In the last post in this series on Chinese philosophy, we closed with the Confucian doctrine of Rectification of Names, which demands that people be true to the names and/or titles and roles they take on in society. If one is called a king or a father, the authority that comes with the occupation of such a role must be warranted by the appropriate knowledge, virtue and behavior. Anything less constitutes an error in judgment at best, a fraud at worst. The negligent father and tyrannical king fall short of their names, their titles and whatever prestige comes with these. The great 4th century Confucian thinker, Mencius, goes as far as to state that the people are justified in rebellion if their king is " a king in name only" and a tyrant in reality. "Real" kings do not disregard the needs of those they rule any more than "real" fathers neglect the need of their own children. If the names and behaviors are not correlated in terms of wisdom and virtue (in all of the 5 relationships including friendship, siblings, husband/wife, father/son, ruler/ subjects) than human interaction redounds to mere power play, wherein one party takes advantage of the other and reciprocity is absent. This is an excellent place to bring Taoism into the evolving conversation of the so-called "100 Schools" of philosophy during the "Warring States" period-- a bloody time during which several mega-states competed for ultimate power over the lands that had been nominally united under the Zhou for 800 years.
The Inadequacy of Language For Teaching The Tao:
Taoism is not only hard to pin down by means of words and names, but it espouses a radical skepticism regarding the capacity of words or names to adequately represent or signify the objects or beings for which they stand. This is especially true of such elusive concepts as virtue and wisdom which are front and center for Confucianists. The first line of first chapter of the Tao Te Ching makes the severe limits of language a central theme. There Lao Tzu (lit. "Old Master" -- likely a fictitious being given credit for the work of several authors) states axiomatically that:
"The Tao [Way] that can be told of
Is not the eternal Way:
The name that can be named
Is not the eternal Name"
(fr. Sources of Chinese Trad. Vol 1: p. 51)
This makes the rectification of names and their referents a tricky project, especially regarding attempts to fix the ultimate meanings of virtue and wisdom. For Taoists, language about spiritual, ethical and aesthetic aspects of life is best thought of along the lines of poetry and not snippets of everyday conversations in prose which try to describe perfectly what is right and how one should live-- as the Analects of Confucius. It is in evocative metaphors and analogies rather than prosaic descriptions of ideal sages and rituals that one may (with a little luck) experience intimations of previously dormant wisdom and insight regarding the Tao-- the underlying order of the cosmos or totality of nature with which the Taoist harmonizes by living simply and spontaneously. Confucian philosophy, say the Taoists, is based on conventional symbols-- i.e. words made up by people to communicate which are then taken to signify aspects of life and nature that are not made up by people, but exist without words or rituals. One can behave kindly without saying a thing, and more importantly without expressing the kindness by means of ritual propriety as with Confucius. On the other hand, Taoists worry that those who rely on words and teachings to learn what they see as natural virtues may miss the mark entirely. This happens when, for example, ritualized smiling learned as etiquette leads to behavior that no longer appears warm and spontaneous, but cramped and contrived. So the quest to fix the meaning and expression of virtue and wisdom through symbols and rituals can result in fossilized or phony behavior. Just as the eternal Tao cannot be named and is beyond the reach of language, so Confucians should see that true virtue and wisdom cannot be named or taught by means of formulas and definitions, but only realized in ineffable experience, according to Taoism.
Archie Bahm, a 20th century comparative philosopher who transliterated the Tao Te Ching as Nature and Intelligence describes the limits of language this way:
"Nature can never be fully described, for such a description of nature would have to duplicate nature. No name can fully express that which it represents." (Bahm: p. 11)
Thus, there must always be an irreducible ambiguity and imprecision in all descriptive accounts of reality, and by implication all aspects of reality including virtue and wisdom. None of these can be "fully expressed" by words. Since this is so, the wise person will not rely on words to learn the Way of Nature and the Way of living naturally. (The meaning of the Tao combines these meanings, i.e. the Way that Nature or the Cosmos works, and the most natural way for human beings to live in accordance with nature) Bahm writes:
If Nature is inexpressible, he who desires to know Nature as it is in itself will not try to express it in words. (Bahm p. 11)
Not only are words inadequate as expressions of nature, virtue or wisdom, but by using them with great frequency we can mistake ideas expressed by words with nature as it is in itself. The proverbial map is thus confused with the territory it is supposed to represent. Of course the map is real too, but its reality is not the reality of the land it represents (you can't live in a house "on a map") but of abstractions; conventional symbols that can distort the way we experience the world. Taoists especially mistrust the abstractions of philosophers like the Confucians, because they tend to get lost in their own symbolic creations, and in doing so lose touch with that which is perfectly natural and ultimately simple, e.g. the sequence of seasons, days and nights, waxing and waning of the moon and all the other cycles and rhythms of nature which can be experienced directly, but not described. One can experience a description of a sunset (e.g. in a poem or painting). But experiencing even a beautiful artwork that represents a sunset is not the same as experiencing a sunset. As obvious as this is, once pointed out, we use words in place of the realities they are meant to represent so frequently, that our experiences of the wordless world of sunrises and sunsets can come to be shaped by expectations we internalize through language and concepts circulating in our culture. As Alan Watts once commented in a lecture, it is not uncommon to hear a tourist say, on reaching a beautiful tourist destination, "It's just like a postcard!"
To the extent that language evokes a sense of reverence for the Tao or Way, that language is aesthetic and poetic rather than didactic. The Tao Te Ching is written in a poetic style in which metaphors allow us to intuit the meanings which can withstand multiple interpretations. Like so much water, the experience of the Tao always escapes the net of symbols and names. It can be felt or experienced, but not "captured" in words.
Returning to the ancient context, the Confucian project of "rectifying the names" (so that, for example, the title "King" corresponds exactly to a set of traits and virtues shared by all kings) the Taoists hold that such a correspondence would presuppose a perfect or ideal language that we simply do not have. Thus the Confucian project of cultivating virtue by use of words and rituals is dismissed as naive at best, misleading and even harmful at worst. Ancient Taoists held that language when used for discussions of the transcendent truths of the Tao or for purposes of defining moral traits that manifest the Tao, simply falls short. It is by definition conventional, thus artificial and thus not expressive of the naturally ordered totality of beings we call the Tao. Thus Taoists are quietists regarding metaphysics and ethics. As Wittgenstein famously says in the very last sentence of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus thinking largely about Religion and Ethics:
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." (Dover ed. p. 108)
Having discussed the first chapter in some detail, it might make more sense now than it would without the historical and philosophical context. The translators (Adiss and Lombardo) render the chapter we've been discussing as follows:
"The Tao called Tao is not Tao/ Names can name no lasting Name/ Nameless: the origin of the Heaven and Earth/ Naming: the source of ten thousand things. Empty of desire, perceive mystery/Filled with desire, perceive manifestations/They have the same source, but different names/call them both deep/ deep -- and again deep/ The gateway to all mystery." (Hackett ed.)
We know that this is a meditation on the relationship between words and the realities they are thought to name and render intelligible. We have seen that in the very attempt to make them intelligible, our vivid experiences of reality are filtered through standardized semantic units which are created by and for members of specific societies. We have seen that though these standardized meanings can be serviceable for certain purpose such as categorizing objects and beings in a pragmatic context, it is far less obvious how things stand when we try to use language to describe personal experiences of deep emotions, perceptions of beauty, virtue and an intuitive grasp of existence itself. The Tao is the Way of Nature, which we are told by Taoists can be intuitively apprehended when in wordless, contemplative states. Whatever all of this means (recalling how inadequate words are here) it implies, at the very least, that according to early Taoism a) reality is intelligible rather than inscrutable b) orderly rather than chaotic and c) capable of being perceived and acted upon in ways that make life not only more beautiful but practical. For example, several chapters emphasize the importance and usefulness of empty space, such as the use of the space in a cup for holding liquids we drink, or openings such as open windows which allow us to maintain contact with the environment outside, to see the world and breathe fresh air. So again, this first chapter of Lao Tzu a) distinguishes linguistic descriptions of reality from reality itself, b) establishes that both descriptions of reality AND the reality itself are real, i.e. descriptions of the world are not the same things as "The World" yet they do exist AS descriptions which are not unreal in the way that, say, false memories are unreal. Finally, we are left with an affirmation of these 2 different kinds of realities, namely a) beings and b) descriptions of beings. The meditation ends by affirming the fascination the author/s feel before the mysterious existences of these 2 different kinds of reality (beings and descriptions of beings). To contemplate beings and descriptions of them is to contemplate the "gateway to all mystery" as one popular translation has it. So we have seen how the doctrine of fixing or rectifying the relation between words and the virtues they name is challenged by the early Taoists. In the very next chapter (the second in a book of 81 terse chapters) the entire project of cultivating virtue which defines the Confucian enterprise comes under attack.
The Futility of Cultivating Virtue according to Taoists:
If the Taoists are right about the limits of language in pinning down such realities as virtues and wisdom, the Confucian project is at the very least complicated and possibly jeopardized by the critique. But there are many other problems that arise for Confucian thought according to early Taoists. Here I will explore only one more of those, namely the analysis of morality contained in Lao Tzu which is first adumbrated in chapter 2. Though the critique goes on for much of the book, I will use only chapter 2 which provides the the main thrust of the argument that conceptualizing goodness in books and discourses is actually counterproductive. It seems like an odd claim, so how does it work? Here is the meditation on the way things often go wrong when we try to separate the good from the bad and/or the beautiful from the ugly:
"Recognize beauty and ugliness is born/ Recognize good and evil is born
Is and isn't produce one another.
Hard depends on easy/long is tested by short
High is determined by low/Sound is harmonized by voice
After is followed by before.
Therefore the sage is devoted to non-action [Wu Wei]
Moves without teaching
Creates 10,000 things without instruction
Lives but does not own,
Acts but does not presume,
Accomplishes without taking credit.
When no credit is taken,
Accomplishment endures." (Hackett ed. Ch. 2)
Despite the reputation of Taoism as obscure and deeply enigmatic in nature, this seems to me to contain a clear and concise dialectical argument about a) the psychological genesis of opposites (up down, right left etc.) and b) the implications that such a psychological theory of opposite pairs has for those who wish to make practical distinctions between the good and bad, right and wrong and beautiful and ugly. It's not clear that the argument is on target, but to the extent that it is correct, it at least complicates the Confucian project of describing the Junzi (Ideal Person) in contradistinction to the Small or Petty Person, given to the blemishes of vanity, selfishness, greed and the like. So here is a philosophical restatement of the second chapter which is influenced by Archie Bahm and others (e.g. Bryan van Norden, A.C. Graham et al.). In the end, I take responsibility for the quality or lack of quality in analyzing Ch. 2.
The general point which applies to the construction of opposite pairs (not just those in ethics and aesthetics) is simply that the genesis of contraries ( up/down, in/out, north/south etc.) lies in contemplating some distinct set of phenomena which are then treated as different in kind from all other phenomena in at least one sense. Thus, in terms of directions, we can contemplate the set of all conceivable phenomena that involve moving upwards (mountain climbing, airplane takeoffs, elevators, escalators, jumping up, raising one's arm/s and hand/s to ask questions in a classroom etc.). The simple point is that once we put all these examples in the same distinct category and call that category "Upward motion," say, we immediately think of the opposite category of "downward motion" item for item. Thus, we no sooner think of climbing mountains than we have the implicit contrary of "descending" the mountain in mind. We picture an escalator, and immediately grasp that the device that we use to go up is the same as the device we use to go down, and so on for all these actions. This is the case, according to Taoists, because climbing and descending are actually 2 aspects of the same phenomenon, just as jumping up is impossible without landing again -- thus moving downward. As Alan Watts used to say in his lectures, "one can't keep going up without coming down." Double meanings aside, he was being serious about a Western blindspot, the quest to keep improving, to keep getting better and better-- in a word the ethical category of progressivism, which also took the form of "Whig History" written as self-congratulatory rhetoric that celebrates the "rise and supremacy" of Europe relative to all other civilizations. We see this "moving up and up" infinitely in such Enlightenment thinkers as Condorcet with his notion of "Infinite perfectability of Mankind" and again in Hegel's dialectic in which the tension of opposites always propels history so as to insure that something (rationality, self-awareness and awareness of the immanent principle of the Absolute divinity in history) gets continuously "bigger and better" through historical time. Marx, who secularizes Hegelian dialectics still sees in the bloody play of conflicting opposites (class war, for example) the basis for believing that despite all appearances, we are moving historically towards the Good (the classless society, etc.) and away from the "bad" (e.g. the misery of feudalism and industrial wage labor). So both in ethics and 19th century theories of history, we see wishful thinking that is rationalized in theories celebrating one-directional thinking governed by the metaphor of upward movement (much as we use the spatial metaphor to capture economic transitions as with "upward mobility" and stories we class as "from rags to riches").
So, when Daoists "diagnose" the thinking-style of Confucius and his disciples, they see a naive construction of a category in which all is "pure" and "good" i.e. the 'Junzi' or Ideal Person, always becoming a "better" person-- more virtuous, wiser etc. But Taoists of the period mock the whole project as not only futile, but perhaps dangerous or at least counterproductive. A clear example is the idea we examined in the last post, of Ren which is the basic benevolence we manifest whenever treating others with loyalty, courtesy, concern etc. No sooner we think about that than we think about the possibility of acting in ways that may hurt or fail to show proper concern for the other. We become self-conscious about not just the "good" but the possibility of "going wrong." Indeed, all morality would be redundant if there were no possibility of "going wrong." Already, in studying the "good" we are simultaneously striving to avoid the "bad." This is why effortless action (Wu Wei) which was discussed in terms of Confucius is radically reinterpreted by Daoists, as indicated in the last few lines all of which center on getting the idea of the self out of the way of action (e.g. acting without taking credit; acting without presumption et al.). For Confucius action becomes effortless (Wu wei) because the rituals that express virtue (li) become second nature through constant practice, as with virtuoso musicians who appear to play effortlessly, but in reality studied the detailed fingerwork for years before mastering it. For Daoists, Wu Wei is radically spontaneous and not the product of habituation. A sudden physical or mental move may occur immediately and without a lifelong preparation, and we are asked to trust our instincts, to not take our emotional and moral temperature at every turn but rather to let go and act without overemphasizing our own importance. Paradoxically, the more we think about being good at something, the less spontaneous and "effortless" it is likely to be. The key to Wu Wei for Taoists is un-self-consciousness, as happens when you are so immersed in doing something that you don't even think about the fact that you are doing it. I recall an example of this from a book I once read in which a centipede walking on all 100 of its little legs is stopped and asked by a flatworm, "How do you manage to coordinate all 100 of your legs so that you walk with such ease and effortlessness? Confused and now suddenly self-conscious, the centipede collapses on the spot. When we think too much about ourselves and how we "should" move, think, perform rituals etc., we risk losing touch with the Tao itself which gives us a natural mode of access to understanding and action in the world.When we take the self-image of ourselves as "virtuous persons" or junzi too seriously, we lose spontaneity because we are always living in the realm of "should." I "should" do this in order to be good. I should have done that, I failed to live up to my role as a good husband/wife etc. The category of "should, " as Nietzsche remarks in his Thus Spake Zarathustra, can take the form of a tyrannical conscience. Taoists, living thousands of years before him, had some interesting observations along these lines. In a discussion of Chapter 2 (quoted in full above) author Homes Welch, summarizes some of the themes here. He comments incisively that:
"[Lao Tsu's] sage never *tries* [emph added] to do good, because this requires having a concept of good which leads to having a concept evil, which leads to combatting evil, which only makes evil stronger. Second the sage never tries do do good because "every straight is doubled by a crooked, every good by an ill" (Ch. 58W) Human affairs are complex: good done to one person may be evil to another. Reward the deserving man with a prize and we plant envy in the hearts of the undeserving." (Welch: p. 23)
By now, I hope the general paradoxical theme that occupies much of the book of Lao Tzu starting from chapter 2 is clear. The paradoxical pattern, according to Lao Tsu, is that much of the harm done to human beings is the result of our contriving to do good. Put this way, it is a clear refusal to accommodate the Confucian impulse to articulate and ritualize virtue and uplift the lives, hearts and behaviors of all human beings in society from the upper echelons of royalty to the simple farmers. Lao Tzu does not believe in political programs and ethical projects. The philosophy of early Taoism has at times been embraced by anarchists who similarly believe that by exiting the social contract with all its overworked formulas, rituals, norms and high-minded calls to patriotism, we leave behind a pattern of behaviors that create the very conflict and harm they wish to avoid. Taoists often left the cities and villages of this violent period in ancient China to live as recluses and hermits.
Thoughts/ Assessment:
I hesitate to say much about my own response to the Taoist critique of Confucian philosophy, mainly because I would much rather know what any potential readers think of it, which is the suggested question for those who choose to comment. But if pressed to say at least a little bit on the subject, I would admit that some of these arguments raise genuine linguistic and psychological questions that challenge the Confucian project, but I would hasten to add at least the following 2 points. 1) The Taoist faith in withdrawal from the hurly burly of Warring States era society as a means of improvement is far less promising than the project of constructing a virtuous society via education and inculcation of norms and roles in the family-- the main artery through which "habits of the heart" are passed from generation to generation. Clever and quiet hermits who have dropped out and tuned into the mystical Tao may appeal to some modern anarchists, but I think Taoism's real strength was not in the area of politics where it contributed only indirectly, but rather in the realms of religion and the arts starting in the Han Dynasty. This contribution became extremely important when Buddhism was brought into the Song era version of Confucianism known as "Neo Confucianism" in which the central concepts of Mahayana Buddhism were not just translated into Chinese, but significantly altered in the process giving birth to Chan (i.e. Zen) Buddhism, as well as providing a mystical explication of the Tao or Way that found its way into the Neo-Confucian synthesis of the 11th century. So, to sum my own thoughts up here, the Taoist critique was less then devastating to Confucianism. Sure, it points to the impossibility of perfect or accurate description of mystical and ethical concepts, but this is always the case when new students flock around those who claim to teach virtuous living. Worse than imperfections of language as pedagogical tools is giving up on the idea of teaching virtue at all, counseling a kind of self-reliant and reclusive orientation in which the individual learns to trust his intuitions regarding the Way or Tao, but shows little interest in acting so as to bring an end to social strife and war. One can certainly grow emotionally and spiritually by living a reclusive and contemplative life, but this does not constitute a solution to the problems of the Warring States era that Confucians were up against.
However, once again, Taoism, though too perfectionistic for the political realm would in time inform the rich and beautiful landscape paintings, poems and mystical philosophical writings of both Tang and Song era China centuries later. Even within the Han dynasty Taoism played a vital role in the cultural sphere, if not so much within the largely Confucian and Legalistic state with its vast and literate bureaucracy. We will come to the Han Synthesis in the next post in this series of the history of ideas and philosophies of China in comparative perspective.
Suggested Question: What is your opinion regarding the Taoist critique of Confucian philosophy as explored in this post?
References/Suggested Reading:
-Tao Te Ching-- Lao-Tzu: trans. by Stephen Addiss and Stanley Lombardo: Hackett Publishing Co. 1993
-Sources of Chinese Wisdom (Volume I) compiled by WM Theodore De Bary, Wing-Tsit Chan and Burton Watson: Columbia U Press, 1960
- Tao Teh King by Lao Tzu Interpreted as Nature and Intelligence by Archie J. Bahm: Jain Publishing Co. 1996
-Taoism: The Parting of The Way by Holmes Welch: Beacon Press, 1957
-What is Taoism? by Herrlee G. Creel: U of Chicago Midway Reprint: 1970
- Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Dover edition: 1999
-The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently...and Why by Richard E. Nisbett: Free Press, NY 2003
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