Early Taoist Critique of Confucianism: The Tao Te Ching

 (Note: this post is part 2 in a series of posts on Ancient Chinese philosophy and religion. It will make more sense to those who either read the intro to Confucianism post last week, or who have some background knowledge in this area.) --PD

In the last post in this series on Chinese philosophy,  we closed with the Confucian doctrine of Rectification of Names, which demands that people be true to the names and/or titles and roles they take on in society. If one is called a king or a father, the authority that comes with the occupation of such a role must be warranted by the appropriate knowledge, virtue and behavior. Anything less constitutes an error in judgment at best, a fraud at worst. The negligent father and tyrannical king fall short of their names, their titles and whatever prestige comes with these. The great 4th century Confucian thinker, Mencius, goes as far as to state that the people are justified in rebellion if their king is " a king in name only" and a tyrant in reality. "Real" kings do not disregard the needs of those they rule any more than "real" fathers neglect the need of their own children. If the names and behaviors are not correlated in terms of wisdom and virtue (in all of the 5 relationships  including friendship, siblings, husband/wife, father/son, ruler/ subjects) than human interaction redounds to mere power play, wherein one party takes advantage of the other and reciprocity is absent. This is an excellent place to bring Taoism into the evolving conversation of the so-called  "100 Schools" of philosophy during the "Warring States" period-- a bloody time during which several mega-states competed for ultimate power over the lands that had been nominally united under the Zhou for 800 years.

The Inadequacy of Language For Teaching The Tao:

Taoism is not only hard to pin down by means of words and names, but it espouses a radical skepticism regarding the capacity of words or names to adequately represent or signify the objects or beings for which they stand. This is especially true of such elusive concepts as virtue and wisdom which are front and center for Confucianists.  The first line of  first chapter of the Tao Te Ching makes the severe limits of language a central theme. There  Lao Tzu (lit. "Old Master" -- likely a  fictitious being given credit for the work of several authors) states axiomatically that:

"The Tao [Way]  that can be told of
Is not the eternal Way:
The name that can be named 
Is not the eternal Name"
(fr. Sources of Chinese Trad. Vol 1: p. 51)

This makes the rectification of names and their referents a tricky project, especially regarding attempts to fix the  ultimate meanings of virtue and wisdom. For Taoists, language about spiritual, ethical and aesthetic aspects of life is best thought of along the lines of poetry and not snippets of everyday conversations in prose which try to describe perfectly what is right and how one should live-- as the Analects of Confucius. It is in evocative metaphors and analogies  rather than prosaic descriptions of ideal sages and rituals that one may (with a little luck) experience intimations of previously dormant wisdom and insight  regarding the Tao-- the underlying order of the cosmos or totality of nature with which the Taoist harmonizes by living simply and spontaneously. Confucian philosophy, say the Taoists, is based on conventional symbols-- i.e. words made up by people to communicate which are then taken to signify aspects of life and nature that are not made up by people, but exist without words or rituals. One can behave kindly without saying a thing, and more importantly without expressing the kindness by means of ritual propriety as with Confucius. On the other hand, Taoists worry that those who rely on words and teachings to learn what they see as natural virtues may miss the mark entirely. This happens when, for example, ritualized smiling learned as etiquette leads to behavior that no longer appears warm and spontaneous, but cramped and contrived. So the quest to fix the meaning and expression of virtue and wisdom through symbols and rituals can result in fossilized or phony behavior. Just as the eternal Tao cannot be named and is beyond the reach of language, so Confucians should see that true virtue and wisdom cannot be named or taught by means of formulas and definitions, but only realized in ineffable experience, according to Taoism.

Archie Bahm, a  20th century comparative philosopher who transliterated the Tao Te Ching as Nature and Intelligence describes the limits of language this way:

"Nature can  never be fully described, for such a description of nature would have to duplicate nature. No name can fully express that which it represents." (Bahm: p. 11)

Thus, there must always be an irreducible ambiguity and imprecision in all descriptive accounts of reality, and by implication all aspects of reality including virtue and wisdom. None of these can be "fully expressed" by words. Since this is so, the wise person will not rely on words to learn the Way of Nature and the Way of living naturally. (The meaning of the Tao combines these meanings, i.e. the Way that Nature or the Cosmos works, and the most natural way for human beings to live in accordance with nature) Bahm writes:


If Nature is inexpressible, he who desires to know Nature as it is in itself will not try to express it in words. (Bahm p. 11)

Not only are words inadequate as expressions of nature, virtue or wisdom, but by using them with great frequency we can mistake ideas expressed by words with nature as it is in itself. The proverbial map is thus confused with the territory it is supposed to represent. Of course the map is real too, but its reality is not the reality of the land it represents (you can't live in a house "on a map")  but of abstractions; conventional symbols that can distort the way we experience the world. Taoists especially mistrust the abstractions of philosophers like the Confucians,  because they tend to get lost in their own symbolic creations, and in doing so lose touch with that which is perfectly natural and ultimately simple, e.g. the sequence of seasons,  days and nights, waxing and waning of the moon and all the other cycles and rhythms of nature which can be experienced directly,  but not described. One can experience a description of a sunset (e.g. in a poem or painting). But experiencing even a beautiful artwork that represents a sunset is  not the same as experiencing a sunset. As obvious as this is, once pointed out, we use words in place of the realities they are meant to represent so frequently, that our experiences of the wordless world of sunrises and sunsets can come to be shaped by expectations we internalize through language and concepts circulating in our culture. As Alan Watts once commented in a lecture, it is not uncommon to hear a tourist say, on reaching a beautiful tourist destination, "It's just like a postcard!"

To the extent that language evokes a sense of reverence for the Tao or Way, that language is aesthetic and poetic rather than didactic. The Tao Te Ching is written in a poetic style in which metaphors allow us to intuit the meanings which can withstand multiple interpretations. Like so much water, the experience of the Tao always escapes the net of symbols and names. It can be felt or experienced, but not "captured" in words.

Returning to the ancient context, the Confucian project of "rectifying the names" (so that, for example, the title "King" corresponds exactly to a set of traits and virtues shared by all kings) the Taoists  hold that such a correspondence would presuppose a perfect or ideal language that we simply do not have. Thus the Confucian project of cultivating virtue by use of words and rituals is dismissed as naive at best, misleading and even harmful at worst. Ancient Taoists held that  language when used for discussions of the transcendent truths of the Tao or for purposes of defining moral traits that manifest the Tao, simply falls short. It is by definition conventional, thus artificial and thus not expressive of the naturally ordered totality of beings we call the Tao. Thus Taoists are quietists regarding metaphysics and ethics.  As Wittgenstein famously says in the very last sentence of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus thinking largely about Religion and Ethics:

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." (Dover ed. p. 108)

Having discussed the first chapter in some detail, it might make more sense now than it would without the historical and philosophical context. The translators (Adiss and Lombardo) render the chapter we've been discussing as follows:

"The Tao called Tao is not Tao/ Names can name no lasting Name/ Nameless: the origin of the Heaven and Earth/ Naming: the source of ten thousand things. Empty of desire, perceive mystery/Filled with desire, perceive manifestations/They have the same source, but different names/call them both deep/ deep -- and again deep/ The gateway to all mystery." (Hackett ed.)

We know that this is a meditation on the relationship between words and the realities they are thought to name and render intelligible. We have seen that in the very attempt to make them intelligible, our vivid experiences of reality are filtered through standardized semantic units which are created by and for members of specific societies. We have seen that though these standardized meanings can be serviceable for certain purpose such as categorizing objects and beings in a pragmatic context, it is far less obvious how things stand when we try to use language to describe personal experiences of deep emotions, perceptions of beauty, virtue  and  an intuitive grasp of existence itself. The Tao  is the Way of Nature, which we are told by Taoists can be intuitively apprehended when in  wordless, contemplative states.  Whatever all of this means (recalling how inadequate words are here) it implies, at the very least, that according to  early Taoism  a) reality is intelligible rather than inscrutable b) orderly rather than chaotic and c) capable of being perceived and acted upon in ways that make life not only more beautiful but practical.  For example, several chapters emphasize the importance and usefulness of empty space, such as the use of the space in a cup for holding liquids we drink, or openings such as open windows which allow us to maintain contact with the environment outside, to see the world and breathe fresh air.  So again, this first chapter of Lao Tzu  a) distinguishes linguistic descriptions of reality from reality itself, b) establishes that both descriptions of reality AND  the reality itself  are real, i.e. descriptions of the world are not the same things as "The World" yet they do exist AS descriptions which are not unreal in the way that, say, false memories are unreal.  Finally, we are left with an affirmation of these 2 different kinds of realities, namely a) beings and b) descriptions of beings. The meditation ends by affirming the fascination the author/s feel before the mysterious existences of these 2 different kinds of reality (beings and descriptions of beings). To contemplate beings and descriptions of them is to contemplate the "gateway to all mystery" as one popular translation has it. So we have seen how the doctrine of fixing or rectifying the relation between words and the virtues they name is challenged by the early Taoists. In the very next chapter (the second in a book of 81 terse chapters) the entire project of cultivating virtue which defines the Confucian enterprise comes under attack.

The Futility of Cultivating Virtue according to Taoists:

If the Taoists are right about the limits of language in pinning down such realities as virtues and wisdom, the Confucian project is at the very least complicated and possibly jeopardized by the critique. But there are many other problems that arise for Confucian thought according to early Taoists. Here I will explore only one more of those, namely the analysis of morality contained in  Lao Tzu which is first adumbrated in chapter 2. Though the critique goes on for much of the book, I will use only chapter 2  which provides the  the main thrust of the argument that conceptualizing goodness in books and discourses is actually counterproductive. It seems like an odd claim, so how does it work? Here is the meditation on the way things often go wrong when we try to separate the good from the bad and/or the beautiful from the ugly:

"Recognize beauty and ugliness is born/ Recognize good and evil is born

Is and isn't produce one another.

Hard depends on easy/long is tested by short
High is determined by low/Sound is harmonized by voice
After is followed by before.

Therefore the sage is devoted to non-action [Wu Wei]
Moves without teaching
Creates 10,000 things without instruction
Lives but does not own,
Acts but does not presume,
Accomplishes without taking credit.

When no credit is taken, 
Accomplishment endures." (Hackett ed. Ch. 2)


Despite the reputation of  Taoism as obscure and deeply enigmatic in nature, this seems to me to contain a clear and concise dialectical argument about a) the psychological genesis of opposites (up down, right left etc.) and b) the implications that such a psychological theory of opposite pairs has for those who wish to make practical distinctions between the good and bad, right and wrong and beautiful and ugly. It's not clear that the argument is on target, but to the extent that it is correct, it at least complicates the Confucian project of describing the Junzi (Ideal Person) in contradistinction to the Small or Petty Person, given to the blemishes of vanity, selfishness, greed and the like. So here is a philosophical restatement of the second chapter which is influenced by Archie Bahm and others (e.g. Bryan van Norden, A.C. Graham et al.). In the end, I take responsibility for the quality or lack of quality in analyzing Ch. 2.

The general point which applies to the construction of opposite pairs  (not just those in ethics and aesthetics) is simply that the genesis of contraries ( up/down, in/out, north/south etc.) lies in contemplating some distinct  set of phenomena which are then treated as different in kind from all other phenomena in at least one sense. Thus, in terms of directions, we can contemplate the set of all conceivable phenomena that involve moving upwards (mountain climbing, airplane takeoffs, elevators, escalators, jumping up, raising one's arm/s and hand/s to ask questions in a classroom etc.). The simple point is that once we put all these examples in the same distinct category and call that category "Upward motion," say, we immediately think of the opposite category of "downward motion" item for item. Thus, we no sooner think of climbing mountains than we have the implicit contrary of "descending" the mountain in mind. We picture an escalator, and immediately grasp that the device that we use to go up is the same as the device we use to go down, and so on for all these actions.  This is the case, according to Taoists, because climbing and descending are actually 2 aspects of the same phenomenon, just as jumping up is impossible without landing again -- thus moving downward. As Alan Watts used to say in his lectures, "one can't keep going up without coming down." Double meanings aside, he was being serious about a Western blindspot, the quest to keep improving, to keep getting better and better-- in a word the ethical category of progressivism, which also took the form of "Whig History" written as self-congratulatory rhetoric that celebrates the "rise and supremacy" of Europe relative to all other civilizations. We see this "moving up and up" infinitely in such Enlightenment thinkers as Condorcet  with his notion of "Infinite perfectability of Mankind" and again in Hegel's dialectic in which the tension of opposites always propels history so as to insure that something (rationality, self-awareness and awareness of the  immanent principle of the Absolute divinity in history) gets continuously "bigger and better" through historical time. Marx, who secularizes Hegelian dialectics still sees in the bloody play of conflicting opposites (class war, for example) the basis for believing that despite all appearances, we are moving historically towards the Good (the classless society, etc.) and away from the "bad" (e.g. the misery of feudalism and industrial wage labor). So both in ethics and 19th century theories of history, we see wishful thinking that is rationalized in theories celebrating one-directional thinking governed by the metaphor of upward movement (much as we use the spatial metaphor to capture economic transitions as with "upward mobility" and stories we class as "from rags to riches").


So, when Daoists "diagnose" the thinking-style of Confucius and his disciples, they see a naive construction of a category in which all is "pure" and "good" i.e. the 'Junzi' or Ideal Person, always becoming a "better" person-- more virtuous, wiser etc. But Taoists of the period mock the whole project as not only futile, but perhaps dangerous or at least counterproductive. A clear example is the idea we examined in the last post, of Ren which is the basic benevolence  we manifest whenever treating others with loyalty, courtesy, concern etc.  No sooner we think about that than we think about the possibility of acting in ways that may hurt or fail to show proper concern for the other. We become self-conscious about not just the "good" but the possibility of "going wrong." Indeed, all morality would be redundant if there were no possibility of "going wrong." Already, in studying the "good" we are simultaneously striving to avoid the "bad." This is why effortless action (Wu Wei) which was discussed in terms of Confucius is radically reinterpreted by Daoists, as indicated in the last few lines all of which center on getting the idea of the self out of the way of action (e.g. acting without taking credit; acting without presumption et al.). For Confucius action becomes effortless (Wu wei) because the rituals that express virtue (li) become  second nature through constant practice, as with virtuoso musicians who appear to play effortlessly, but in reality studied the detailed fingerwork for years before mastering it. For Daoists, Wu Wei is radically spontaneous and not the product of habituation. A sudden physical or mental move may occur immediately and without a lifelong preparation, and we are asked to trust our instincts, to not take our emotional and moral temperature at every turn but rather to let go and act without overemphasizing our own importance. Paradoxically, the more we think about being good at something, the less spontaneous and "effortless" it is likely to be. The key to Wu Wei for Taoists is un-self-consciousness, as happens when you are so immersed in doing something that you don't even think about the fact that you are doing it.  I recall an example of this from a book I once read in which a centipede walking on all 100 of its little legs is stopped and asked by a flatworm, "How do you manage to coordinate all 100 of your legs so that you walk with such ease and effortlessness? Confused and now suddenly self-conscious, the centipede collapses on the spot. When we think too much about ourselves and how we "should" move, think, perform rituals etc., we risk losing touch with the Tao itself which gives us a natural mode of access to understanding and action in the world.When we take the self-image of ourselves as "virtuous persons" or junzi too seriously, we lose spontaneity because we are always living in the realm of "should." I "should" do this in order to be good. I should have done that, I failed to live up to my role as a good husband/wife etc. The category of "should, " as Nietzsche remarks in his Thus Spake Zarathustra, can take the form of a tyrannical conscience. Taoists, living thousands of years before him, had some interesting observations along these lines. In a discussion of Chapter 2 (quoted in full above) author Homes Welch,  summarizes some of the themes here. He comments incisively that:


"[Lao Tsu's] sage never *tries* [emph added] to do good, because this requires having a concept of good which leads to having a concept evil, which leads to combatting evil, which only makes evil stronger. Second the sage never tries do do good because "every straight is doubled by a crooked, every good by an ill" (Ch. 58W) Human affairs are complex: good done to one person may be evil to another.  Reward the deserving man with a prize and we plant envy in the hearts of the undeserving." (Welch: p. 23)


By now, I hope the general paradoxical theme that occupies much of the book of Lao Tzu starting from chapter 2 is clear. The paradoxical pattern, according to Lao Tsu, is that much of the harm done to human beings  is the result of our contriving to do good. Put this way, it is a clear refusal to accommodate the Confucian impulse to articulate and ritualize virtue and uplift the lives, hearts and behaviors of all human beings in society from the upper echelons of royalty to the simple farmers. Lao Tzu does not believe in political programs and ethical projects. The philosophy of early Taoism has at times been embraced by anarchists who similarly believe that by exiting the social contract with all its overworked formulas, rituals, norms and high-minded calls to patriotism, we leave behind a pattern of behaviors that create the very conflict and harm they wish to avoid. Taoists often left the cities and villages of this violent period in ancient China to live as recluses and hermits.

Thoughts/ Assessment:

I hesitate to say much about my own response to the Taoist critique of Confucian philosophy, mainly because I would much rather know what any potential readers think of it, which is the suggested question for those who choose to comment. But if pressed to say at least a little bit on the subject, I would admit that some of these arguments raise genuine linguistic and psychological questions that challenge the Confucian project, but I would hasten to add at least the following 2 points. 1) The Taoist faith in withdrawal from the hurly burly of Warring States era society as a means of improvement is far less promising than the project of constructing a virtuous society via education and inculcation of norms and roles in the family-- the main artery through which "habits of the heart" are passed from generation to generation. Clever and  quiet hermits who have dropped out and tuned into the mystical Tao may appeal to some modern anarchists, but I think Taoism's real strength was not in the area of politics where it contributed  only indirectly, but rather in the realms of religion and the arts starting in the Han Dynasty. This contribution became extremely important  when Buddhism was brought into the Song era version of Confucianism known as "Neo Confucianism" in which the central concepts of Mahayana Buddhism were not just translated into Chinese, but significantly altered in the process giving birth to Chan (i.e. Zen) Buddhism, as well as providing a mystical explication of the Tao or Way that found its way into the Neo-Confucian synthesis of the 11th century. So, to sum my own thoughts up here, the Taoist critique  was less then devastating to Confucianism. Sure, it points to the impossibility of perfect or accurate description of mystical and ethical concepts, but this is always the case when new students flock around those who claim to teach virtuous living. Worse than imperfections of language as pedagogical tools is giving up on the idea of teaching virtue at all, counseling a kind of self-reliant and reclusive orientation in which the individual learns to trust his intuitions regarding the Way or Tao, but shows little interest in acting so as to bring an end to social strife and war. One can certainly grow emotionally and spiritually by living a reclusive and contemplative life, but this does not constitute a solution to the problems of the Warring States era that Confucians were up against.

 However, once again, Taoism, though too perfectionistic for the political realm would in time inform the rich and beautiful landscape paintings, poems and mystical philosophical writings of both Tang and Song era China centuries later. Even within the Han dynasty Taoism played a vital role in the cultural sphere, if not so much within the largely Confucian and Legalistic state with its vast and literate bureaucracy. We will come to the Han Synthesis in the next post in this series of the history of ideas and philosophies of China in comparative perspective.



Suggested Question: What is your opinion regarding the Taoist critique of Confucian philosophy as explored in this post?



References/Suggested Reading:

-Tao Te Ching-- Lao-Tzu:  trans. by Stephen Addiss and Stanley Lombardo: Hackett Publishing Co. 1993

-Sources of Chinese Wisdom (Volume I) compiled by WM Theodore De Bary, Wing-Tsit Chan and Burton Watson: Columbia U Press, 1960

- Tao Teh King by Lao Tzu Interpreted as Nature and Intelligence by Archie J. Bahm: Jain Publishing Co. 1996

-Taoism: The Parting of The Way by Holmes Welch: Beacon Press, 1957

-What is Taoism?  by Herrlee G. Creel: U of Chicago Midway Reprint: 1970

- Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Dover edition: 1999

-The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently...and Why by Richard E. Nisbett: Free Press, NY 2003

Early Confucian Thought (6th to 2nd Century BCE)

Early Confucianism: A Basic Overview

Confucius is to China what Socrates and in some ways Jesus Christ is to the West. His teachings are  fundamental  not only to Chinese culture, but also much of East Asian culture.

"Confucianism" is a relatively recent term coined by Jesuit missionaries in the 16th century. The Chinese language knows no equivalent term, and the complex and ever-changing tradition Westerners call Confucianism was and still is generally called Rujia or Rujiao-- i.e. 'the traditional way of the scholars' and 'the teachings of the scholars' respectively. Confucius,  about whom we know little with certainty, was one of many members of a semi-noble class called the Shi  https://history.followcn.com/2019/02/01/the-shi-as-a-noble-occupation/ , who were well educated, and though they lacked political power, worked as advisors and teachers helping to shape the policies of competing leaders (often warlords) during the period of great fragmentation in which the Zhou emperors progressively lost power to regional warlords and hegemons who fought with one another for power in the once integrated lands of the nominal Zhou Empire. Emperors, by the time of Confucius' were reduced to figureheads while real power lay in the hands of ambitious military leaders and hegemons of the time.

Confucius' teachings are known to us primarily by way of a collection of allegedly accurate transcriptions of conversations with some of his students (the Lunyu or Analects of Confucius). The earliest of these seems to first appear no sooner than 100 years after Confucius' death (his traditional dates are 551-479 BCE). The version we have now appears between 200 and 300 years after his death, and there were several other versions in circulation before China's first Emperor, Qin Shi Huang, had all Rujia books (and any other books that contradicted his own policies) burned, and as many teachers and scholars as he could find executed-- often buried alive. Fortunately, the Qin Dynasty was very short lived, and those scholars who had escaped the Qin dragnet rewrote-- often from memory-- the classics of Confucius and others that had narrowly survived the burnings.  At any rate, the Analects, which is the main text under consideration here, is comprised of fragments placed in no special thematic or chronological order, though many scholars believe that the first 9 chapters -- esp. 3-9-- were written earlier than the others. The Analects ("conversations" or Lunyu) appears to be cryptic and enigmatic at best to those who read it without commentaries, which is always how it is read in China. As far as biographical knowledge goes, we rely mainly on the Analects and later texts including Mencius, Xunzi, Taoists such as Chuang Tzu and, significantly, the court histories of the official historian of the Han Dynasty,  Sima Qiang, whose writings--though valuable-- tend to blur the lines separating facts and legends or myths.

Confucius' teachings were presented by him as a distillation of the wisdom of earlier sages and wise governors-- mainly from the early Zhou Dynasty of the 11th century BCE, whom Confucius saw as paradigms of sagacity and virtue. He famously denied having any original doctrine, claiming to be a "transmitter and not an original thinker" (7.1). He specified the special place of early Zhou leaders saying: "We take the Zhou as our model." (3.14)  Of all the Zhou leaders, one, The Duke of Zhou, was given pride of place, and is mentioned frequently in the Analects. The Duke of Zhou did not have a formal claim on power, but ruled as a regent for the underage King Cheng when the founding emperor, King Wu died.The Duke staved off rebellion, expanded territory, and, according to legend, established the principle of the "Mandate of Heaven" which would become an important aspect of Confucianism (esp. in the writings of Mencius). What is important for our purposes is  Confucius' interpretation of history as a decline from a Golden Age (however accurate or not this may be) to the almost-anarchic state of affairs in his own time. Chinese culture (Huaxia) was being lost amidst the wars and corrupt feudal-type states of his era, in which peasants were routinely overworked and famines were very common.

Confucius' diagnosis and prescription for this perceived malady was moral in nature. Selfish rulers and citizens alike no longer had a sense of their place in society and the cosmos. For example, rulers acted as if they had no obligations to the ruled, and could rule with impunity. Confucius insists that the ruler who cannot rule over a sound economy in which peasants have food at the table have no business in government. At that time, this sounded more revolutionary than it might today. This, though, is only a basic starting point.

Genuine rulers, like those of the "Golden Age," must re-learn the Chinese classics, not merely intellectually but as a basis for proper living in order to cultivate virtue  (De) and benevolence (Ren)  which are to be expressed in a panoply of rituals (Li) that should guide people from the cradle to the grave. A lifelong moral training would result in a state in which the ideal person (Junzi) embodies virtue gracefully and effortlessly (Wu wei, i.e. graceful or  effortless action). Such an education of character was to be understood as nothing less than the re-appropriation of the ancient wisdom of the sages of yore which could not be improved on. For what these sages had mastered was The Tao, the eternal way of being which conforms to the Will of Heaven (Tianming), understood as an immanent moral force that has desires which are perfect and wise, and which is capable of punishing and rewarding human beings, especially rulers.

Originally Tian  (Heaven) was worshiped as a sky-god, but became less anthropomorphic while taking on a decidedly moral cast during the middle Zhou era. It was worshiped increasingly as the moral order of the universe rather than as a specific deity or being. Yet this moral order retained such properties as desire, will, judgment and the ability to act on the world so as to punish or reward people-- especially political leaders.  Confucius assumes as much, but is silent on the details of all things supernatural, focusing instead on what can be done here in this world (e.g. see Analects 6.22  and 11.12). The Mandate of Heaven  or Tianming (which makes rulers or "sons of Heaven" legitimate) can be stripped from leaders who do not act virtuously, or in accordance with the Tao (note Taoists will interpret the Tao in somewhat different ways, largely in response to Confucian teachings). When Heaven's Mandate is lost, it was thought that signs and portents would appear in the form of natural disasters, eclipses or famines. These were signs that leadership had weakened or become corrupt. Confucians concentrated less on such signs as  on the ethical prerequisites for gaining and maintaining the mandate. This requires the inculcation of leadership virtues  that conform to the will of Heaven and thus to  the eternal way of the cosmos, or the Tao.

 Confucius himself was viewed as something of an expert on Huaxia or traditional Chinese culture,  and taught the Tao (the established way or path) of the ancients found in such books as The I Ching (originally a book on divination which came to include philosophical elements); The Book of Odes (a collection of what might be called folk songs from the earlier Zhou era) and various documents that recount the history of Chinese civilization from the legendary rulers of the Xia Dynasty (about whom almost nothing is known) through the Shang and the Zhou dynasties. In later centuries, when Confucian thought (Rujia) became the official ideology of the Han Dynasty, five books were canonized as 'The Five Classics." These are:  The I Ching,  The Book of Odes(both mentioned above), The Spring and Autumn Annals (historical records pertaining to the state of Lu, which was Confucius' place of birth), The Book of Documents (containing semi-legendary and legendary stories about pre-Zhou dynasties) and The Book of Rites (or rituals). The centerpiece of Confucius' teachings and thought is to be found in  The Analects of Confucius (Lunyu or 'conversations' of Confucius) in which Confucius draws on such texts as the 5 classics, interpreting them in ways that were innovative (despite his claim that he was not an original thinker) and have formed much of the basis for Chinese culture, politics, religion and philosophy ever since.  His influence cannot be exaggerated.  Confucianism is as fundamental to  Chinese civilization and culture as were rationalistic Greek philosophy and Christianity in the West.
 
The Core Teachings:

Confucius' teachings have as their goal nothing less than the perfection of human conduct from the ruler down to the peasant. Of course,  he doesn't expect this to be thoroughly realized, but it is the ideal end or purpose underlying Analects and other texts used by Confucians.  Good conduct must be realized a) in communal settings characterized by much face-to-face interaction and b) involve the mastery of intricate rituals appropriate to the specific situations in which people interact. This "ritual propriety" which suffuses all relationships is not to be confused with mere etiquette in the sense of external behaviors. It is essential to understand li (ritual propriety) as sincere expression of reverence for what many westerners might see as "mundane matters." Learning, for example,  the proper way to bow, sit, serve food, mourn, celebrate holidays, marry,  address others, etc. may seem relatively unimportant from a moral perspective today, but it is only through the proper use of significant words and gestures that our sincere feelings of appreciation, respect, reverence, sympathy and even love can be reliably communicated. Weddings and funerals, for example, allow us to come together to share some of the profoundest human feelings and thoughts about life, love and death.   The internalization of ritual propriety can be illustrated by discussing the way Confucius used the Book of Odes (folk songs).  By singing these revered songs-- a ritual activity-- Confucius believed that students could come to embody the wisdom they contain. One of the odes/songs, for example,  is sung from the point of view of farmers oppressed by unjust rulers that overtax them even as they endure food shortages and hunger.

"Big rat, big rat/ Do not gobble our millet!/ Three years we have slaved for you, /Yet you take no notice of us." (The Book of Songs, trans. A. Waley: New York: Grove Press, 1960, p.309).

As stated above,  Confucius held that  no ruler incapable of providing for the basic needs of his subjects is a worthy ruler, and the Book of Odes provides a ritualized way of channeling grievances. By learning such a song, Confucius' students engaged in a ritual which also cultivated appropriate sympathy for the poor farmers whose lives depended on their produce. Without learning and singing such a song, it might be easy for the educated elites studying with Confucius to become insensitive to the needs of the ordinary farmers who comprised the majority of citizens.  More generally, Confucius says this about the Book of Odes:

"The songs number 300, but I will cover their meaning in a single phrase: 'Let there be no depravity in your thoughts.' (2.2: Dawson trans.).

 Another translation in Bryan Van Nordon has "Oh, they [the songs] will not lead you astray." As Van Norden states of this quotation, "In other words, the Odes ultimately are a guide to not swerving from the Way (Tao). " (p.30) So while some have criticized Confucius for emphasizing these songs and other rituals merely as mechanical means to solidarity, Confucius praised the wisdom of their content at every turn, pointing to the manner in which internal states (feelings, attitudes, thoughts, intentions etc.) must coincide with external rituals ( e.g. singing of odes, mourning the dead, marrying,  bowing properly, etc.). The worst outcome for Confucius, was one in which people do not know why they behaved as they do, lack the deeper understanding of rituals and, even worse, behave according to the right external forms while inwardly harboring mental states that run counter to their  meaning (e.g. mourning in the prescribed fashion but without inner feelings of grief).

Indeed, funeral rites were very important, as filial piety is the basis for a just social order, and veneration of ancestors is basic to Huaxia or Chinese culture. When one's mother or father dies, the traditional period of mourning was three years. This involved avoiding fancy clothes, festive foods and  practical activities when possible. This was criticized even by Confucius' student, Zai Wo, who complains in the Analects that 3 years is too long, and wastes time that might be better spent enjoying life and getting  on with practical activities such as farming. In Analects (17.19) Confucius askes Zai Wo:

 " 'If you were then to eat good rice and wear embroidered clothes, would you feel at ease?' 'Yes,' he  replied. 'If you would be at ease then by all means do so,' said the Master...When Zai Wo had left, the master said...As for [Zai Wo's] inhumaneness, it is not until a child is three years old that it escapes [the need of] being nursed by its parents. The three years' mourning is the mourning universally adopted by all under Heaven. Surely, Zai Wo had three years' love from his parents?" (Dawson trans. 17.19)

Here we can  see that one of the most prolonged and serious rituals discussed in Analects is not taught in the spirit of imitating outward behaviors without inner understanding of right motivation, underlying emotions, and an explanation of the function and origin of the ritual.  Unlike a cruel taskmaster, Confucius says, in essence, "if you don't get the point of the ritual you may as well not do it; go and eat all the fancy food you like if you are 'at ease.'" But once Zai Wo leaves the room, Confucius imparts the real lesson regarding this ritual to the students left in his presence. As with all rituals, it is meaningful only if the outward form is supported by the appropriate underlying emotional state (in this case, genuine feelings of sorrow and loss). It must also be matched by internal understanding of its purpose (to express gratitude for the many years of love and nurturance  the parent provided to the child). Without these and other internal states (reverence and love), the rituals, however perfectly executed behaviorally, are like corn husks without corn-- empty formalities. Viewing Confucian li (ritual propriety) in this way is one of the most common and serious misunderstandings of the entire Confucian project of action in accordance with the Tao. Just as the odes enable the noble classes to sympathize with peasants by assuming their viewpoint in songs about being exploited, as cited above, so we are asked not merely to mourn (i.e. wear certain mourning clothes,  participate in  funerary rites, etc.) but to undergo the corollary feelings/emotions, desires, motives and intellectual understandings that alone give vitality and spiritual significance to rituals.

The junzi (ideal person as opposed to the "petty person") will eventually move through life largely in terms of the prescribed rituals as if by second nature. He (or in our own times 'she')  will be fully present and sincere when bowing, eating, singing or mourning in accordance with the Tao by means of the rituals long ago prescribed by sages.  Everyday life, then, becomes something like an aesthetically graceful dance in which the dancers are not merely "going through the motions" but rather intimately connected with their every movement in a way that has been so thoroughly internalized as to be perfectly natural, effortless and unselfconscious. As any advanced musician or dancer knows, there comes a point where one is no longer thinking about technique while playing or dancing, because years of training have led to an ease and graceful spontaneity that has virtue, the root word of "virtuosity." This is Wu Wei (a state of "flow" and spontaneity while doing things one originally had to learn, e.g. walking, talking, riding a bicycle, driving or playing an instrument). Of course, Taoists will have much more to say about Wu Wei, some of it critical of the Confucian approach-- but there is also similarity between the 2 schools.

So insightful and sincere activity channeled through ancient rituals is what beautifies and intensifies spirituality in our everyday lives from farming, to interacting with loved ones in the family right up to honoring officials who have performed their duties well. But in order to better appreciate some of these examples, we turn now, to the cardinal virtues of Confucian thought as expressed in the  "5 Basic Relationships" taught by Confucius.

                                                    PART II

The Necessary Virtues of the Ideal Person and the 5 Basic Relationships:

The ideal person (junzi) must act in accordance with necessary virtues which have no exact Western equivalents. These virtues are most visible in our interactions with others. These interactions are, in turn, best understood in terms of the values, norms and roles so carefully articulated by Confucius and those who followed in his path. Again, the roots of all this are already evident in ancient writings from the sages of Ancient China.

Basic virtues include Ren (benevolence) De ( moral force or virtue), Li (ritual propriety which was discussed in the previous section) Wu Wei (also discussed above) and Remonstrance (the obligation to tactfully and respectfully correct superiors, but backing down if they refuse to stand corrected). There are others, but for a short overview like this one these are the essentials.

Ren  is a sine qua non. Without it no moral cultivation is possible. It is also, perhaps, the most elusive of all these terms. Confucius refers to ren  as the "single thread that runs" through all philosophy, all aspects of the Tao. A reasonably good starting point is to define it as a form of "benevolence" as many translators have it. The character for ren in Chinese pictures a man with the number two (represented as 2 horizontal lines) directly to his right. This signifies the irreducibility of virtue to any single individual. We are social through and through. To cultivate or learn virtue is possible only through interactions with at least one other being.  One can be benevolent only when others are there to be treated well. One can appreciate benevolence or good will only when others are there to demonstrate it in action. Still, ren is used frequently and conspicuously little is said about it by way of definition. It is so basic to so many other virtues, that it is hard to pin down verbally. For example, when discussing righteousness (yi), loyalty (zhong) or faithfulness (xin) we are already presupposing good will. It motivates righteousness, provides the basis of loyalty, and is demonstrated by long-lasting faithfulness, for example to loved ones. What is the common denominator of all these and other virtues, then? It is outgoing love, solicitude and/ or sympathy that is sometimes stronger (e.g. for members of one's family) and sometimes less strong (e.g. fellow citizens whom one has never met before a given interaction). Confucius does not expect nor advise people to feel and act on benevolence in equal measure to any and all persons with whom we interact. Contrary to something like Christian agape (equal love felt and shown to all human beings precisely because they are human beings), ren will naturally be felt more intensely towards those with whom we are intimate than  strangers. This is endorsed by Confucians as the natural way of things or The Tao, and is sometimes called the principle of "differentiated caring" by Confucian scholars.  Put simply, we usually do have and ought to have a greater sense of moral obligation toward those with whom we are bound in community-- esp. friends and kin.  A passage from Analects helps to illustrate this.

A regional governor bragged to Confucius that his subjects were so virtuous that one had recently turned his own father in for stealing a sheep. Confucius replied:

"In my locality, those who are upright are different from those. Fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. Uprightness is to be found in this. (Dawson trans. 13.18)

This, of course, doesn't mean that the son sanctions the father's behavior, and as a good son his role obligates him to remonstrate  (respectfully show disapproval of the behavior and attempt to correct the father who has stolen.) But any other philosophical schools in China (e.g. the Mohists who counseled universal love on an equal basis) and, of course, many Western moral views from Ancient Greece and the teachings of Jesus Christ right up to Kant, are highly critical of any such idea of preferential treatment, i.e. of making distinctions based on role differences. "Covering up" for a thief, no matter how close a relation, is immoral. Moral principles are universal, they apply equally to every person. Further, special treatment of loved ones thwarts the development of universal love-- the essence of religiosity and also of theories of Universal Human Rights. At worst, it justifies or rationalizes nepotism, favoritism, chauvinism and other dysfunctional practices that interfere with the development of just and fair ethical practice. What do the Confucians have to say about all this?

They point out that ethical theory that is not capable of being realized ordinary people is ultimately moot. Most, perhaps all people-- with a few exceptions such as alleged Saints and Boddhisattvas-- simply cannot feel impartial love for all persons including those from other lands, those not yet born, strangers, malefactors etc. The Mohist ideal (or Christian or Buddhist as well) of equal and impartial love for all is at odds with the natural tendency to, for example, become far more upset when a loved one dies than a stranger. To take another example, we don't all give equal attention and equally valuable gifts to everybody whose birthdays we happen to know.There is a certain kind of universal love endorsed by Confucians, but it must be set apart from those many important forms which come about through interaction and emotional attachment. Thus something like agape or universal love is captured in Analects 12.5 in which a disciple complains that unlike most other men, he has no brothers.  He is told that "if [you] are a gentleman [junzi or ideal person], if  [you] show courtesy in all your dealings with others, and observe the obligations of ritual [li], then all within the 4 seas are your brothers." In other words, the person who approaches the ideal state of the sage sees all people as, metaphorically and spiritually, "brothers/sisters."  This shows that Confucianism does not lack an appreciation of the basic humanism at the heart of so many philosophies and religion, but rather that it  recognizes that it is far easier to discuss such virtue than it is to feel and manifest it. It is only when one approaches the understanding of a realized sage that such fellow-feeling is truly activated in the inner life and outward behavior of any given individual.

Further, it is erroneous to assume that greater love or sympathy for certain people (e.g. friends and relations)  than for strangers somehow entails blase attitude of indifference towards the latter. Again,  the more one cultivates wisdom, the greater will be his or her capacity to feel love towards all human beings based on deep empathy and understanding of the human condition. It's simply that other crucial ethical precepts and behaviors are perfectly compatible with human psychology at a less developed stage. Thus we need ethical principles that can be practiced sincerely by those who are not saints and sages, but rather ordinary human beings. Confucius was, in this sense, a realist. It should also be remembered that dynastic governments in China depended on deeply loyal familial bonds, and this requires filial piety.

Ren, then is a necessary condition for most other virtues and for the expression of such virtues as loyalty on which society and governance depend for their legitimacy and stability. It is good will and benevolence which undergird so much of what we do and expect others to do in daily life in and outside of politics.

If ren is hard to define, it is made palpable to all by means of the many rituals we have already discussed (li or "ritual propriety" as in the cases of mourning, singing, marrying, bowing etc.). Put differently, these rituals-- the glue of society--  are hollow and mechanical when the vital element of ren  (benevolent spirit) is absent. Li minus ren (benevolence) comes to nought.  The external and internal worlds (i.e. behavior and underlying feelings and intentions) must be aligned, and both must conform to the Way or Tao which is not a set of man-made laws or norms, but ageless principles of being etched into, and constitutive of the cosmos or natural order itself. Just as ren and li must be correlative, so must Heaven and Earth.  Tanxia (all things under heaven) must express the "will of Heaven" and thus the eternal way of being-- The Tao.

The Tao of Confucius is far more social than that of Taoists, many of whom lived as hermits and reacted against Confucian thought. They came to form the second of China's 3 principle teachings, the Taojia (the school of the Taoists). According to Confucius, the will of Heaven dictates that all is well only when  certain social roles and rituals are properly understood and practiced, both in politics and society generally. A special emphasis is placed on familial relations (familial piety). In order to  understand the basic Confucian virtues such as  ren,  de and wu wei (i.e. benevolence, moral force and effortless action) we must first understand the five basic relationships in Confucian thought, viz., Father and son; ruler and subject; husband and wife; elder and younger brother; and  friend and friend.

The first thing to note is that all these relationships, with the exception of friend/friend, presuppose a hierarchical and patriarchal social structure. Even friendships in Chinese culture are embedded in hierarchies to varying degrees. Which is the older and which the younger friend? Has one achieved greater rank or education than the other? To the extent that social differentiation exists between friends it will probably find expression in the various interaction rituals (greetings, titles used to address others etc.) that suffuse the relationship. But the most important relationships in Confucianism are those within families. Sincerely felt adherence to the rituals binding on family members are at the core of Confucianism. The observance of such rituals is called "Ritual Piety," and much of East Asian culture from the household to the government cannot be properly understood without some appreciation of the hold ritual propriety still has on East Asians. Today we even see it reflected in "filial piety" laws that obligate adult children to look after their aging parents. Confucius believed that when laws are necessary to uphold filial piety, it is already very weak. The basis for social cohesion and shared morality in Confucian thought is not law (as often is the case in the West) but folkways and rituals that are enacted with genuine enthusiasm and good will because they are so deeply internalized. In each of the five relationships, both parties have obligations to the other, and these are emphasized over privileges.

The son is obliged to yield to the will of his father. This is not seen as the father's "privilege" to impose his will on the son, but rather as the proper and natural way for sons to relate to fathers. Why is it not primarily a privilege? Because the reason the father's will prevails is that his obligation to raise his child properly, to educate his son (again today this holds females be they mothers or daughters) is one not taken lightly. The father is responsible for teaching his son/s right and wrong, imparting survival skills as well as intricacies of li (rituals) so that he can enter into society productively, etc. So the authority of the father is not a blank check any more than the ruler's authority over the subject. Both must conform to the eternal way (Tao) which means that various feelings, motives and intellectual understandings must be present in both parties of the relationship. This is true of husband and wife and siblings as well. To the extent that the behavior and underlying emotions and motives deviate from the Tao, to that extent the father, son, brother, wife, mother etc. is only a father, son, brother etc. in name. A father in name only is not a real father any more than  a deviant ruler is a legitimate governor.  So, far from being a superficial doctrine, filial piety (the core of our sociality and of our polities) are classed either as being real or merely nominal.  A merely nominal leader does not enjoy the Mandate of Heaven, and Mencius (a Confucian who wrote  about 150 yrs after Confucius died) fleshes this out by providing an argument that allows for the overthrow of merely nominal leaders (e.g. emperors in name only who do not live up to their obligations to those they rule, starting with adequate food for the peasants).

Here we arrive at one of the most important doctrines in Confucianism which is known as the "Rectification of Names." When Confucius is asked by a student what he would first do if he gained power in a state to set things right, he answered, thus:

"What is necessary is to rectify names, is it not?...If names are not rectified, then  words are not appropriate. If words are not appropriate, then deeds are not accomplished." (17:3)

What does this mean, exactly? Well, lets take the example of a father who behaves like a so-called "dead-beat dad" by shirking financial obligations to the family, spending nights drinking with bar-friends and who does nothing to help his son/s to be prepared for school assignments. Unless all of these deficiencies are addressed, the father is not behaving like a good father, and for Confucius the point of being called by the name, "father" is to capture in language certain properties  that are implied by the definition of that term. Confucius is not referring to biological facts alone, but as always, the socially expressed traits that hold societies together  and reveal good character. He uses the term "father" rather as a family psychologist might, taking note of the necessary traits of a "good father" or, at the very least, a "functional father."  When the name "Father" is used widely in a society that lacks a large number of functional or good fathers, the word and the referent of the word no longer correspond to one another.  This may be a linguistic problem, but it is also an existential and societal one. It means that men who don't behave like fathers are able to pass themselves off as genuinely good or functional fathers. This divergence of word and referent in the area of fundamental roles and relationships is a sure sign of social decay or the decline of crucial virtues, norms and rituals needed to uphold a stable and decent society.

This is even more problematic if political power is arrogated by warlords or other leaders who have a great sense of privilege and power with little or no corresponding sense of obligation to those they rule. Names like "King" or "Emperor"  carry certain dignified meanings that derive from the sincere enactment of obligations such as not overtaxing the poor, and providing infrastructure so that the quality of life for citizens is not allowed to lapse into a state of abject filth and decrepitude. Again, under certain conditions of neglect, Confucians (esp. Mencius) will argue that the irresponsible leader has forfeited the mandate of Heaven, meaning that a rebellion or coup can be looked upon as just and proper.

The upshot of all this is that the basic relationships, and the intricately interwoven rituals through which they unfold are not to be understood in terms of blind conformity to those with power-- though, like any system, Confucian thought can be abused resulting in corrupt behavior. The Confucian outlook prioritizes a state of affairs in which as many people as possible in all sectors of society understand and feel at home with their various roles and responsibilities, and expect others to be similarly situated within what is experienced as a hierarchical but highly ethical cosmos in which the will of Heaven is made manifest on Earth by means of the sincere and deeply internalized moral codes and rituals that are social aspects of the eternal Tao governing the cosmos (Heaven and Earth or Tanxia-- lit. "all things under Heaven."



References and Suggested Reading: 

-Confucius: The Analects: trans. Raymond Dawson, Oxford Press, NY, 1993


-A Short History of Chinese Philosophy  by Falun Yu-Lan: Free Press, 1976

-Introducing Chinese Religions by  Mario Poceski: Routledge, 2009

-Introduction to Classic Chinese Philosophy by Bryan van Norden: Hackett Press: 2011

-Beyond The Secular West: ed. Akeel Bilgrami: Columbia U Press: 2016
 
-Disputers of The Tao by A.C. Graham: Open Court Press: 2003~

-The Book of Songs: trans.  Arthur Waley, Grove Press:  1960

-Sources of Chinese Tradition (Volume I): compiled by Wm. Theodore De Barrhy, Wing-Tsit Chan and Burton Watson: Columbia Univ. Press, 1960

Question: How does the early Confucian ethical world view differ from that of Western philosophical and religious conceptions of ethics and the good life?