals consider negative freedom as usually resulting from being uncoerced by the state. Thus, for example, the Bill of Rights and Amendments specify that the state cannot force me to worship in this or that denomination, that I am left alone (within some parameters) to speak unimpeded by the state, and that I shall not be reduced to chattel slavery ( the Civil War Amendments). The idea is that, for example, the more I am left alone to pursue what I want without being coerced, the more I have the right kind of freedom for a liberal society. Berlin has thinkers like JS Mill in mind here, and all of this accords with Liberalism as it evolved in the 19th and 20th centuries with an expanding realm of rights.

Positive Freedom, on the other hand, combines 2 different conceptions of freedom which Berlin claims collapse into one another in a way that threatens liberal and open societies. The first of these is self-legislating action where I am able to give myself a rule to follow, a maxim to follow so as to direct my own life. Note that negative liberty does not entail such autonomy. I can be tied to a chair for a month and then released without knowing what to do once I have my "liberty." A prisoner can be released after years of incarceration and yet have no positive conception of how to act upon being released. In other words, negative liberty is not synonymous with the notion of *autonomy*-- something about which Berlin is fully aware. So why not endorse a positive conception of freedom which includes the autonomy of the agent? This seems reasonable enough.

Berlin claims, however, that the problem with this positive conception of self-governing individuals tends to collapse into a third type of freedom which he calls the freedom to "realize your true self" or "authentic nature" or "true interests." This more value-laden conception of freedom as self-realization is, says Berlin, one which tends to merge with a form of collectivism that anticipates Totalitarianism-- and thus must be avoided at all costs no matter how seductive it may look at first. What does he have in mind?

His own examples include that of Rousseau for whom freedom means conformity to the Universal or General Will of the self-governing people. Being free is knowing what will allow for the self-realization of the well being of each and every member of the demos-- the people. If someone, even one person, does not conform his or her will to the Universal or General will, Rousseau famously says in the Social Contract, "He must be forced to be free." The freedom of each, in theories that feature positive freedom prominently, tend to depend on "the freedom of all." Another example can be found in Kant's theory of freedom as autonomy. Being free is not doing what I WANT or WISH to do, but conforming my will to a universalizable maxim-- The Categorical Imperative-- which is, in principle, morally binding on each and every rational being. This is not "do your own thing" but "obey the law that makes you free." In Kant, the law is embodied in each individual qua locus of the autonomous application of reason to action. In the end, all these freely made decisions turn out to be 'duties.' Hence the label "Deontology" for Kant's theoretical framework (*deon* means duty or obligation).

Berlin is concerned that the content of positive freedom can thus be supplied by third parties who tell us what we ought to do in order to be free, authentic, to realize our true nature, to be maximally rational, etc.
The axiological or value-laden dimension can, thinks Berlin, easily lead to a loss of individual liberty in the name of some "higher good" or set of "true interests"-- sometimes interests  that the agents themselves do not see or understand; thus they must be "forced'" to do what's "really" good for themselves and other members of society.

In this regard,  Hegel is another example Berlin gives. True freedom evolves rationally only in the context of socio-political and historical developments which have much more importance than the "arbitrary will" of individuals (Wilkur) which may reflect the desires of individuals, but may deviate from their own true interests and purposes. For Hegel,  it is within the confines of a strong central state that we may come to realize or appropriate our freedom in modern Weswtern civilization ; NOT within civil society (for Hegel this realm means mostly the economic or market-situated realm in modern terms and not what we mean today by civil society as all informal institutions that fall somewhere between individuals and the state).

Note that Berlin is looking at the perils of positive freedom through the prism of modern Totalitarianism. He views Bolshevism, for example, as a perfectly logical outgrowth of positive freedom as discussed above. Now it is not the General Will or abstract rationality ala Kant, or the State which provides us with the knowledge of what is "really" in our best interests to flourish authentically, but rather it is a small and coercive elite or vanguard of "professional revolutionaries." Marx dreamed of workers becoming aware of their own interests; Bolsheviks said they required direction from those who know better than they, blinkered as they are by "false consciousness."

The Third Reich, though different ideologically, also claimed that the realization of the authentic self of the Aryan European required obedience  to a coercive entity and dictator who can better discern the  interests of individuals than the individuals themselves. Berlin, thus generalizes from these and other examples, concluding that despite seductive aspects of freedom as self-realization, it too often collapses into coercive statism, groupthink, and tyranny that snuffs out the negative liberty (being left alone by the state chiefly) so fundamental to the liberal project.

So we've seen Berlin's main argument: the most valuable and reliable form of freedom is negative freedom, and that positive freedom tends to collapse into ideas about self-realization that in turn collapse into authoritarian mechanisms. One can argue with all of this, of course, but I want to draw attention to another form of freedom which I think most people have in mind when using the term and which is submerged or lost in the discussion here. Let's call it freedom as empowerment/capability.


On this common sense view, being released from handcuffs does not leave me "free" if what is meant here is my being  capable of achieving some specific end/s that have importance to me. Let's say I'm released, but  lack money to eat or secure lodging. Am I "free" in the sense of having powers and capacities to get the things I want? The whole appeal of negative liberty is that when left alone by the state I have the means to live my life as I wish. If I want to become an astronaut, I'm free to pursue that goal as part of the pursuit of happiness. But absent stable living conditions, resources, access to education, the right connections etc., it's a pipe-dream. Still, formally speaking, I am free to try. Nobody can stop me from having my dream and pursuing it. I may be reminded, in liberal ideology, that "where there's a will there's the way" and read lots of Horatio Alger stories (from rags to riches) though structural realities make these very improbable on average. The ideology of can-do individualism tends to eclipse the necessity of powers and capacities that one must have to truly pursue one's personal goals with a good chance of achieving them.  The emancipation of serfs in Russia and slaves in the US did not empower these  long-oppressed groups so that they could realistically fulfill their needs and wants at the most basic levels (i.e. their life-chances, as sociologists say).

Berlin says that whether or not one *gets* what one wants/desires in a state of negative liberty is a contingency --  i.e. not part of the formal analysis of freedom. Just because I'm free to pursue X doesn't mean I have a good chance of getting X. These are not to be confused in his framework.

I think this makes his theory of liberty too weak to capture what many (if not most of us)  mean when thinking about freedom in everyday life. In  real circumstances, the reason people want liberty is because they want to actually achieve their goals in a meaningful way. The mere absence of constraint (everyone is free to go to Harvard in principle) is meaningless absent the capacities and powers to do so (e.g. good public education, relevant skills, a roof over one's head, money or subsidies,  etc.). If freedom (as is the case with, for example, Marx, Dewey and others) involves increasing the ability to get what one wants or needs, then negative liberty alone would seem inadequate. One can arbitrarily  define freedom as "negative liberty" but it turns out to be only one among several other ways, and not very consistent with what most people implicitly tend to include-- the ability to fulfill given needs and desires that have quite specific content.

In the end then, it's not that Berlin is "right" or "wrong" but that his conception of freedom is too thin to suit those of us who believe that the abstract possibility of getting X (make X food, education, a specific career etc.) is hollow if divorced from the MEANS to getting these. The means are personal powers and capacities often dependent on mediating social structures (family, education, the economy, etc.) which are instrumental in assuring access to life chances.

If one sees things that way, then the State has much more reason to intervene  than the limited government mantra of liberals and now neoliberals.  Government should be viewed with caution by citizens. But so should, say, corporate interests and many other non-governmental social constellations. We might look to the government, as Social Democracy tends to do, as one important means for trying to insure that those who have been marginalized and disempowered can find meaningful assistance in the interests of the public good (i.e. where a healthy society is thought to require that most people have reasonable life-chances, opportunities to not just pursue but achieve ends that make for a meaningful and viable existence). The exact contours of social justice can be debated and contested, but at least the idea that in principle the government has some reason to help individuals acquire powers and abilities (e.g. cognitive and linguistic skills, labor skills, access to computers and knowledge of how to use them) is compatible with any notion of freedom that includes the an account of freedom as a means to exercising one's powers and abilities. We don't just want freedom in order to be left alone by a potentially overweening state, but to achieve specific ends by exercising abilities and powers that satisfy needs and wants associated with a reasonably good life.

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(Note: An earlier post on  Amartya Sen's Capabilities Approach to ethics has some relevance to this topic. Happily, he is also focused on applying his theory in policy through such institutions as the UNDP. For overview see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability_approach).

References: 

-Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays On Liberty: Oxford; 1969  (see esp. the chapter/essay, Two Concepts of Liberty)

Notes:

(1) One of the best recent critiques of Berlin's work on Freedom, in my view, can be found in Raymond Geuss's  essay, Freedom as an Ideal, in his book Outside Ethics,Princeton: 2005 (pp.67-78).  I would also argue that earlier work by Marx, TH Green, John Dewey et al. contains many of the insights found in Geuss' piece. Other criticisms of note written *after* Berlin's 1958 essay include those of MacCullum, GA Cohen and others. Some of these are discussed in this Stanford Ency. article on Negative and Positive Freedom here:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/

Is Reflective Reason A Virtue?

 Recently philosopher, Nick Byrd, asked whether reflective reason is a virtue. https://byrdnick.com/archives/13007/reflection-and-virtue#more-13007 Is the capacity to think in a rational and reflective manner--for example, when evaluating the cogency of an hypothesis or performing mathematical operations "in our heads"-- a moral virtue? It may or may not be. In order to ask that question though, there is another question regarding free will and determinism that must be first be addressed.

I. Must we have free will in order to possess virtues?

Many people (philosophers and otherwise)  hold that free will is an illusion, that our actions are largely if not wholly determined by causal chains.  It has been argued that in order to say that a person possesses a virtue, that person must have free will of the kind that is incompatible with hard determinism (the position that everything one does is a necessary result of prior causes and conditions governing behavior). The argument runs thus: 

Virtues must be under voluntary control in order that they can be praiseworthy or blameworthy. If a person is not responsible for cultivating virtue/s, then they deserve neither praise nor blame. That would be like praising one (as opposed to appreciating one) for the color of their eyes or hair.

On this view any and all virtues:

a) must be under voluntary control in order that

b) they can be praiseworthy or blameworthy.

Suppose reflective reasoning turns out to be deterministic rather than voluntary? Suppose, for example, it depends not on agency or free will but rather genetic and environmental determinants.

This issue is raised in Byrd's post. But it is equally problematic for the well established virtues (courage, moderation, etc.). These could also be distributed unevenly due to genetic and environmental determinants-- or at least strong influences. So the problem of whether reflective reasoning "can be a virtue" if it is not voluntary is a generic problem when considering any alleged virtuous traits and behaviors which may turn out to be deterministic.

Thus, if that is the main argument against calling reflective reasoning virtuous, then I think it is safe to say that reflective reasoning is as much a virtue as the more familiar virtues I mention above. In other words, the problem raised has less to do with the moral status of reflective reasoning as such than the question of whether or not non-voluntary behavior can ever be virtuous at all. If we say, 

"No," then by definition reflective reasoning is not virtuous no matter how much it may benefit ourselves and others.

II. Tentative Reason for believing Reflective Reason is a Virtue:

Let's suppose that, as I suspect, reflective reasoning can be refined even if we are born with unequal capacities. The virtue, then, would lie in learning how to think more clearly about problems in order to make better decisions, and thus act with greater prudence. Prudential wisdom is certainly a virtue, and as Aristotle discusses, it depends on the ability to think rationally and carefully about matters at hand. One should certainly be praised for long and patient efforts to think about problematic situations skillfully and rationally. I would argue that it is clear that rational thinking that is refined by learning skills such as critical thinking/informal logic is one vitally important factor in making good judgments that benefit ourselves and others.

Still, there remains the argument that reflective reason is neutral morally. What is or is not virtuous, on this view, is the use to which it is put, i.e. the context in which Reflective Reason (RR) occurs. It can be used to accomplish things that may be good or bad; to feed the hungry or kill the innocent, for example. A cunning dictator may use reflective reasoning as much as a peace activist.

So why is it sensible to call reflective reasoning a virtue?

I think it is sensible because most putative virtues (generosity, friendliness, courage, et al.) also do not insure good ethical judgment without the support of other virtues. Courage alone doesn't insure good judgment in general. Brave behavior can be found in terrorists as well as heroic firefighters. Intelligence, concern for the well-being of others, and other qualities, must be in place in order for the virtue of courage to result in good judgment and wise action. True courage requires the cooperation of other virtues in order to count as true courage (as opposed to reckless risk-taking, for example). In the same way, rational reflection is one among several basic virtues. Reflective reasoning without concern for the well-being of one's fellow human beings (compassion), without the ability to face our fears (courage), without the ability to avoid extremes (moderation) can lead to destructive and reckless acts. This line of thought leads to the old idea that the virtues are interdependent; that in some sense they form a unity. Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics all held to some variant of this idea (see https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00354.x  ) as do Buddhist ethics and Confucian ethics.

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Questions:

1) Must virtues be under voluntary control of an agent? Can one be virtuous even if the virtue is determined by causes outside the agent's control such as genetics? 

2) Is Reflective Reason a virtue or does it depend on the use to which it is put in our decisions and actions?

3) Do you think virtues such as courage, moderation, kindness, and others, are separate from each other or must they work together in some kind of harmony or unity in order to result in a life of virtue?

(These questions are suggestions only.)

Integrating Buddhist Practices and Modern Psychotherapy

Recent decades have witnessed a remarkable trend in psychology, practical philosophy and the self-help sector. Buddhist  practices emphasizing "radical acceptance" (such as mindfulness based on Vipassana and Zen traditions) have become prominent aspects of both the academic and popular spheres of discourse in clinical psychology.  Additionally, Greco-Roman Stoicism (which also emphasizes calm detachment from desires) has also influenced psychologists and self-help authors in recent decades. In terms of the practical or applied aspect of this trend, there are many relatively new therapeutic modalities that emphasize the acceptance of environmental conditions and internal mental states in a non-judgmental manner. For example, Dialectical Behavioral Therapy, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy and several others all tout the virtue of achieving a state of detachment from one's own desires, thoughts, sensations and emotions while cultivating awareness of the phenomena from moment to moment. This depends on the ability to calmly experience both pleasant,unpleasant and neutral states in the ongoing present without attempting to alter them or avoid them. This is achieved in some cases through formal meditation combined with psychotherapy, and in other cases informally  (i.e. without  meditation practices).  Hospitals, clinics, training centers for therapists and text-books have increasingly taught and implemented therapeutic modalities of this kind for everything from  PTSD, depression and anxiety, to chronic pain, addictions, stress reduction and anger management. But the underlying psychology comes both from ancient Stoicism and some forms of Buddhism, both reinterpreted for a late-modern and more or less secular therapeutic consumer culture. What is "radical acceptance" such that it can be seen in both, for example Zen Buddhism and new approaches to Behavioral Therapy? How does it fit into a culture based largely on the ideas of progressivism and meliorism (the idea that by controlling, influencing or changing the world we find increased well-being both socially and psychologically)? How do Buddhist philosophies that aim to help us evaluate and reduce our cravings and desires find a place in modern Western culture which is so inextricably bound up with consumerism (which is based largely on appealing to our fleeting and impulsive desires?)

Radical Acceptance, on one psychologist's definition, means "completely and totally accepting something from the depths of your soul, with your heart and your mind. You stop fighting reality." (Karyn Hall: 3 Blocks to Radical Acceptance, Psychology Today,12/5/13) Typical examples, some of which Hall discusses,  include accepting the reality of bumper-to-bumper traffic when you are already late to an important meeting; accepting the reality that your spouse has cheated on you; accepting that life isn't fair and you may suffer injustices such as being passed over for a job that is given to someone unqualified instead of you. The idea is that the more you "fight" these realities, the more you end up nursing grudges and resentments that lead to anger, anxiety and depression. Why? Because (and this is the Stoical/Buddhistic premise) these realities are simply out of our hands. We cannot control or even significantly influence such external events in the world. Our best bet is to be at peace with them even though we may not like or approve of the behaviors and actions that bring them about. So accepting is not the same as liking or approving of unpleasant realities. Rather, it amounts to achieving an attitude of calm understanding that although often we can't control the events themselves, we can strive to modify our responses to the events so that at least they do not cause us undue suffering.

Buddhists and Stoics have long held that we have extremely limited control over external conditions, but that we can come to skillfully exercise influence over our interior world of emotions, thoughts, desires, and expectations. Indeed, it is true that in Ancient Rome or India external hindrances to well-being were very largely beyond the control of human agency. But in the wake of the scientific, industrial and political "revolutions" of the past few centuries, the balance of human influence over the environment and other people has changed considerably.

In ancient India and Rome even the most high-born ranks of society were at the mercy of the elements in ways we are not, and those who were not aristocrats were socially impotent in the face of injustice. Today the combination of technological innovations and political rights and freedoms for many people has made it possible to change external realities that had previously been called unchangeable. We live in the midst of constant attempts to reconfigure norms and  behaviors we don't "accept" because they are seen as being unfair. Suffragettes; civil rights activists; same-sex marriage; advocacy for altering carbon emissions in recognition of the profound influence we do have over external conditions (and with this influence a corollary responsibility to ourselves and future generations); the fight to extend available medical interventions to all citizens precisely because they do influence the course of illnesses and induce health-- all these and other examples make plain that Western history veered away from stoical acceptance which Hegel described as a form of "Unhappy Consciousness." In a concealed reference to Marcus Aurelius, the Roman emperor and philosopher, and to Epictetus, a Roman slave who became a philosopher, Hegel, in Phenomenology of Spirit, writes "whether on the throne or in chains . . . [the Stoic's] aim is to be free, and to maintain that lifeless indifference which steadfastly withdraws from the bustle of existence" (§199, 121). The historical context for such a withdrawal from external relations is, he continues,  "a time of universal fear and servitude..." (ibid). That is, stoicism emerged in the context of a society in which there was widespread fear of contradicting or deviating from the governing norms and institutions (the Roman Empire).  Modernity in the West, though, embraces a philosophy of ameliorating social and environmental ills through interactive, rational interventions in science, technology, applied ethics (e.g. the Human Rights Movement) and political reform and/or revolution (both the American and French  serving as archetypes for the modern age).  So when Dr. Hall (quoted above) and others say that it is utterly "futile" to suffer frustration in traffic, or to  be angry about  having been treated unfairly, we need to examine this claim more carefully.

First, as Hall and others readily acknowledge, in keeping with Stoical and Buddhistic philosophies, most of the time we cannot directly control the reality of feeling anger, frustration, disappointment and so on. To exercise stoical self-control we must  incorporate psychological principles and cultivate practices that allow us to feel that anger or disappointment without acting on it. We learn to sit with it patiently, enduring the displeasure without judging it to be "bad" or "good" or anything else. Acceptance depends on detachment from ones' feelings and passions just as with the ancient philosophies. However, this detached acceptance of emotional and mental states, if and when it is embodied "radically," may be at odds with deep convictions Westerners often have about the function of emotions in everyday life.

Let's say that after a few years of practicing deep acceptance,  one is no longer so readily disturbed by the misfortunes of bumper-to-bumper traffic,  being cheated on, or being passed over for a job that someone less qualified ends up getting. Of course, acceptance does not mean the person now likes or approves of these conditions-- but since the troubling situations can't be changed, they are not resisted (one "stops fighting reality" as Hall says in above quote). But there is a big difference between saying that I can't change the traffic I'm already in today and I can't attempt to solve the frustrating problem of highway congestion in general so that others and I will not have to keep "accepting" the problem. This is where meliorism (progressively improving external and internal conditions in terms of our shared values and goals) can come into conflict with radical acceptance. According to meliorists like the American Pragmatists or civil rights pioneer WEB Du Bois, we must first  believe in our ability to change all kinds of daunting external and internal situations in order to influence them. That is, the "can-do" philosophers of progress  challenge us to imagine bold solutions that may seem unrealistic based on current conditions and standards. Crucially, such a "will to believe" depends on treating unpleasant emotional states not in a detached but passionate manner.

For example, in Rome, Epictetus (the Stoic) was a slave who claimed that he was free internally because he accepted his condition. I suppose modern slaves (both those in US history and those now subject to human trafficking) could adopt some such acceptance of the "unchangeability" of these massive social institutions and networks. After all, any one individual living under such draconian conditions might have only a slim chance of ever achieving liberty. But if this virtual inevitability fails to stir up anger, resentment, anxiety, depression, fear and all the other disturbing states that trauma usually leaves in its wake, then the motivation to protest and agitate for change may not come about. It seems that activism is itself a byproduct not of detachment from but passionate engagement with our unpleasant emotions and their external causes.  The meliorist does not "accept non-judgmentally" but rather passionately condemns and resists situations taken to be caused by external  forces even if those forces are unlikely to simply disappear. What is all-important is the belief that, in principle, the offensive conditions and resulting "negative emotions" can be changed by human intervention. It is this possibility which provides hope and motivates action.While therapies and philosophies based largely on radical acceptance tend to focus on the internal conditions of the subject, in many real-life scenarios the problem/s may well be external and objective.  In such instances,  "negative" emotions (e.g. anger, fear, sadness et al.) can be interpreted as perfectly natural signs indicating just what is problematic "out there" in the external world.  The emotions may well function both as information about and motivation to fight unwanted conditions in our lives.  If we seek to attenuate such emotions, loosening their grip on us, we may lose an important spur to action as in the case of anger leading to  activism or sorrow serving as an inspiration to compose a poem or music, or even as a source of psychological insight. Mindfulness and acceptance of emotions is a valuable skill, but it is not always the best or most appropriate way of understanding and  dealing with difficult emotions.

Indeed we live in a geological age some earth scientists call the "anthropocene" because it is held that we have influenced the earth dramatically in ways dangerous to ourselves and myriad species in the biosphere. If there is an answer to global climate change, it is clear that we will have to first truly feel rightly pissed off about the apathy of politicians and corporate elites that would leave the earth in a dangerous state to their own children. This is part of the message the activist Greta Thunberg imparts wherever she goes.Without righteous anger, without passionate condemnation, there will be no course-correction. What do the advocates of radical acceptance say about this line of thought?

Here, the best response can be summarized by quoting from Reinhold Niehbuhr's "Serenity Prayer." Putting aside the belief in God, it expresses a principle such that one seeks too acquire:

"The serenity to *accept* the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference."


This seems to be a reasonable way to combine stoical acceptance with proactive meliorism so as to have the best of both worlds. Something along these lines is just what is often endorsed by advocates of acceptance-based therapies and recovery programs. They often speak of "balancing acceptance and change."  It is held that in order to change things we must first accept them. But the problem is that it begs our original question which is "Just what things can we change, and which things can't we change?" Saying that I will try to accept those things I can't change makes sense only if I really can't change them. What is needed is "the wisdom to know the difference" between what can't  be changed and can, and such determinations are almost always controversial. One person may hold that socio-political conditions can't be changed and fall into apathy while the activist refuses to give up. So we're back to square one trying to evaluate what turns out to be an attitudinal bias either in favor of the will to believe that we CAN influence many events against all odds or believing that we cannot. In other words, much of the evaluation of what can and can't be changed is not deducible on logical grounds alone but involves basic temperament, viz. optimism and pessimism. One person's "realistic optimism" may seem overly cautious and pessimistic to a another person more predisposed to fiery activism. The standards of what can and can't be changed  are often based not on knowledge and evidence,  on any unequivocal but rather such elements as confidence, tenacity, inventiveness and hope. It may have once seemed "unrealistically optimistic" to suppose humans can fly or that governments can be changed so that they address such things as the rights of not-very-powerful minorities. Indeed, there are hard limits to what can be achieved in such areas.  But who among us can claim to know exactly where these limits lie, or what can and cannot be altered in advance? So, if someone experiences intense righteous anger in the present moment because they are addressed with a racial epithet, as has been the case many times before, they might say to themselves: "This already happened. I can't change it. I can't change the past. I am hurting now and must accept the situation. Only if I fully accept it can I later think about changing it." But it may be that equally valid is thinking about the  external cause (systemic racism) while feeling rightly angry and indignant so that there is sufficient motivation to join others in fighting the problem that led to this painful experience and myriad others just like it. Those who cultivate a serene acceptance may suffer less emotional distress as a result in the long run ( a therapeutic advantage); but they may also have diminished motivation to passionately resist the status quo.

Certainly monastic Buddhism and Roman Stoicism have often failed to challenge the status quo. Traditional Buddhist monks leave the everyday world, forego family life, and carry a begging bowl for all necessary funds. The monastic centers have usually depended on the patronage of those with wealth and power. Roman Stoics seldom discussed social and political reform, if at all. From the Emperor Marcus Aurelius to the slave Epictetus, one's lot in life is to be accepted. I mention these facts because these ancient philosophies are the basis of much of the modern work on acceptance. The principle expressed in the Serenity Prayer does not provide details regarding what we can and cannot change. But Buddhist dharma and the teachings of Greco-Roman Stoics that have inspired the new therapies do provide clear guidance on that point. Here, for example,  is Epictetus' principle of differentiating that which we can and cannot change:


“Some things are in our control, while others are not. We control our opinions, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything of our own doing. We don’t control […] everything not of our own doing.”  (Enchiridion/Handbook of Epictetus)

Or Gautama from the Dhammapada:

"Let a man put away anger, let him renounce pride. Let him get beyond all worldly attachments; no sufferings befall him him who is not attached to name-and-form [nama-rupa or phenomenal existence] and who calls nothing his own.

He who curbs his rising anger like a chariot gone astray (over the plain), him I call a real charioteeer; others but hold the reins (and do not deserve to be called charioteers)." (Sections 221-222 Dhammapada) 



Compared to moderns, these ancient quotes reveal great confidence in the earnest disciple's  ability to control internal processes including what we think, feel, desire, avoid and choose. Modern western culture operates on very different assumptions. We are socialized to believe that strong desires (tanha  or craving in Buddhist terms) and emotions, for example, arise involuntarily, and that at best we can try to tweak those thoughts, beliefs and desires which make us suffer but cannot completely overcome them. An obvious case in point is the nearly universally held belief in "romantic love." We moderns can't help "falling in love." We enjoy and suffer from the passions and longings that "move" us emotionally in life. Romance is just one example of an obvious and intense kind. Who today believes that our "opinions" (as Epictetus says)  about foods, music, movies, friends, acquaintances, jobs, social statuses and roles (to name a few) are really within our "control" as individual agents? Ancient Stoicism and Buddhism both  teach that with proper training, we can control much of this. The quote from the Dhammapada above asks all disciples to "get beyond all attachments," which certainly includes romantic longings along with strong desires for material wealth, status, sex, pleasant foods we come to crave,  et. al.  I don't think this is compatible with the much more deterministic ideas we have such that we have innate (perhaps genetic or otherwise "hard wired") preferences, dispositions, temperaments and traits of character.

On the other hand Epictetus and Gautama are adamant about our helplessness regarding  that which we, according to them, cannot control. Again, quoting Epictetus and the Buddha:

"We do not control those things not of our own doing" (Epictetus: ibid)those things not of our own doing"

"Not the unworthy actions of others, not their misdeeds of commission and omission, but one's own misdeeds of commission and omission should one regard."(Dhammapada: S. 50)

 Both quotes express the conviction that what we can and should change are our own thoughts, desires and actions, not those of others.  But in our outer-directed culture, it is the desire to change others, to convince them to think and do as we would have them think and do, that is prized above the rigorous training of our own minds.  This, by the way, is not necessarily a bad thing in every case. For it includes the value placed on individuals having a meaningful role in trying to change or shape socio-political  events and forces as well as interpersonal behavior directed at each of us by others.
Within our modern culture--steeped in individuality, utilitarianism, and the "can do" philosophy of meliorism-- most of us surely think we can influence, and at times control external doings and happenings. To this end we try to learn "how to influence others" to "get our way" -- which interestingly is a part of Dialectical Behavior Therapy skills training, viz. "Interpersonal Effectiveness." The dialectical relation between acceptance and change in DBT puts the scale far closer to modern conceptions of agency than do the Stoics and Buddhists that influenced Marsha Linehan, the founder of DBT. I can't go into depth here, but in the tradition (Zen) she studied, it is held that there is no "self" to even change. These are deep philosophical issues, and I only point at them in passing to indicate how ambiguous the notion of "balancing acceptance and change" really is once we try to apply the distinction situationally in everyday life.  Judgments regarding what we can and can't control have a lot to do with socio-cultural, technological  and historical context, which-- unfortunately-- most psychotherapy fails to address (with exceptions such as Erich Fromm and Karen Horney).

I think that we moderns tend to believe that "willpower"and instrumental action are effective until we find ourselves unable to "get out of a rut"-- whether in a difficult relationship, addictions, unemployment, suffering abuse, feeling lingering anxiety or depression etc. In the parlance of 12 step psychology, we tend to assume we're in charge of things until we "bottom out," whether as a result of alcohol, drugs or counterproductive attachments ("addiction") to food, sex, gambling or whatever else it may be.  If instrumental approaches to changing these internal and external states of affairs fail, some of us may lose confidence in our own efficacy and become receptive to acceptance-based approaches to living like the 12 step program, or the new therapies influenced by Buddhism and Stoicism. There are certainly limits to what we can change, but again it's not clear how these limits vary not only from person to person but cultural context to cultural context. The philosophy of meliorism asks us to stand strong despite defeat, and to affirm a kind of heroic conception of life as the overcoming of obstacles. This is a big part of our culture ("you can do anything you put your mind to"  or "you can make it if you try") which countervails acceptance-based life orientations and therapeutic"strategies.


For example, WEB Du Bois, influenced by William James and other meliorists, claimed that only if we first believe in our capacity to redeem the world can it come to pass. Sometimes there is no epistemological basis for accepting or rejecting a belief (especially beliefs about future states of affairs). When we are acting in a context of unknowns, beliefs may best be justified in terms of likely benefits.  Du Bois says that the loss of believing in prospects of human progress is a kind of "death." We don't all agree on exactly what progress consists in, and can leave that for a separate discussion on ethics. But many will agree with Du Bois that 2 impediments to social and personal progress or improvement are racism and social inequality. If one believes these can't be diminished through some kind of human agency or engagement, this "death" of belief in changing external conditions for the better against all odds-- this death of hope-- condemns us not to a healthy acceptance but to an  ill-advised resignation to powerful forces before which we then buckle.  Martin Luther King cited Du Bois' writings as a key influence. It is reflected in the optimism (without evidence in advance) in such speeches as King's "Mountaintop Speech" where he says:

"Like anybody, I would like to live – a long life; longevity has its place. But I'm not concerned about that now. I just want to do God's will. And He's allowed me to go up to the mountain. And I've looked over. And I've seen the Promised Land. I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people, will get to the Promised Land."

Of course we don't know for sure what will happen or if there is any kind of "Promised Land" awaiting the activists being addressed.   But such heartfelt expressions of faith and hope against all odds can (when outcomes are truly unknown) influence attitudes which in turn influence actions which may then affect the outcome in question. So in order to evaluate just which things we should accept as  out of our hands and which we should cultivate the will and courage to change is a much more personal and culturally shaped matter than many advocates of  acceptance-based therapies might imagine.

Personally, I practice mindfulness (though I'm not religious and don't follow any one particular therapeutic ideology) to great benefit. But in my own experience, there is a constructive balance between passionate interest and engagement in our emotional responses on the one hand, and the ability to withstand pain, loss, injury and anger with equanimity on the other. There is something liberating about being able to simply observe or experience the feelings and associated thoughts that come and go in conscious experience without being bent out of shape by them. It's a fine balancing act, and, needless to say, I don't always get it right, and so suffer plenty like most of us. Still, the emphasis on acceptance in recent decades, I think, needs to be better integrated into our cultural and historical legacy which is based so largely on learning ever more about how to modify and improve external as well as internal conditions that  bring suffering about. A healthy synthesis of ancient and modern wisdom has not yet come into being.

What are your thoughts? 

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Related Readings/Resources:

-The "How To Be A Stoic" website is run by philosopher, biologist and modern lifestyle Stoic, Masimo Pigliucci of City Univ. of New York. It includes essays, videos, and links that discuss both ancient stoicism and stoicism for 21st century living. There are also essays that discuss the current joining of Stoicism and Buddhism in a secular context, as discussed above.
 https://howtobeastoic.wordpress.com

--Want to be happy? Then live like a Stoic for a week (published in The Conversation 9/18) Philosopher,  John Sellars, calls attention to the extremely limited conception of the ability of persons to influence or meaningfully shape external conditions in Stoicism.  https://theconversation.com/want-to-be-happy-then-live-like-a-stoic-for-a-week-103117
 

 -- Mindfulness as a Key Construct in Modern Psychotherapy: by  Patricia Bach, Stephen Hayes & Michael Levin. Abstract and article download available here: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-2263-5_11

-- Integrating Mindfulness Meditation with Cognitive and Behavioral Therapies: The Challenge of Combining Acceptance-based and Change-Based Strategies: Canadian Journal of Psychiatry: Vol. 50, No. 13: 2005: Mark A Lau,  PhD, Shelly F Mcmain Phd  (Pdf here: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/070674370505001310

-- The Mindfulness Conspiracy, by Ronald Purser, appeared in the Guardian last year. Professor Purser is also the author of McMindfulness: How Mindfulness Became The New Capitalist Spirituality (Repeater Books; 2019) .  Purser argues in both the book and article that "The fundamental message of the mindfulness movement is that the underlying cause of dissatisfaction and distress is in our own heads," i.e. the ways in which we relate to our own thoughts and feelings rather than social and political forces. "By failing to address collective suffering, and systemic change that might remove it,[teachers of radical acceptance and mindfulness] rob [it] of its real revolutionary potential, reducing it to something banal that keeps people focused on themselves." (from Guardian Article here: https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/jun/14/the-mindfulness-conspiracy-capitalist-spirituality  ) He is greatly concerned that approaches emphasizing radical acceptance turn subjects inward where they focus on their reactions and responses to events rather than cultivating critical engagement with the events as problems in themselves, thus blunting the drive toward activism in a society that is already far too complacent in the face of major social and interpersonal ills.

--From Conceptualization to Operationalization of Mindfulness: in Handbook of Mindfulness-- Theory, Research and Practice: Guilford Press: 2015 (p. 151-170): J.T. Quaglia, K.W. Brown, et. al.  These researchers emphasize the need for reliable methods to study phenomenological states constitutive of mindfulness. Though I have not addressed methodological issues and problems here, the authors reasonably conclude that "[m]uch work is needed to better understand the nature and expression of mindfulness, as suggested in our review." (p.161) Draft of chapter avail as pdf here: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/234b/a4cf66586b4a8f0f4c6bb70b538711ff7f3c.pdf  Excellent work on the problem of operationalizing and empirically studying therapeutic benefits of mindfulness and acceptance in Buddhist-influenced therapies and practices can be found in the work of John D. Dunne and Evan Thompson.

-- Buddhist Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Cognitive Science: Assessing the Dialogue: Evan Thompson avail. at Thompson's website along with other articles relevant to the topic:  https://evanthompson.me/articles/

-- Buddhist Meditation & Neuroscience: Excellent, critical and concise essay by Bernard Faure :
http://files.meetup.com/1502376/FaureB2012.pdf

-- The Problem of Mindfulness by philosopher, Sahanika Ratnayake,  argues that Mindfulness/Radical Acceptance contain problematic metaphysical assumptions about "Reality" and "Self" which can undercut the hard contemplative and analytic work of seeking self-knowledge. Whether or not she is convincing, it is worth considering her critique published on Aeon here: https://aeon.co/essays/mindfulness-is-loaded-with-troubling-metaphysical-assumptions

--Mechanisms of Change in Dialectical Behavior Therapy: Theoretical and Empirical Observations: Journal Of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 62(4), 459-480 (2006) : Thomas R. Lynch, Alexander L. Chapman et. al. https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.472.9570&rep=rep1&type=pdf

--Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit  (see Ch. 4; esp.  section 199 on Stoicism) trans. A.V. Miller,

US Treatment of N@zi War Criminals After WW2: A Tale of 2 Policies

Policy#1: US Hunts Down and Prosecutes Nazis and Nazi Collaborators 

Recently I opened the Washington Post and saw an interesting article on the US Office of Special Investigations' (OSI) hunt for Nazi war criminals during the 1980s, 90s and early 21st century. Author and journalist, Debbie Cenziper's article is based on her 2019 book, Citizen 865 : The Hunt for Hitler's Hidden Soldiers in America.  The WaPo article is called "The Nazis and The Trawniki Men: How a team of prosecutors and historians uncovered the details behind an SS training camp in occupied Poland — and exposed Nazi collaborators hiding in plain sight in America." https://www.washingtonpost.com/magazine/2020/01/23/how-department-justice-team-exposed-nazis-hiding-america/?arc404=true   It is a good article, but like the book, Citizen 865, it leaves critical details about both the OSI and overall US policy toward Nazis in the US after WW2 out of the account. It also focuses emphatically on one collaborator,  Jakob Reimer (the titular "citizen 865") whose story is not typical of those POWs that were recruited by the Germans in Poland and Ukraine  because he was ethnically German, and thus was able to become a German citizen fighting in the German Army-- not a paramilitary group comprised of Slavs who were defined as inferiors to be conquered by the Nazis. By making a German citizen and sergeant emblematic of the Trawniki men in her article, Debbie Cenziper blurs ethnic distinctions that were crucial within the Nazi ambit.

During the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, 3 million soldiers died in German POW camps (Cenziper). POWs were worked to death, starved, tortured and often executed by the Germans who were under strict orders from Hitler to treat them this way. The plan was to occupy the USSR as"living space" (Lebensraum) exploit all its resources, and turn the "lowly" Slavs into servants if not slaves to the "Master Race." Forced labor and enslavement were extremely common in German occupied lands, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Mistreatment, such as starvation and torture, was the main cause of death. During the early 1940s, forced laborers comprised  about 20% of the German workforce. However, as Cenziper notes in her article, those Ukrainians that were "perceived to hold strong anti-Soviet sentiments...[were thought to make] reliable recruits for managing land that the Germans planned to conquer."

There is a tortured and tangled set of questions and issues still hotly debated regarding just who was really sympathetic to the Nazis in Ukraine, Belarus etc. and who was trying to survive by convincing Germans that they were sympathizers. That anti-Semitism was widespread in the region is, unfortunately, well established. But even those who were anti-Semitic and did not think highly of Stalin and the Bolsheviks, were aware that the  German conquerors  hated "the Motherland" and the Slavs inhabiting it. Most Ukrainian nationalists resisting the Soviets had little sympathy for the Nazis planning to  reduce Ukraine to "Lebensraum" or living space for Germans to extract natural resources and rule over those they didn't kill or deport. While it is true that some anti-Semitic Ukrainian nationalists greeted the Germans enthusiastically, believing false promises about Ukrainian independence in return for collaboration, most did not. Indeed, More than 4.5 million Ukrainians joined the Red Army to fight Nazi Germany, and more than 250,000 served in Soviet partisan paramilitary units. This is a much larger number than than that of the willing collaborators. (see Potichnyi: 1997:  http://www.infoukes.com/upa/related/military.html  )


Citizen 865 (aka Jakob Reimer)--who features so prominently in Cenziper's article and book-- was a Ukrainian Soviet soldier who was captured by the Germans. But, as I mention above, his story is atypical.  Like many other Nazi recruits during the war against the USSR, Reimer came to the Germans as a POW. He was captured fighting against the Germans as a second lieutenant  in the Red Army when his platoon was captured by the Germans.  However, unlike most of those captured,  he was descended from German Mennonites and thus had "German blood" and language skills-- both distinguishing him from the Slavs of Ukraine, Poland and Belarus whom Germans saw as being only one notch above Jews in their racial hierarchy. Unlike the Slavs that were recruited by the Nazis, Reimer was granted German citizenship in 1944 when Hitler made all ethnic German military and police personnel eligible for German citizenship. Reimer, like other Trawniki men, served as a camp guard and took part in the liquidation of Jewish ghettos in Poland. Unlike most, though, the Germans awarded him with a medal, granted him citizenship and promoted him to the rank of Guard First Sergeant in 1945.  In 1952 he applied for US citizenship, and was naturalized in 1959. He lived in the NY metropolitan area as a salesman escaping notice until the OSI investigations of the 1980s.  In 1992 the OSI prosecutors filed a denaturalization suit which led to his being stripped of US citizenship and slated for deportation.  He challenged the decision, but it was upheld by the US Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) in 2004. He died in 2005 before leaving the US. So, in a nutshell, that is the case of "citizen 865."
 

The OSI was established to investigate and bring justice to bear on those who committed crimes against humanity and international law.  Founded in the 1960s, the main emphasis was finding and prosecuting Nazi war criminals living in the US. While it investigated and prosecuted several Nazi collaborators from Eastern Europe (with mixed success), it did little to deal with the much more troubling matter of the US government protecting high level Nazi war criminals who were welcomed to the US in order to work as scientists under a secret plan known as Operation Paperclip. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Paperclip

Policy #2: US Gives Nazi Scientists Citizenship and Prestigious Jobs to Fight Cold War

Annie Jacobsen's disturbing book on Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program that Brought Nazi Scientists to America: focuses on 21 of the 1,600 German scientists that were given not only citizenship but prestigious jobs in government programs and American universities. Of these 21 cases,  8 had worked directly with Hitler, Himmler or Göring; 15 were active Nazi Party members; 10 served in paramilitary squads like the SA and SS; and six were tried at Nuremberg. These men (and others like them not profiled in Jacobsen's book) had developed the rockets that brought death to civilians in London, Birmingham, Liverpool and Antwerp among others. They had developed some of the nastiest bio-weapons known to humanity,  and some conducted "medical experiments" on Jews in the death camps. (see NYTimes Review of the book: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/books/review/operation-paperclip-by-annie-jacobsen.html   )


Further, none of these German scientists was a Ukrainian or Polish POW taken from the allied Red Army, and then given the choice of collaborating or being worked to death, starved or perhaps simply shot or hanged as was common. I am certainly not defending the Hiwis (willing collaborators) including the Trawniki men. Their atrocities-- often committed in the concentration camps of Eastern Europe-- are a matter of record.  However, there is a double standard here in terms of US policies. The heinous crimes of some of the 1,600 Germans in Operation Paperclip were overlooked, despite protests from several within the Dept. of War at the time, and such luminaries as Eleanor Roosevelt, Einstein and several prominent Rabbis.  I could not even find an entry for  Operation Paperclip or the names of prominent US-protected Nazis like Wernher von Braun in the index of Cenziper's somewhat moralistic book subtitled "The Hunt for Hitler's Hidden Soldiers in America." I wondered, "Why didn't the OSI take any of this on?" What I  found is  that they did investigate one  US-protected rocket scientist and Operation Paperclip beneficiary, Arthur Rudolph, in 1984. He promptly agreed to leave the US if the OSI would refrain from prosecuting him, and both sides agreed. He was never brought to justice. What were the crimes of Arthur Rudolph?

He not only developed weapons that were used to bomb civilians in England, but he headed up operations at a terrible underground facility called Mittlewerk tasked with the production of V-2 missiles. The workers consisted of  slaves that ended up in concentration camps. Thousands of these imprisoned laborers died at Mittlewerk while building the missiles.  Rudolph lived as a respected German citizen after leaving the US. But even after doing so, West Germany protested the treatment of Rudolph along with several well-placed US scientists and a director of US National Archives on WW2. They argued that  Rudolph was under orders to use the slaves, and that it was not his job to choose or recruit them. "Rudolph never employed slave labor. He was an employee too," one of his defenders, German-American physicist, Friedwardt Winterberg,  stated (see  https://www.csmonitor.com/1985/0905/ateam2.html  ) In other words, he was just taking orders by trying to build the missiles as quickly as possible even if it killed (as it did) many of the workers! If working Nazi slaves to death in order to make WMD that killed untold numbers of civilians in Europe isn't being one of "Hitler's hidden soldiers in America," then I don't know what is.

Yet in her book, Citizen 865: The Hunt for Hitler's Hidden Soldiers in America, Debbie Cenziper, whose book ostensibly covers the OSI investigations and prosecutions,  devotes just one small and incidental paragraph to this troubling target of the OSI hunt for war criminals in America. This is important because it is the only OSI case that directly challenged the status of any of the Operation Paperclip recruits. It is the only time that any of them were formally accused of being war criminals who committed crimes against humanity. Yet Cenziper is all but silent on the one collision of OSI and Operation Paperclip that almost went to court. This is the entire paragraph; every thing in the book pertaining to the Arthur Rudolph OSI case:

"Rosenbaum [former Director of the U.S. DOJ Office of Special Investigations (OSI)] had launched and led the the development of OSI's case against NASA scientist Arthur L.H. Rudolph, who was accused of using slave laborers at a factory that produced rockets for the Nazi war machine. Rudolph, one of more than 100 rocket engineers who were secretly brought to the US after the war, had agreed in 1984 to give up his citizenship and move back to Germany." (Cenziper: p. 74)

The OSI, to be clear, did argue that Rudolph was responsible for working these slaves to death. Nevertheless, they made a deal  get him out of the country quietly, safely and without a trial. What does this say about the consistency of the US Cold War policy regarding Nazis? How can the seeming contradictions be explained?

The most frequently argued defense of Operation Paperclip is simply that the US had to scoop up these scientists or the Soviets would do so.  To maintain the US' military edge and national security interests during the Cold War the government had to place pragmatism over principles. But as Jacobsen points out, the Soviets had a very different way of getting the knowledge they wanted out of German scientists-- and it worked, as the stockpiles show. Their equivalent to Operation Paperclip was Operation Osoaviakhim. The approach was completely different from Paperclip. They would capture scientists they wanted literally at gunpoint, and then put them to work without giving them the prestige and celebrity of, say, Wernher von Braun. After the "Great Patriotic War"against the Germans there was no patience for the very people who tried to overrun their country in the name of racial superiority. If for no other reason, the moral issue was not lost on the Soviets who did not treat these scientists with kid gloves. Some were given official rank in the Red Army, but they worked under the strict and watchful eye of the state. The Soviets drained their brains for information, and often enough, let them leave once they had enough knowledge to continue building on the advances made with their skills. (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Osoaviakhim   )

As Annie Jacobsen points out, the Soviet approach indicates that there was no need to embrace or valorize the Nazis in order to gain the strategically important knowledge the US sought. There was no need to give these men makeovers, turning them into "respectable" scientists and academics. But there was an additional factor according to the author. Just as the Soviets hated the Germans after WW2, the Germans hated the USSR, and thus (it was thought by US officials) would make loyal Cold Warriors. If this rationale really did play a role in shaping the Operation Paperclip policies, it seems fair to ask whether or not such a seemingly Faustian bargain was really justified, even on pragmatic grounds. And if one argues that it is, then isn't it somewhat hypocritical to go after the Hiwis/collaborators, many of whom were originally Red Army soldiers captured while fighting against the Nazis? It's a question that goes to the heart of US claims to moral exceptionalism in a morally ambiguous world where things are rarely black and white.


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References/Related Reading: 

-Citizen 865: The Hunt for Hitler's Hidden Soldiers in America  by Debbie Cenziper: Hatchette Books, New York: 2019 https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0316449652/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=washpost-20&camp=1789&creative=9325&linkCode=as2&creativeASIN=0316449652&linkId=a06a9ae3bc19e3c29e3911e9c9be8879

-The Nazis and the Trawniki Men (article) by Debbie Cenziper: Washington Post, 1/23/20
https://www.washingtonpost.com/magazine/2020/01/23/how-department-justice-team-exposed-nazis-hiding-america/?arc404=true

-Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program that Brought Nazi Scientists to America: Annie Jacobsen: Little, Brown and Company, NY: 2014  https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00BAXFBI2/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1

-The Peter J. Potichnyi Archives on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine (see materials covering the years 1941-1945)--  University of Toronto Library Online:  http://www.infoukes.com/upa/related/pjpc.html

-Ukraine During WWII: History and its Aftermath - ed. Yury Boshyk: Univ. of Alberta, Edmonton 1986  http://diasporiana.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/books/14255/file.pdf 

Integrating Ancient Philosophy and Modern Therapy: Stoicism, Mindfulness and the New Acceptance-Based Therapies

Recent decades have witnessed a remarkable trend in psychology, practical philosophy and the self-help sector. Stoicism and other philosophies of what is sometimes called "radical acceptance" (such as mindfulness-based approaches derived from Buddhism) have become prominent aspects of both the academic and popular spheres of discourse. In terms of the practical or applied aspect of this trend, there are many relatively new therapeutic modalities that emphasize the acceptance of environmental conditions and internal mental states in a non-judgmental manner. For example, Dialectical Behavioral Therapy, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy and several others all tout the virtue of achieving a state of detachment from one's own desires, thoughts, sensations and emotions. This depends on the ability to calmly experience both pleasant and unpleasant states in the ongoing present without attempting to alter them or avoid them. This is achieved in some cases through formal meditation combined with psychotherapy, and in other cases informally  (i.e. without  meditation practices).  Hospitals, clinics, training centers for therapists and text-books have increasingly taught and implemented therapeutic modalities of this kind for everything from depression and anxiety, to chronic pain, addictions, stress reduction and anger management. But the underlying psychology comes both from ancient Stoicism and some forms of Buddhism, both reinterpreted for a late-modern and more or less secular therapeutic culture. What is "radical acceptance" such that it can be seen in both, for example Zen Buddhism and Greco-Roman Stoicism? How does it fit into a culture based largely on the ideas of progressivism and meliorism (the idea that by controlling, influencing or changing the world we find increased well-being both socially and psychologically)?

Radical Acceptance, on one psychologist's definition, means "completely and totally accepting something from the depths of your soul, with your heart and your mind. You stop fighting reality." (Karyn Hall: 3 Blocks to Radical Acceptance, Psychology Today,12/5/13) Typical examples, some of which Hall discusses,  include accepting the reality of bumper-to-bumper traffic when you are already late to an important meeting; accepting the reality that your spouse has cheated on you; accepting that life isn't fair and you may suffer injustices such as being passed over for a job that is given to someone unqualified instead of you. The idea is that the more you "fight" these realities, the more you will nurse grudges and resentments that lead to anger, anxiety and depression. Why? Because (and this is the Stoical/Buddhistic premise) these realities are simply out of our hands. We cannot control or even significantly influence such external events in the world. Our best bet is to be at peace with them even though we may not like or approve of the behaviors and actions that bring them about. So accepting is not the same as liking or approving of unpleasant realities. Rather, it amounts to achieving an attitude of calm understanding that although often we can't control the events themselves, we can strive to modify our responses to the events so that at least they do not cause us undue suffering.

Buddhists and Stoics have long held that we have extremely limited control over external conditions, but that we can come to exercise a very masterful influence over our interior world of emotions, thoughts, desires, and expectations. Indeed, it is true that in Ancient Rome or India external hindrances to well-being were very largely beyond the control of human agency. But in the wake of the scientific, industrial and political "revolutions" of the past few centuries, the balance of human influence over the environment and other people has changed considerably.

In ancient India and Rome even the most high-born ranks of society were at the mercy of the elements in ways we are not, and those who were not aristocrats were socially impotent in the face of injustice. Today the combination of technological innovations and political rights and freedoms for many people has made it possible to change external realities that had previously been called unchangeable. We live in the midst of constant attempts to reconfigure norms and  behaviors we don't "accept" because they are seen as being unfair. Suffragettes; civil rights activists; same-sex marriage; advocacy for altering carbon emissions in recognition of the profound influence we do have over external conditions (and with this influence a corollary responsibility to ourselves and future generations); the fight to extend available medical interventions to all citizens precisely because they do influence the course of illnesses and induce health-- all these and other examples make plain that Western history veered away from stoical acceptance which Hegel described as a form of "Unhappy Consciousness." In a concealed reference to Marcus Aurelius, the Roman emperor and philosopher, and to Epictetus, a Roman slave who became a philosopher, Hegel, in Phenomenology of Spirit, writes "whether on the throne or in chains . . . [the Stoic's] aim is to be free, and to maintain that lifeless indifference which steadfastly withdraws from the bustle of existence" (§199, 121). The historical context for such a withdrawal from external relations is, he continues,  "a time of universal fear and servitude..." (ibid). That is, stoicism emerged in the context of a society in which there was widespread fear of contradicting or deviating from the governing norms and institutions (the Roman Empire).  Modernity in the West, though, embraces a philosophy of ameliorating social and environmental ills through interactive, rational interventions in science, technology, applied ethics (e.g. the Human Rights Movement) and political reform and/or revolution (both the American and French  serving as archetypes for the modern age).  So when Dr. Hall (quoted above) and others say that it is utterly "futile" to suffer frustration in traffic, or to  be angry about  having been treated unfairly, we need to examine this claim more carefully.

First, as Hall and others readily acknowledge, in keeping with Stoical and Buddhistic philosophies, most of the time we cannot directly control the reality of feeling anger, frustration, disappointment and so on. To exercise stoical self-control we must  incorporate psychological principles and cultivate practices that allow us to feel that anger or disappointment without acting on it. We learn to sit with it patiently, enduring the displeasure without judging it to be "bad" or "good" or anything else. Acceptance depends on detachment from ones' feelings and passions just as with the ancient philosophies. However, this detached acceptance of emotional and mental states, if and when it is embodied "radically," may be at odds with deep convictions about the function of emotions in everyday life.

Let's say that after a few years of practicing deep acceptance,  one is no longer so readily disturbed by the misfortunes of bumper-to-bumper traffic,  being cheated on, or being passed over for a job that someone less qualified ends up getting. Of course, acceptance does not mean the person now likes or approves of these conditions-- but since the troubling situations can't be changed, they are not resisted (one "stops fighting reality" as Hall says in above quote). But there is a big difference between saying that I can't change the traffic I'm already in today and I can't attempt to solve the frustrating problem of highway congestion in general so that others and I will not have to keep "accepting" the problem. This is where meliorism (progressively improving external and internal conditions in terms of our shared values and goals) can come into conflict with radical acceptance. According to meliorists like the American Pragmatists or civil rights pioneer WEB Du Bois, we must first  believe in our ability to change all kinds of daunting external and internal situations in order to influence them. That is, the "can-do" philosophers of progress  challenge us to imagine bold solutions that may seem unrealistic based on current conditions and standards. Crucially, such a "will to believe" depends on treating unpleasant emotional states not in a detached but passionate manner.

For example, in Rome, Epictetus (the Stoic) was a slave who claimed that he was free internally because he accepted his condition. I suppose modern slaves (both those in US history and those now subject to human trafficking) could adopt some such acceptance of the "unchangeability" of these massive social institutions and networks. After all, any one individual living under such draconian conditions might have only a slim chance of ever achieving liberty. But if this virtual inevitability fails to stir up anger, resentment, anxiety, depression, fear and all the other disturbing states that trauma usually leaves in its wake, then the motivation to protest and agitate for change will not come about. It seems that activism is itself a byproduct not of detachment from but passionate engagement with our unpleasant emotions.  The meliorist does not "accept non-judgmentally" but rather passionately condemns and resists situations taken to be caused by external  forces even if those forces are unlikely to simply disappear. What is all-important is the belief that, in principle, the offensive conditions and resulting "negative emotions" can be changed by human intervention. It is this possibility which provides hope and motivates action.While therapies and philosophies based largely on radical acceptance tend to focus on the internal conditions of the subject, in many real-life scenarios the problem/s may well be external and objective.  In such instances,  "negative" emotions (e.g. anger, fear, sadness et al.) can be interpreted as perfectly natural signs indicating just what is problematic "out there" in the external world.  The emotions may well function both as information about and motivation to fight unwanted conditions in our lives.  If we seek to attenuate such emotions, loosening their grip on us, we may lose an important spur to action as in the case of anger leading to  activism or sorrow serving as an inspiration to compose a poem or music, or even as a source of psychological insight. Mindfulness and acceptance of emotions is a valuable skill, but it is not always the best or most appropriate way of understanding and  dealing with difficult emotions.

Indeed we live in a geological age some earth scientists call the "anthropocene" because it is held that we have influenced the earth dramatically in ways dangerous to ourselves and myriad species in the biosphere. If there is an answer to global climate change, it is clear that we will have to first truly feel rightly pissed off about the apathy of politicians and corporate elites that would leave the earth in a dangerous state to their own children. This is part of the message the activist Greta Thunberg imparts wherever she goes.Without righteous anger, without passionate condemnation, there will be no course-correction. What do the advocates of radical acceptance say about this line of thought?

Here, the best response can be summarized by quoting from Reinhold Niehbuhr's "Serenity Prayer." Putting aside the belief in God, it expresses a principle such that one seeks too acquire:

"The serenity to *accept* the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference."


This seems to be a reasonable way to combine stoical acceptance with proactive meliorism so as to have the best of both worlds. Something along these lines is just what is often endorsed by advocates of acceptance-based therapies. They often speak of "balancing acceptance and change."  In order to change things we must first accept them. But the problem is that it begs our original question which is "Just what things can we change, and which things can't we change?" Saying that I will try to accept those things I can't change makes sense only if I really can't change them. What is needed is "the wisdom to know the difference" between what can't  be changed and can, and such determinations are almost always controversial. One person may hold that socio-political conditions can't be changed and fall into apathy while the activist refuses to give up. So we're back to square one trying to evaluate what turns out to be an attitudinal bias either in favor of the will to believe that we CAN influence many events against all odds or believing that we cannot. In other words, much of the evaluation of what can and can't be changed is not deducible on logical grounds alone but involves basic temperament, viz. optimism and pessimism. One person's "realistic optimism" may seem overly cautious and pessimistic to a another person more predisposed to fiery activism. The standards of what can and can't be changed  are often based not on knowledge and evidence,  on any unequivocal but rather such elements as confidence, tenacity, inventiveness and hope. It may have once seemed "unrealistically optimistic" to suppose humans can fly or that governments can be changed so that they address such things as the rights of not-very-powerful minorities. Indeed, there are hard limits to what can be achieved in such areas.  But who among us can claim to know exactly where these limits lie, or what can and cannot be altered in advance? So, if someone experiences intense righteous anger in the present moment because they are addressed with a racial epithet, as has been the case many times before, they might say to themselves: "This already happened. I can't change it. I can't change the past. I am hurting now and must accept the situation. Only if I fully accept it can I later think about changing it." But it may be that equally valid is thinking about the  external cause (systemic racism) while feeling rightly angry and indignant so that there is sufficient motivation to join others in fighting the problem that led to this painful experience and myriad others just like it. Those who cultivate a serene acceptance may suffer less emotional distress as a result in the long run ( a therapeutic advantage); but they may also have diminished motivation to passionately resist the status quo.

Certainly monastic Buddhism and Roman Stoicism have often failed to challenge the status quo. Traditional Buddhist monks leave the everyday world, forego family life, and carry a begging bowl for all necessary funds. The monastic centers have usually depended on the patronage of those with wealth and power. Roman Stoics seldom discussed social and political reform, if at all. From the Emperor Marcus Aurelius to the slave Epictetus, one's lot in life is to be accepted. I mention these facts because these ancient philosophies are the basis of much of the modern work on acceptance. The principle expressed in the Serenity Prayer of Niehbuhr does not provide details regarding what we can and cannot change as the Stoics they derive the principle from do. Here is Epictetus' principle of differentiating that which we can and cannot change:



“Some things are in our control, while others are not. We control our opinions, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything of our own doing. We don’t control […] everything not of our own doing.”  (Enchiridion/Handbook of Epictetus)

Compared to moderns, this reveals great confidence in controlling internal processes including what we think, desire, avoid and choose. Modern western culture operates on very different assumptions. We are socialized to believe that desires and emotions, for example, arise involuntarily, and that at best we can try to tweak those thoughts, beliefs and desires which make us suffer. An obvious case in point is the nearly universally held belief in "romantic love." We can't help "falling in love." We enjoy and suffer from the passions and longings that "move" us emotionally in life. Romance is just one example of an obvious and intense kind. Who today believes that our "opinions" (as Epictetus says)  about foods, music, movies, friends, acquaintances, jobs, social statuses and roles (to name a few) are really within our "control" as individual agents? Ancient Stoicism (and some forms of monastic Buddhism) teach that with proper training, we can control much of this. I don't think this is compatible with the much more deterministic ideas we have such that we have innate (perhaps genetic or otherwise "hard wired") preferences, dispositions, temperaments and traits of character.

On the other hand Epictetus is adamant about our helplessness regarding "those things not of our own doing." This, of course, includes socio-political  events and forces as well as interpersonal behavior directed at each of us by others.  But within our modern culture--steeped in individuality, utilitarianism, and the "can do" philosophy of meliorism-- most of us surely think we can influence, and at times control external doings and happenings. To this end we try to learn "how to influence others" to "get our way" -- which interestingly is a part of Dialectical Behavior Therapy skills training, viz. "Interpersonal Effectiveness." The dialectical relation between acceptance and change in DBT puts the scale far closer to modern conceptions of agency than do the Stoics and Buddhists that influenced Marsha Linehan, the founder of DBT. I can't go into depth here, but in the tradition (Zen) she studied, it is held that there is no "self" to even change. These are deep philosophical issues, and I only point at them in passing to indicate how ambiguous the notion of "balancing acceptance and change" really is once we try to apply the distinction situationally in everyday life.  Judgments regarding what we can and can't control have a lot to do with socio-cultural, technological  and historical context, which-- unfortunately-- most psychotherapy fails to address (with exceptions such as Erich Fromm and Karen Horney).

I think that we moderns tend to believe that "willpower"and instrumental action are effective until we find ourselves unable to "get out of a rut"-- whether in a difficult relationship, addictions, unemployment, suffering abuse, feeling lingering anxiety or depression etc. If instrumental approaches to changing these internal and external states of affairs fail, some of us may lose confidence in our own efficacy and become receptive to acceptance-based approaches to living. There are certainly limits to what we can change, but again it's not clear how these limits vary not only from person to person but cultural context to cultural context. The philosophy of meliorism asks us to stand strong despite defeat, and to affirm a kind of heroic conception of life as the overcoming of obstacles. This is a big part of our culture ("you can do anything you put your mind to"  or "you can make it if you try") which countervails acceptance-based life orientations and therapeutic"strategies.


For example, WEB Du Bois, influenced by William James and other meliorists, claimed that only if we first believe in our capacity to redeem the world can it come to pass. Sometimes there is no epistemological basis for accepting or rejecting a belief (especially beliefs about future states of affairs). When we are acting in a context of unknowns, beliefs may best be justified in terms of likely benefits.  Du Bois says that the loss of believing in prospects of human progress is a kind of "death." We don't all agree on exactly what progress consists in, and can leave that for a separate discussion on ethics. But many will agree with Du Bois that 2 impediments to social and personal progress or improvement are racism and social inequality. If one believes these can't be diminished through some kind of human agency or engagement, this "death" of belief in changing external conditions for the better against all odds-- this death of hope-- condemns us not to a healthy acceptance but to an  ill-advised resignation to powerful forces before which we then buckle.  Martin Luther King cited Du Bois' writings as a key influence. It is reflected in the optimism (without evidence in advance) in such speeches as King's "Mountaintop Speech" where he says:

"Like anybody, I would like to live – a long life; longevity has its place. But I'm not concerned about that now. I just want to do God's will. And He's allowed me to go up to the mountain. And I've looked over. And I've seen the Promised Land. I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people, will get to the Promised Land."

Of course we don't know for sure what will happen or if there is any kind of "Promised Land" awaiting the activists being addressed.   But such heartfelt expressions of faith and hope against all odds can (when outcomes are truly unknown) influence attitudes which in turn influence actions which may then affect the outcome in question. So in order to evaluate just which things we should accept as  out of our hands and which we should cultivate the will and courage to change is a much more personal and culturally shaped matter than many advocates of  acceptance-based therapies might imagine.

Personally, I practice mindfulness (though I'm not religious and don't follow any particular therapeutic ideology) to great benefit. But in my own experience, there is a constructive balance between passionate interest and engagement in our emotional responses on the one hand, and the ability to withstand pain, loss, injury and anger with equanimity on the other. There is something liberating about being able to simply observe or experience the feelings and associated thoughts that come and go with various emotions without being bent out of shape by them. It's a fine balancing act, and, needless to say, I don't always get it right, and so suffer plenty like most of us. Still, the emphasis on acceptance in recent decades, I think, needs to be better integrated into our cultural and historical legacy which is based so largely on learning ever more about how to modify and improve external as well as internal conditions that  bring suffering about.

What are your thoughts? 

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Related Readings/Resources:

-The "How To Be A Stoic" website is run by philosopher, biologist and modern lifestyle Stoic, Masimo Pigliucci of City Univ. of New York. It includes essays, videos, and links that discuss both ancient stoicism and stoicism for 21st century living. There are also essays that discuss the current joining of Stoicism and Buddhism in a secular context, as discussed above.
 https://howtobeastoic.wordpress.com

--Want to be happy? Then live like a Stoic for a week (published in The Conversation 9/18) Philosopher,  John Sellars, calls attention to the extremely limited conception of the ability of persons to influence or meaningfully shape external conditions in Stoicism.  https://theconversation.com/want-to-be-happy-then-live-like-a-stoic-for-a-week-103117
 

 -- Mindfulness as a Key Construct in Modern Psychotherapy: by  Patricia Bach, Stephen Hayes & Michael Levin. Abstract and article download available here: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-2263-5_11

-- Integrating Mindfulness Meditation with Cognitive and Behavioral Therapies: The Challenge of Combining Acceptance-based and Change-Based Strategies: Canadian Journal of Psychiatry: Vol. 50, No. 13: 2005: Mark A Lau,  PhD, Shelly F Mcmain Phd  (Pdf here: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/070674370505001310

-- The Mindfulness Conspiracy, by Ronald Purser, appeared in the Guardian last year. Professor Purser is also the author of McMindfulness: How Mindfulness Became The New Capitalist Spirituality (Repeater Books; 2019) .  Purser argues in both the book and article that "The fundamental message of the mindfulness movement is that the underlying cause of dissatisfaction and distress is in our own heads," i.e. the ways in which we relate to our own thoughts and feelings rather than social and political forces. "By failing to address collective suffering, and systemic change that might remove it,[teachers of radical acceptance and mindfulness] rob [it] of its real revolutionary potential, reducing it to something banal that keeps people focused on themselves." (from Guardian Article here: https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/jun/14/the-mindfulness-conspiracy-capitalist-spirituality  ) He is greatly concerned that approaches emphasizing radical acceptance turn subjects inward where they focus on their reactions and responses to events rather than cultivating critical engagement with the events as problems in themselves, thus blunting the drive toward activism in a society that is already far too complacent in the face of major social and interpersonal ills.

--From Conceptualization to Operationalization of Mindfulness: in Handbook of Mindfulness-- Theory, Research and Practice: Guilford Press: 2015 (p. 151-170): J.T. Quaglia, K.W. Brown, et. al.  These researchers emphasize the need for reliable methods to study phenomenological states constitutive of mindfulness. Though I have not addressed methodological issues and problems here, the authors reasonably conclude that "[m]uch work is needed to better understand the nature and expression of mindfulness, as suggested in our review." (p.161) Draft of chapter avail as pdf here: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/234b/a4cf66586b4a8f0f4c6bb70b538711ff7f3c.pdf  Excellent work on the problem of operationalizing and empirically studying therapeutic benefits of mindfulness and acceptance in Buddhist-influenced therapies and practices can be found in the work of John D. Dunne and Evan Thompson.

-- Buddhist Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Cognitive Science: Assessing the Dialogue: Evan Thompson avail. at Thompson's website along with other articles relevant to the topic:  https://evanthompson.me/articles/

-- Buddhist Meditation & Neuroscience: Excellent, critical and concise essay by Bernard Faure :
http://files.meetup.com/1502376/FaureB2012.pdf

-- The Problem of Mindfulness by philosopher, Sahanika Ratnayake,  argues that Mindfulness/Radical Acceptance contain problematic metaphysical assumptions about "Reality" and "Self" which can undercut the hard contemplative and analytic work of seeking self-knowledge. Whether or not she is convincing, it is worth considering her critique published on Aeon here: https://aeon.co/essays/mindfulness-is-loaded-with-troubling-metaphysical-assumptions

--Mechanisms of Change in Dialectical Behavior Therapy: Theoretical and Empirical Observations: Journal Of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 62(4), 459-480 (2006) : Thomas R. Lynch, Alexander L. Chapman et. al. https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.472.9570&rep=rep1&type=pdf

--Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit  (see Ch. 4; esp.  section 199 on Stoicism) trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford U Press: 1977