Friday, January 2, 2026

New Jones section (1/2/26)

 

Sir William Jones and the Asiatic Society: Colonial Scholarship at the Threshold of Modernity

In 1783, William Jones—already celebrated as a linguist, jurist, and translator—arrived in Calcutta as a judge on the Supreme Court of Bengal. Within three years, he had founded the Asiatic Society and launched what became the discipline of comparative philology by identifying the common ancestry of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and other languages. Jones's collaborative work with Indian pandits, his advocacy for studying Indian texts "on their own terms," and his genuine reverence for Sanskrit literature made him an unlikely figure in the colonial apparatus. Yet he was also a colonial official wielding legal authority over Indians, a Biblical literalist who read Hindu cosmology through Genesis chronology, and a believer in European civilizational superiority despite his respect for Indian antiquity. The Asiatic Society became both a site of genuine intellectual exchange and an instrument of colonial knowledge production—a case study in how Tier-1 capacities (curiosity, epistemic humility, collaborative openness) can operate within, and be bounded by, thick Tier-2 commitments.


Tier-2 Commitments: Biblical Literalism, European Superiority, and Religious Enlightenment

Jones operated within a dense constellation of metaphysical, religious, and civilizational commitments that shaped every aspect of his work. Three stand out as particularly consequential.

First, Jones took the Biblical account of Genesis as literally, historically true. In his "Anniversary Discourses" to the Asiatic Society, he declared that "if the Mosaic account of the Flood be not true, then our national religion is on poor foundations."^1^ This was not casual piety but methodological principle: Jones used Enlightenment philology and comparative mythology to vindicate Biblical chronology against Voltairean skeptics who questioned whether human civilization could have arisen in the 4,000-6,000 years allowed by scriptural genealogies. As Urs App demonstrates in The Birth of Orientalism, Jones pursued what Renaissance humanists had called prisca theologia or "Ancient Theology"—the search for traces of primeval monotheistic revelation before the "idolatry of Babel."^2^ His discovery of linguistic kinship among Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin was not a secular breakthrough but part of this theological project: the Indo-European family mapped the post-Flood dispersal of Noah's descendants, with the "three sons of Noah" framework organizing his ethnological speculations.^3^

Jessica Patterson's Religion, Enlightenment and Empire shows that Jones's literalist focus on the Noachic Flood provided what he considered "rational" historical proof for the Bible, withstanding scientific scrutiny through comparative philology and geology.^4^ Thomas Trautmann calls this approach "Mosaic Ethnology": Indo-European languages as evidence of Genesis history, with linguistic divergence tracking the scattering of peoples after Babel.^5^ Far from representing Enlightenment secularism, Jones exemplified what scholars now call the "Religious Enlightenment"—a strain of eighteenth-century thought that deployed rational inquiry, comparative method, and empirical research in service of Christian apologetics, not against it.^6^ Michael J. Franklin positions Jones within the Rational Dissent tradition associated with figures like Richard Price and connections to Benjamin Franklin, showing how Jones's approach to Hinduism extended heterodox Christianity rather than transcending it.^7^

Second, Jones assumed European civilizational superiority as self-evident. India's ancient accomplishments commanded respect, but Europe was "more advanced" not merely technologically but morally and intellectually. In his third Anniversary Discourse (1786), Jones praised Sanskrit's grammatical perfection yet framed Indian philosophy as valuable primarily insofar as it approximated or anticipated European discoveries. The trajectory was clear: India had achieved greatness in antiquity, but had since stagnated or declined, while Europe progressed. This narrative justified British rule as potentially beneficial—enlightened governance could restore India to past glories or guide it toward modernity.

Third, Jones remained committed to Enlightenment universalism: the comparative method would reveal rational principles underlying superficial cultural differences, and all civilizations could be ranked on a single developmental scale. Combined with Biblical literalism, this produced a curious hybrid: polytheistic "idolatry" represented corruption of original monotheism, yet could be studied systematically to recover traces of primeval truth. Hindu cosmology's vast time-scales had to be compressed to fit Genesis; caste systems and "superstitions" marked decline from rational religion; yet Sanskrit texts preserved fragments of ancient wisdom worth recovering.

These commitments were mutually reinforcing. Biblical literalism required explaining Indian antiquity within 6,000-year timeline. European superiority explained why Jones would be the one to "recover" India's past for modern knowledge. Comparative method promised to synthesize everything into coherent picture—with Christianity and European civilization at the apex.


Navigation Under Constraint: Reverence, Collaboration, and the Limits of Curiosity

Within this framework, Jones nevertheless exhibited genuine curiosity and collaborative openness that enabled substantial intellectual exchange. His reverence for Sanskrit was not feigned. He called it "more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either."^8^ He spent years studying with pandits, learning not just language but prosody, philosophy, and literary conventions. He translated the Śakuntalā, Gītagovinda, and the Manusmṛti, producing works that introduced European readers to Indian literary and legal traditions in unprecedented depth.

Jones advocated studying Indian texts "in their own terms" rather than dismissing them as barbarous superstition—a marked contrast to many contemporaries who saw Hindu practices as mere devil-worship or degraded idolatry. He insisted the Asiatic Society employ Indian scholars as equals (within limits of colonial hierarchy), paid them respectfully, acknowledged their expertise in Society proceedings, and credited them in publications. This was not universal practice among colonial officials.

Yet this openness operated within strict boundaries. Jones's "Ancient Theology" project meant he was always reading through Indian texts to recover traces of original monotheism, not engaging Hindu cosmology on its own metaphysical terms. When texts presented doctrines irreconcilable with Genesis—such as the Kali Yuga's millions of years—Jones compressed timelines, reinterpreted metaphors, or dismissed passages as "priestly interpolations." When pandits explained concepts that didn't fit his theological framework, Jones either adapted them to his purposes or noted them as curiosities requiring future study.

Edward Said's Orientalism captures this dynamic with characteristic sharpness: "To rule and to learn, then to compare Orient with Occident: these were Jones's goals, which, with an irresistible impulse always to codify, to subdue the infinite variety of the Orient to a 'complete digest' of laws, figures, customs, and works, he is believed to have achieved."^9^ Said emphasizes how Jones's scholarship was inseparable from colonial power: as Supreme Court judge, Jones needed to systematize Hindu and Muslim law to administer justice "according to native custom" (as Company policy required). His translations of the Manusmṛti and legal digests compiled with pandits' assistance became instruments of governance—fixing fluid, context-dependent legal traditions into codified, enforceable statutes. The "discovery" of Indo-European kinship simultaneously elevated India's ancient past and justified British present rule: if Indians were civilizationally related to Europeans, then Britain's governance could be framed as familial stewardship rather than alien domination.

Jones's Tier-1 capacities—curiosity about unfamiliar traditions, willingness to learn from Indian scholars, epistemic humility about gaps in his own knowledge—enabled genuine collaboration and produced valuable scholarship. But these capacities operated within Tier-2 constraints that ultimately subordinated Indian knowledge to European frameworks and colonial purposes. The pandits Jones worked with were expert scholars in their own right, yet their knowledge entered the historical record primarily through Jones's framing, translation, and interpretation. Their names appear in acknowledgments; Jones's name defines the achievement.


Limits and Complications: Power Asymmetry and Biblical "Leakage"

The Asiatic Society's collaborative intellectual work unfolded within a profound power asymmetry that shaped every interaction. Jones was not a disinterested scholar but a Supreme Court judge—literally holding legal power over the Indians he studied with. Pandits who worked with the Society depended on British patronage in a context where traditional courtly and temple-based systems of scholarly support were eroding under Company rule. The "voluntary" nature of their collaboration must be understood against this background: refusing the most powerful legal official in Bengal carried risks.

This asymmetry extended to knowledge production itself. When Jones and pandits disagreed about textual interpretation, Jones's reading typically prevailed in published versions. When Indian scholars presented cosmological or philosophical frameworks incompatible with Christianity, Jones determined which elements were "essential" (and translatable) versus "priestly corruption" (and dismissable). The collaborative process was genuine, but occurred within a structure where European frameworks had final authority.

Jones's Biblical literalism produced what sensitive readers have called "intermittent leakage of Christian presuppositions" in his renderings of Sanskrit texts—a trait common among eighteenth and nineteenth-century Orientalists.^10^ Translating Hindu concepts of dharma, karma, moksha, or brahman inevitably involved interpretive choices, and Jones consistently chose renderings that made Indian philosophy more compatible with Christian theology. Brahman became "Supreme Being" (monotheistic deity), dharma became "duty" (Christian obligation), karma became "fate" or "destiny" (Providence), and moksha became "salvation" (Christian redemption). These weren't neutral equivalences but assimilations that obscured genuine metaphysical differences.

The contradiction between Jones's professed respect for Indian learning and his assumption of European superiority surfaced repeatedly. He praised Sanskrit's grammatical sophistication yet described contemporary Indians as having "degenerated" from ancient heights. He collaborated with pandits yet positioned himself as the one who would make their knowledge truly comprehensible by systematizing it through European categories. He advocated for Indian autonomy in religious and customary matters yet wielded legal authority to enforce his interpretations of "authentic" Hindu law against living traditions that had evolved beyond Manu's dicta.

None of this makes Jones a hypocrite or villain. He was operating with intellectual tools and moral frameworks available to him—tools that included genuine curiosity, comparative method, collaborative spirit, and Biblical literalism, racial hierarchy, and imperial confidence. The point is precisely that Tier-1 capacities and Tier-2 commitments operated simultaneously, enabling productive exchange while also constraining and ultimately subordinating what was exchanged.


Genealogical Afterlife: The Ambiguous Legacy of Colonial Philology

Jones's work birthed comparative philology as a discipline, establishing methods and frameworks that dominated nineteenth-century linguistics. His "philological proof" of Indo-European kinship—presented in the famous Third Anniversary Discourse (1786)—inspired generations of scholars who mapped language families, reconstructed proto-languages, and theorized about prehistoric migrations.^11^ The discovery was genuine and consequential: Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Gothic, Celtic, and Persian do share common ancestry. The linguistic evidence Jones marshaled was sound.

Yet this achievement was inseparable from its theological and imperial context. The Indo-European hypothesis served multiple agendas simultaneously: it vindicated Genesis chronology (post-Flood dispersal), it established civilizational kinship between Indians and Europeans (justifying British rule as familial governance), and it positioned Sanskrit as "classical" antiquity (safely past, requiring European scholars to resurrect it). Subsequent scholars secularized Jones's framework, dropping the Biblical scaffolding, but retained the basic structure: languages evolve from common ancestors, can be ranked by sophistication, and reveal historical migrations that map onto racial/civilizational hierarchies.

The Asiatic Society itself became a model for colonial knowledge institutions—learned societies that combined genuine scholarship with administrative utility, employing "native informants" whose expertise enriched European knowledge while subordinating indigenous intellectual traditions to Western frameworks. Later Orientalist institutions from Cairo to Saigon followed this pattern: collaborative research producing valuable knowledge while simultaneously supporting colonial governance.

Jones's ambiguous legacy includes both genuine contributions to human knowledge and participation in colonial knowledge-power. He helped establish comparative philology, introduced European readers to Sanskrit literature, and demonstrated that ancient India possessed sophisticated intellectual traditions worthy of serious study. He also codified Hindu law in ways that simplified and rigidified living traditions, framed Indian civilization as past greatness requiring European resurrection, and used scholarship to support colonial administration. The pandits he worked with enabled his achievements but remain largely anonymous in historical memory—their expertise acknowledged in footnotes while Jones's name defines the era.

As Jawaharlal Nehru later wrote, Jones was "a great scholar who did work of lasting value," yet "his scholarship was tied up with the politics and economics of British rule."^12^ The Asiatic Society's intellectual exchange was real; the power asymmetry structuring that exchange was also real. Tier-1 virtues enabled collaboration; Tier-2 commitments ensured the collaboration served imperial ends. Navigation across profound difference occurred, but within boundaries that ultimately reinforced the hierarchies being navigated.


Endnotes:

^1^ William Jones, "Third Anniversary Discourse" (1786), in The Works of Sir William Jones (London, 1807), 3:34.

^2^ Urs App, The Birth of Orientalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 133-156.

^3^ Thomas R. Trautmann, Aryans and British India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 28-61.

^4^ Jessica Patterson, Religion, Enlightenment and Empire: British Interpretations of Hinduism in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 178-203.

^5^ Trautmann, Aryans and British India, 49-61.

^6^ David Sorkin, The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). On Jones specifically, see Patterson, Religion, Enlightenment and Empire, 15-42.

^7^ Michael J. Franklin, Orientalist Jones: Sir William Jones, Poet, Lawyer, and Linguist, 1746-1794 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 89-112.

^8^ Jones, "Third Anniversary Discourse," 34.

^9^ Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994 [1978]), 78.

^10^ On "Biblical leakage," see Raymond Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance: Europe's Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680-1880, trans. Gene Patterson-Black and Victor Reinking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 54-67; Franklin, Orientalist Jones, 234-258.

^11^ For Jones's impact on comparative philology, see Hans Aarsleff, The Study of Language in England, 1780-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 115-161; Trautmann, Aryans and British India, 62-97.

^12^ Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: John Day Company, 1946), 299.


[Word count: ~2,850 words]

Thursday, January 1, 2026

William Jones history and legacy notes (revisited)

 

To rule and to learn, then to compare Orient with Occident: these were Jones’s goals, which, with an irresistible impulse always to codify, to subdue the infinite variety of the Orient to a “complete digest” of laws, figures, customs, and works, he is believed to have achieved. (Said 1994:78)

Sir William Jones (1746–1794) is often viewed as the "father of Indology," yet his legacy is a battleground between those who see him as a brilliant bridge-builder and those who see him as a sophisticated tool of colonial power.

Before diving into the debates sparked by Edward Said or the "Religious Enlightenment" revisionists, here are the essential and agreed-upon facts of his life.


1. Boyhood and Early Education (1746–1764)

  • Birth & Pedigree: Born in London to a Welsh family. His father, William Jones Sr., was a celebrated mathematician who famously introduced the use of the symbol π to represent the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter.


  • The Widow’s Influence: His father died when Jones was only three. He was raised by his mother, Mary Nix Jones, who encouraged a rigorous "learning by doing" philosophy.


  • Sir William Jones (1746–1794) is often viewed as the "father of Indology," yet his legacy is a battleground between those who see him as a brilliant bridge-builder and those who see him as a sophisticated tool of colonial power.

    Before diving into the debates sparked by Edward Said or the "Religious Enlightenment" revisionists, here are the essential and agreed-upon facts of his life.


    1. Boyhood and Early Education (1746–1764)

    • Birth & Pedigree: Born in London to a Welsh family. His father, William Jones Sr., was a celebrated mathematician who famously introduced the use of the symbol to represent the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter.


  • The Widow’s Influence: His father died when Jones was only three. He was raised by his mother, Mary Nix Jones, who encouraged a rigorous "learning by doing" philosophy.


  • The Harrow Prodigy: At Harrow School, Jones’s linguistic genius became apparent. He mastered Greek and Latin so thoroughly that he began teaching himself Hebrew, Arabic, and Persian during his holidays.


2. The Oxford Years and "Persian Jones" (1764–1783)

  • Oxford Scholar: He entered University College, Oxford, in 1764. Lacking independent wealth, he supported himself by tutoring the young Lord Althorp (son of Earl Spencer).

  •  

Wednesday, December 31, 2025

On my view, once all the dust settles, Science-as-ontology—that is, metaphysical naturalism/physicalism plus strong scientific realism—is best seen as one powerful Tier‑2 tradition among others, not as the neutral frame in which all other outlooks must be judged.

By “Science-as-ontology” here, I mean not laboratory practice or domain‑specific theory, but a thick metaphysical package: whatever exists is physical or wholly dependent on the physical; our best or future natural science will, in principle, fix the complete ontology of the universe; anything that cannot be described in that vocabulary is not ultimately real. This is the form of scientific realism with a capital R that Putnam later abandoned—the “God’s‑eye” picture of a single, theory‑independent total description which our mature science is supposedly converging toward.

Historically, this Tier‑2 formation has roots in 19th‑ and 20th‑century successes of physics, chemistry, and biology, in Victorian and early modern naturalisms, and in the secular humanisms of figures like Einstein and Dewey who explicitly rejected any “supernatural” realm and identified reality with what a completed science would describe. In contemporary philosophy, it shows up as the default physicalism reported in surveys of professional metaphysicians and philosophers of mind, frequently coupled with robust scientific realism about unobservables and with the assumption that scientific ontology is the answer to Quine’s “What is there?”. In psychiatry and medicine, it underwrites biopsychosocial models that, in practice, treat every legitimate phenomenon—pain, mood, “stress,” religious experience—as something that must have, in the end, a discoverable physical mechanism.

Seen through the Tier‑1/Tier‑2 distinction, this is not “the view from nowhere”; it is one thick, historically situated worldview: secular, physicalist, empiricist, wedded to a particular image of Nature as a closed, law‑governed totality. It sits alongside other Tier‑2 traditions (religious, philosophical, ideological), overlaps with them in some places and conflicts in others, and exerts a strong cultural and institutional pull—especially in universities, philosophy departments, and clinical sciences. But it is still a tradition: it has origins, exemplars, canonical texts, tacit norms, and blind spots. It is powerful and often epistemically privileged in many domains, yet it remains one tradition among many, not a metaphysically guaranteed map of Reality as a whole.

On reflection, treating physicalist scientific realism as the ontology of reality is speculative metaphysics because its strongest claims go far beyond what even the best scientific practice actually delivers. Science gives us a patchwork of powerful, domain‑specific theories, impressive technologies, and an evolving set of models that work astonishingly well in many contexts. What it does not give us is a single, unified, evidence‑based demonstration that there is a closed, fixed “object domain” of all that exists, exhaustively characterizable in current or foreseeable physical terms. In practice, we see unresolved fractures (GR vs. QM, dark matter/energy, the hard problem of consciousness, the messy state of psychiatric aetiology), interpretive underdetermination (quantum interpretations, competing models in cosmology and neuroscience), and extensive use of idiopathic and functional labels where mechanisms are unknown. Elevating this fallible, fragmentary picture into a final account of “Nature/Reality as a whole” is an extra philosophical move, not something forced on us by the data.

The view is also structurally incoherent in the way it polices its own boundary. By asserting that “everything is physical or wholly depends on the physical” and “there is no supernatural,” it defines “nature” in purely negative, a priori terms: whatever turns out to be real must, by stipulation, be natural. Any future discovery—panpsychist micro‑subjects, radically new field‑like phenomena, forms of experience that do not fit current categories—will simply be reclassified as “natural” after the fact. This makes “naturalism” unfalsifiable as a global thesis: no possible observation could count as evidence that reality exceeds the current frame, because the frame expands by definition. The same picture then downgrades or redescribes first‑person qualia, thick moral concepts, and religious or depth‑psychological experiences from a purported “view from nowhere,” even though its own third‑person methods depend in practice on precisely those inner perspectives and normative judgments (about what counts as evidence, reliability, harm, or improvement) that it claims to reduce. In that sense, physicalist scientific realism is not just an overgeneralization from good scientific practice; it is a self‑insulating metaphysics that quietly relies on, and then disowns, the very first‑person and normative phenomena it needs in order for science to function at all.

 


To be inserted/revised in long essay on tier 1 &2 virtues and intercultural relations

 1) Re: insertion about negative direction of both official inter and intrastate (civil) wars involving the "great powers" (esp. in West , esp US) and extra-judicial forms of cruelty (secret renditions, drone attacks with ~90% civilian "collateral" death, militarization of police and rates of reported brutality, some well recorded-- not just blacks and Latinos,  but poor whites as well, see WaPo article I cited some time ago), poverty levels rising, starvation rates even in most wealthy nations like US esp. among children). All to contrast with self-understanding, certainly among elites, but more or less among pop. at large, that we're "advanced" and more "humane" than those from past centuries. Some info. on this:

 

 

The current evidence suggests that the early twenty‑first century is not an era of growing peace, but one of record levels of armed conflict, intense Western interventionism, and massive civilian harm, even where great powers avoid direct war with one another. Large‑scale datasets, independent academic projects, and widely accessible indices all show a sharp deterioration in global peacefulness and a heavy human toll linked to post‑Cold War and post‑9/11 wars.

Rising conflicts and Western interventions

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. and allied military interventions have increased in both frequency and geographic spread, contradicting the idea that a unipolar order brought stability. A study summarized by the Quincy Institute’s Responsible Statecraft, using the Military Intervention Project dataset, finds that the United States has undertaken roughly 392 military interventions since 1776 and that more than a quarter of these occurred after the Cold War, making the post‑9/11 period one of the most militarily aggressive in U.S. history.

Global conflict data tell a similar story. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) reports that the number of state‑based armed conflicts reached a record 59 in 2023 and then climbed to 61 in 2024, the highest level since systematic data collection began in 1946. UCDP analysts also note that 2024 was the fourth most violent year since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and that explicitly targeted violence against civilians killed about 13,900 people in that year alone, a 31 percent increase over 2023.

Human costs of the post‑9/11 wars

Research from Brown University’s “Costs of War” project provides one of the clearest, publicly accessible summaries of the human impact of U.S.‑led post‑9/11 wars. According to the project’s 2023–2025 findings, at least 940,000 people have been killed directly by war violence in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, and related theaters, including hundreds of thousands of civilians. When indirect deaths from war‑driven disease, malnutrition, and collapsed infrastructure are included, total fatalities are estimated at roughly 4.5–4.7 million people.

The same research estimates that these wars have displaced at least 38 million people, and possibly as many as 49–60 million, making this the largest episode of forced displacement since World War II aside from the world wars themselves. Mainstream outlets such as the Washington Post and Euronews have summarized these Brown findings, providing easy entry points for non‑specialist readers.

“Great Fragmentation” and the end of the “Long Peace”

The Global Peace Index (GPI), produced annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace and freely available online, shows a long, steady decline in global peacefulness since the mid‑2000s. The 2025 GPI report describes a process of “Great Fragmentation,” noting that many key indicators that precede major wars—such as militarization, refugee flows, and external conflict involvement—are now at their worst levels since World War II.

These findings directly challenge the popular narrative, associated above all with Steven Pinker’s 2011 book The Better Angels of Our Nature, that humanity is living through a historically unprecedented “Long Peace” and “New Peace.” Pinker’s argument emphasizes long‑term declines in violence rates, especially per‑capita risks of violent death, but critics point out that his framework can treat massive modern wars and interventions as compatible with “progress” so long as population growth outpaces deaths. The post‑2014 deterioration captured by UCDP and the GPI—including record numbers of armed conflicts, multi‑decade highs in battle deaths, and severe targeting of civilians—has made Pinker’s optimistic extrapolation look less like a law of history and more like a temporary, fragile plateau enforced by nuclear deterrence and shifting patterns of proxy warfare.

Torture, renditions, and civilian targeting

The post‑9/11 era has also seen the normalization of practices—such as torture, secret detention, and drone warfare—that underscore how far contemporary powers still are from the self‑image of “humane” and law‑bound security states. The U.S. Senate’s report on the CIA detention and interrogation program, together with investigations by groups like Open Society Justice Initiative, document at least 39 individuals tortured under “enhanced interrogation” methods and the participation of at least 54 countries in the CIA’s rendition and black‑site network.

In the Israeli–Palestinian context, the UN Committee Against Torture’s 2025 session on Israel, as well as reports by Palestinian and international human rights organizations, describe widespread and systemic torture and ill‑treatment of Palestinian detainees, including during the Gaza war after October 2023. These accounts detail severe beatings, stress positions, deprivation, dog attacks, and sexual violence, and note a rise in deaths in custody, reinforcing the picture of an international order in which “Western” or Western‑aligned states continue to employ extreme violence behind a liberal façade.

Why Pinker’s story no longer fits the evidence

Taken together, these strands of evidence indicate that the world is not moving steadily toward peace under the guidance of “better angels,” but is instead entering a period of chronic, fragmented, and often undeclared warfare in which powerful states externalize risks and costs onto more vulnerable societies. While it is true that rich countries have largely avoided direct great‑power wars on their own soil since 1945, the record‑high number of armed conflicts, the millions killed directly and indirectly in U.S.‑led wars, and the tens of millions displaced by these interventions undermine the comforting myth that “Western civilization” has transcended its violent past.

By relying heavily on per‑capita statistics and long time‑horizons, Pinker’s framework obscures the scale and distribution of present‑day suffering, especially in regions most affected by Western military action and proxy wars. Publicly accessible resources—UCDP’s conflict tallies, Brown University’s Costs of War reports, and the Global Peace Index—offer a starkly different picture: a world in which organized violence is at or near post‑1945 highs and in which Western‑led and Western‑backed interventions are central drivers of that trend

 


While the frequency of interstate wars (wars between nations) remained generally low after 1945, there has been a documented increase in military interventions and the internationalization of conflicts involving Western powers since the end of the Cold War. 
Post-WWII vs. Post-Cold War Trends
  • Reduced Direct Conflict (1945–1990): Following WWII, major powers avoided direct conventional warfare due to nuclear deterrence and the establishment of alliances like NATO. While proxy wars occurred, the rate of direct Western military intervention was lower compared to the modern era.
  • Rise in Post-Cold War Interventions: U.S. and Western military interventions increased significantly after 1991. One study indicates that over 25% of all U.S. military interventions since 1776 occurred in the post-Cold War period. The average rate of U.S. interventions rose from 8.3 per year during the Cold War to approximately 7 per year in the post-Cold War era, representing a 60% increase in frequency when adjusted for duration.
  • Record Highs in the 2020s: By 2024 and 2025, the number of active state-based armed conflicts reached 61, the highest recorded since the end of World War II. 

Key Drivers of the Increase
  • Unipolarity and Interventionism: The absence of a Soviet counterweight in the 1990s allowed Western powers to intervene more frequently in civil wars and humanitarian crises (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo).
  • Internationalization of Internal Conflicts: Modern wars are increasingly "internationalized," with 78 countries involved in conflicts beyond their borders in 2024.
  • New Strategic Aims: Post-Cold War conflicts shifted toward fighting the War on Terror, removing regimes, and addressing internal stability in fragmented states. 

Impact on Global Peace
  • Battle Deaths: Despite the higher number of conflicts, total battle deaths remained lower than mid-20th century peaks until a recent spike. However, deaths hit a 30-year high in 2022 due to major wars in Ukraine and Gaza.
  • Global Fragmentation: Analysts describe current trends as a "Great Fragmentation," with global peacefulness reaching its lowest levels in decades by 2025.
     
  •  
  • Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the
    Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has seen the highest concentration of direct Western military interventions, particularly in terms of large-scale combat and regime changes .
  •  
  • However, when including all types of military actions (such as troop deployments, threats of force, and special operations), Latin America historically remains the region with the highest total number of U.S. interventions Regional Breakdown of Western Interventions (1991–2025)
  • Middle East and North Africa (MENA): This region became the primary focus of direct combat operations after 1991.
    • Major Operations: Persian Gulf War (1991), Iraq War (2003–2011), Libya intervention (2011), and ongoing counter-ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria.
    • Recent Trends: Frequent use of drone strikes and special forces in Yemen and Somalia as part of the War on Terror.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa: Interventions here have shifted from humanitarian missions to counter-terrorism.
    • Key Interventions: Somalia (1992–1994), and more recent French and U.S. "advise and assist" missions in the Sahel region (Niger, Mali).
  • Europe (Balkans and Eastern Europe): The collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s brought significant Western military involvement to the continent.
    • Key Interventions: NATO bombing in Bosnia (1995) and the Kosovo War (1999).
    • 2020s Shift: While not a direct intervention, the massive scale of Western military aid and intelligence support during the 2022–2025 Russia-Ukraine War represents a peak in internationalized conflict involvement.
  • Asia: Dominated by the 20-year war in Afghanistan (2001–2021), which involved nearly all NATO members and several other Western allies.
  • Latin America and Caribbean: While direct "wars" have decreased, this region still experiences frequent "low-intensity" interventions, such as those in Haiti (1994, 2004) and counter-narcotics operations across Central and South America.  (some links: Statistica:  and Responsible Statecraft = both written before Gaza and during the first year of Ukraine ) Responsible Staecraft Report from  8/22 contains many other helpful links, but now we would have to factor in additionals with Middle East and Gaza on fire. Further, Latin America , which was already noted then as most frequently hit by "low intensity" interventions , now becoming more overt as war with Venezuela looks like a distinct possibility ini near future as we have MURDERED (under faux "War Powers" without congress) 100 people on the open sea in Caribbean and Pacific Ocean off Venezuala and Colombia respectively.  In 2022 RS reports over 400 US interventioins in the 30 yrs. post cold war.  RS author Nick Turse has covered the US role in Africa which he claims led to enormous rises in both terrorism and war there, as well as covert ops in which US was involved in regime change: all his articles for Responsible Statecraft here:    Summary of Intensity vs. Frequency
    Region

    Frequency of InterventionIntensity/Scale of Combat
    Middle EastHighVery High (Major Wars)
    Latin AmericaHighest (Historical)Moderate (Civil/Covert)
    AfricaGrowingModerate (Counter-terror)
    Europe (Ukraine)





 

In the 21st century, U.S. military interventions—primarily associated with the
Post-9/11 Wars—have resulted in millions of deaths and the largest scale of human displacement since World War II. (Brown Costs of War)

1. Casualties (Deaths and Injuries)

Estimates for the total death toll across major war zones (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan) reach as high as 4.5 to 4.7 million people as of late 2025.
After WW2 the rate of wars involving Western powers slowed down, but after the cold war ended it has risen again
While the frequency of
interstate wars (wars between nations) remained generally low after 1945, there has been a documented increase in military interventions and the internationalization of conflicts involving Western powers since the end of the Cold War. 
Post-WWII vs. Post-Cold War Trends
  • Reduced Direct Conflict (1945–1990): Following WWII, major powers avoided direct conventional warfare due to nuclear deterrence and the establishment of alliances like NATO. While proxy wars occurred, the rate of direct Western military intervention was lower compared to the modern era.
  • Rise in Post-Cold War Interventions: U.S. and Western military interventions increased significantly after 1991. One study indicates that over 25% of all U.S. military interventions since 1776 occurred in the post-Cold War period. The average rate of U.S. interventions rose from 8.3 per year during the Cold War to approximately 7 per year in the post-Cold War era, representing a 60% increase in frequency when adjusted for duration.
  • Record Highs in the 2020s: By 2024 and 2025, the number of active state-based armed conflicts reached 61, the highest recorded since the end of World War II. 

Key Drivers of the Increase
  • Unipolarity and Interventionism: The absence of a Soviet counterweight in the 1990s allowed Western powers to intervene more frequently in civil wars and humanitarian crises (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo).
  • Internationalization of Internal Conflicts: Modern wars are increasingly "internationalized," with 78 countries involved in conflicts beyond their borders in 2024.
  • New Strategic Aims: Post-Cold War conflicts shifted toward fighting the War on Terror, removing regimes, and addressing internal stability in fragmented states. 

Impact on Global Peace
  • Battle Deaths: Despite the higher number of conflicts, total battle deaths remained lower than mid-20th century peaks until a recent spike. However, deaths hit a 30-year high in 2022 due to major wars in Ukraine and Gaza.
  • Global Fragmentation: Analysts describe current trends as a "Great Fragmentation," with global peacefulness reaching its lowest levels in decades by 2025. 

Would you like to see a regional breakdown of where these Western military interventions have been most concentrated since 1991?
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Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has seen the highest concentration of direct Western military interventions, particularly in terms of large-scale combat and regime changes. 
However, when including all types of military actions (such as troop deployments, threats of force, and special operations), Latin America historically remains the region with the highest total number of U.S. interventions. 
Regional Breakdown of Western Interventions (1991–2025)
  • Middle East and North Africa (MENA): This region became the primary focus of direct combat operations after 1991.
    • Major Operations: Persian Gulf War (1991), Iraq War (2003–2011), Libya intervention (2011), and ongoing counter-ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria.
    • Recent Trends: Frequent use of drone strikes and special forces in Yemen and Somalia as part of the War on Terror.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa: Interventions here have shifted from humanitarian missions to counter-terrorism.
    • Key Interventions: Somalia (1992–1994), and more recent French and U.S. "advise and assist" missions in the Sahel region (Niger, Mali).
  • Europe (Balkans and Eastern Europe): The collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s brought significant Western military involvement to the continent.
    • Key Interventions: NATO bombing in Bosnia (1995) and the Kosovo War (1999).
    • 2020s Shift: While not a direct intervention, the massive scale of Western military aid and intelligence support during the 2022–2025 Russia-Ukraine War represents a peak in internationalized conflict involvement.
  • Asia: Dominated by the 20-year war in Afghanistan (2001–2021), which involved nearly all NATO members and several other Western allies.
  • Latin America and Caribbean: While direct "wars" have decreased, this region still experiences frequent "low-intensity" interventions, such as those in Haiti (1994, 2004) and counter-narcotics operations across Central and South America. 

Summary of Intensity vs. Frequency
Region

Frequency of InterventionIntensity/Scale of Combat
Middle EastHighVery High (Major Wars)
Latin AmericaHighest (Historical)Moderate (Civil/Covert)
AfricaGrowingModerate (Counter-terror)
EuropeLow (before Ukraine)High (Strategic/Interstate)
Would you like to focus on the strategic reasons why certain regions, like the Middle East, became such a high priority after the Cold War compared to others?
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The Middle East became the primary focus of post-Cold War Western military intervention due to its unique role as the "crossroads of empires" and its disproportionate impact on the global economy
. 
While Latin America remains a high-frequency area for "low-intensity" operations, the Middle East draws massive conventional forces because of the following strategic pillars:
1. Global Energy Security (The "Oil" Factor)
Even as Western nations like the U.S. became net energy exporters by 2024, the Middle East remained critical because it holds 64% of the world's proven oil reserves and 34% of its gas. 
  • Economic Interdependence: Because oil is a fungible global commodity, a supply disruption in the Persian Gulf causes worldwide price spikes that damage Western economies, regardless of where they buy their fuel.
  • Denial of Access: Western strategy often focuses on preventing competitors (historically the USSR, and increasingly China in 2025) from controlling these resources or global shipping lanes like the Suez Canal and Strait of Hormuz. 

2. Regional Stability and Alliance Credibility
With the Soviet Union's collapse, the West—particularly the U.S.—took on the role of the "indispensable power" to manage regional disputes that could escalate into global crises. 
  • Defense of Israel: Ensuring Israel's military superiority and security has been a consistent pillar of Western policy, driven by deep historical, cultural, and strategic ties.
  • Counter-Proliferation: The region’s volatility, combined with the pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by states like Iraq (historically) and Iran, has been a primary justification for "preemptive" military action. 

3. Containment of Non-State Threats
Following 9/11, the Middle East became the central front for the War on Terror.
  • Power Vacuums: The fragmentation of states after the Cold War allowed groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS to seize territory, forcing Western powers into long-term "stabilization" missions to prevent these groups from launching global attacks. 

4. Shift to "Great Power Competition" (2025 Perspective)
By late 2025, Western strategy is shifting again. While the Middle East remains a "hotbed," there is an active effort to pivot toward the Indo-Pacific to counter China and toward Eastern Europe to counter Russia. 
  • Burden Sharing: New 2025 policies emphasize that regional partners (like Israel and the Gulf states) must take a leading role in their own security, allowing the West to "retrench" or reduce its permanent footprint. 

Would you like to examine the economic costs of these Middle Eastern interventions compared to the strategic benefits the West gained from them?
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How much have civilian deaths , injuries, displaced persons and refugees risen in the 21st century due to US interventions
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In the 21st century, U.S. military interventions—primarily associated with the
Post-9/11 Wars—have resulted in millions of deaths and the largest scale of human displacement since World War II. 
1. Casualties (Deaths and Injuries)
Estimates for the total death toll across major war zones (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan) reach as high as 4.5 to 4.7 million people as of late 2025. 
  • Direct Deaths: Over 940,000 people have been killed by direct war violence, including at least 432,000 civilians.
  • Indirect Deaths: An estimated 3.6 to 3.8 million people have died from the "reverberating effects" of these wars, such as the destruction of healthcare, spread of disease, and malnutrition.
  • Injuries: The number of people wounded or traumatized extends into the tens of millions. For instance, in Gaza alone—where the U.S. has provided significant military aid and regional support—more than 169,430 injuries were reported by October 2025. 

2. Displaced Persons and Refugees
The U.S. post-9/11 wars have forcibly displaced at least 38 million people, with some estimates suggesting the number could be as high as 59 million. 
  • Historical Scale: This level of displacement exceeds that of any other conflict in the 20th or 21st century, with the exception of World War II.
  • Recent Surges (2024–2025):
    • Middle East: In the conflicts involving Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank (supported by $31–$33 billion in U.S. military spending since late 2023), over 5.27 million people were newly displaced by September 2025.
    • Syria: Approximately 7.4 million people remain internally displaced in Syria as of 2025, following decades of civil war and international intervention.
    • Iraq: More than 1.1 million people remain displaced within Iraq as of late 2025. 

Summary of Human Impact (2001–2025)
Category

Estimated Total
Direct Violent Deaths940,000+
Total Deaths (Direct + Indirect)4.5 – 4.7 Million
Total Displaced Persons38 – 59 Million
Injuries & TraumaTens of Millions
Note: Indirect deaths often occur long after combat ends due to collapsed infrastructure and are estimated to be 3.5 to 4 times higher than direct combat deaths.
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  • Rising use of torture by US and Western Powers including Israel --best available estimates?

    In the 21st century, allegations and documented instances of torture involving the U.S., Western allies, and
    Israel have surged, primarily driven by the
    War on Terror and more recently by the Israel-Gaza war. 
    United States and Western Interventions (2001–2025)
    The use of "enhanced interrogation techniques"—widely classified as torture—became systematic following the September 11 attacks. 
    • Scale of Abuse: At least 39 individuals were officially documented as being tortured by the CIA, while thousands more were subjected to "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment" across a network of global "black sites" and military prisons like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.
    • Death in Custody: Between 2002 and 2005, at least 17 detainees died from abuse while in the custody of U.S. or U.K. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.
    • Western Complicity: At least 54 governments participated in the U.S. rendition program, which involved transporting suspects to countries where they faced high risks of torture.
    • Current Trends (2025): While large-scale state-sanctioned programs have officially ended, human rights groups in 2025 continue to report on abusive detention conditions in new U.S. migration facilities, citing "enforced disappearances" and inhumane treatment. 

    Israel (2023–2025)
    Estimates of torture in Israel have risen sharply since the escalation of conflict in October 2023. 
    • Systemic Nature: In late 2025, the UN Committee Against Torture described a "de facto state policy of organized and widespread torture" against Palestinian detainees.
    • Specific Allegations: Reports from 2024 and 2025 document severe beatings, attacks by dogs, waterboarding, electrocution, and systematic sexual violence against both men and women.
    • Child Detainees: Estimates indicate that more than 67% of Palestinian children detained in the West Bank reported physical abuse during arrest or interrogation.
    • Fatalities: By late 2025, human rights organizations highlighted at least 19 cases of severe abuse, including the deaths of multiple Palestinians held in Israeli custody. 

    Comparison of Estimates
    Metric 

    U.S. (Post-9/11 Peak)Israel (2024–2025)
    Documented CasesHundreds (interrogations)Thousands (detentions/arrests)
    Death Toll in Custody17+ (Iraq/Afghanistan)6-19+ (Reported cases)
    Methods CitedWaterboarding, stress positions, sleep deprivationSevere beatings, sexual violence, dog attacks, electrocution
     
    CONTRA STeven Pinker: 
    In his 2011 book
    , Steven Pinker used statistical trends to argue that violence has declined significantly across human history, describing a "Long Peace" after WWII and a "New Peace" after the Cold War. 
    By late 2025, empirical evidence presents a major challenge to this thesis. While his data on the long-term decline from prehistory remains influential, the short-term trends of the 2020s have sharply reversed many of the declines he celebrated. 
    1. Rise in Frequency of Conflicts
    Pinker emphasized a steady decline in the number of armed conflicts. However: 
    • Historic Highs: In 2024 and 2025, the number of active state-based armed conflicts reached 61, the highest recorded since data collection began in 1946.
    • Doubling of Conflict: The level of conflict worldwide has doubled over the past five years (2020–2025). 

    2. Battle Deaths Spike
    A core pillar of Pinker's argument was the decline in battle-related deaths as a proportion of the population. Recent data contradicts this "downward sawtooth": 
    • 30-Year Highs: 2022 and 2023 saw the highest levels of battle-related deaths in three decades, largely due to the wars in Ukraine and Ethiopia.
    • Deadliest Year: 2024 was recorded as the fourth most violent year since the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
    • Total Fatalities: Between 2020 and late 2024, fatalities reached nearly 10.5 million, compared to approximately 953,000 for the entire decade of 2010–2019. 

    3. Escalation of Violence Against Civilians
    Pinker argued that modern states "civilized" violence, making it less likely to target non-combatants. 
    • Targeted Violence: In 2024 and 2025, targeted violence against civilians rose significantly, even as some frontline battle deaths stabilized.
    • Demographic Shifts: In 2023, the proportion of women killed in conflicts doubled (from 2 in 10 to 4 in 10) compared to previous years. 

    4. Methodological Criticisms (Post-2011)
    Critics and researchers have noted several flaws in Pinker's original case that have become more evident by 2025:
    • The "Per Capita" Defense: Pinker argues that absolute numbers are less relevant than the probability of an individual dying from violence. Critics respond that if population grows exponentially, war deaths could increase dramatically in absolute terms while still "declining" per capita—a metric that masks the actual scale of modern carnage.
    • Nuclear Deterrence: Many historians argue the "Long Peace" was not driven by "better angels" (reason/empathy) but by nuclear deterrence, which Pinker largely downplayed.
    • Internationalization: Modern conflicts are increasingly "internationalized," involving more outside powers (like Western interventions) than the civil wars Pinker analyzed in the early 2010s. 

    Summary: Pinker vs. 2025 Evidence
    Pinker's Claim (2011) 

    Empirical Reality (2025)
    Violence is on a steady downward trend.Conflict frequency is at a post-WWII high (61 active wars).
    Major interstate wars are becoming obsolete.The Russia-Ukraine war is the deadliest interstate conflict in decades.
    Civilians are safer in the modern era.Civilian casualties surged 72% in 2023 alone.