Here it might help to bring Dewey back into the convo. This is a parallel exchange I had on this topic. --
John Dewey embraced a form of value pluralism and advocated for the use of reflective intelligence and the experimental method (inquiry) within a democratic framework as the primary means of managing the conflicts that inevitably arise from a diversity of values.
Value Pluralism
Dewey argued for a "radical pluralism of value and meaning" in human experience, rejecting the idea of a single, ultimate moral principle or fixed hierarchy of values that could resolve all conflicts theoretically. He held that moral experience is heterogeneous and involves distinct existential factors (such as aspirations, obligations, and approvals) which often conflict and cannot be reduced to one overarching concept.
For Dewey, this conflict is a typical part of the human condition, not a sign of moral failure or a temporary state of ignorance. Trying to solve all moral problems with one "correct" method or a priori fixed reference point is, in his view, inadequate and "impoverish[es] moral life".
Managing Conflict through Inquiry and Democracy
Rather than seeking a theoretical resolution, Dewey focused on a practical, instrumental method for addressing conflicts as they arise in concrete situations.
Inquiry as Method: When habits or impulses are blocked by a "problematic situation" involving conflicting values, thoughtful deliberation (a form of inquiry) is required. This process involves:
Imaginative exploration: Considering various possible courses of action and their potential consequences (a "thought experiment") before acting in the real world.
Empirical testing: Treating value judgments as hypotheses to be tested in practice. The "results are satisfactory" if they solve the problem and enable successful responses to novel situations.
Reconstruction of values: Refining and modifying desires and value judgments in light of their actual consequences and the context, leading to moral progress.
Democracy as a Way of Life: Dewey believed that democracy, conceived as a "mode of associated living" and a "free give-and-take" of experience, is essential for managing value pluralism effectively.
Communication and open interaction: Democratic processes, including discussion, consultation, and debate, allow for the free communication of interests and open interaction among people with diverse backgrounds and values.
Social learning: Democracy is experimental; it provides a framework for collective social learning, enabling society to question established norms and adapt to changing circumstances.
Distrust of fixed authority: He advocated for broad democratic participation, arguing that placing decision-making solely in the hands of "experts" or relying on rigid ethical theories built on a distrust of human intelligence is counterproductive.
In essence, for Dewey, conflict is managed not by imposing a single "right" value, but by using shared intelligence and a commitment to experimental, democratic processes to find practical and mutually satisfactory adjustments among genuinely disparate forces.
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Famously, he was criticized for having few adequate resources to handle conflict. Niehbuhr thought his faith in inquiry too naive, for example, in the face of fierce and high-stakes contestations in the real world. What might a Dewyan say in response? I've read a book on just this topic from the 90s, but thought pragmatists might have developed a) richer readings of Dewey (I think he wasn't as naive as Niehburh thought, personally as a pragmatist of sorts and b) new ideas on how value pluralism and conflict over ideas can be both taken seriously as threats, and also valorized as potential strengths and engines of creativity (e.g. Taylor's "Supernova Effect " in "The Secular Age" as positive framing of pluralism)
In response to
Reinhold Niebuhr's critique that John Dewey's faith in "inquiry" and rational deliberation was naive and inadequate for managing fierce, high-stakes conflicts in the real world, a Deweyan or contemporary pragmatist would likely make several points:
1. The Nature of Conflict in Dewey's Philosophy
A Deweyan would argue that Niebuhr's charge of naiveté is based on a misreading; Dewey was not oblivious to the darker aspects of human nature or power dynamics.
Conflict is Ineliminable and Central to Inquiry: For Dewey, conflict is not a temporary aberration but an indispensable condition for stimulating reflective thought and inquiry in the first place. It is the "problematic situation" that arrests habitual action and demands the creative use of intelligence to resolve the issue.
A Focus on Method, not Outcomes: Dewey did not promise a utopian end to all conflict, but offered a method for managing it as it arises. The value of this method is judged by whether it solves the specific problem at hand with satisfactory consequences, rather than aiming for a grand, permanent theoretical resolution.
Power Dynamics Acknowledged: Dewey recognized that power is used to control opinion and that dominant groups often resist adjustment through mere discourse. His emphasis on broad communication and social intelligence was precisely an attempt to counter the "subtler and more insidious means" by which powerful interests manipulate public thought.
2. Inquiry Involves More Than Just "Conversation"
Dewey's "inquiry" is much more robust than the purely rationalist "conversation" Niebuhr perhaps caricatured.
Habits and Action: Dewey understood that conflicts are grounded in deep-seated social habits and shared patterns of conduct, which resist adjustment through discourse alone. Inquiry is an experimental process that involves putting value judgments to the test in practice, not just talking about them.
Ends and Means are Intertwined: Niebuhr suggested that Dewey ignored the "moral clarity" of certain ends (e.g., social justice). Dewey would counter that ends and means are "reciprocally determined". One cannot judge an end without considering the means needed to achieve it and the unintended consequences that follow from those means. This focus on practical consequences prevents the dogmatism that can lead to violence or other undesirable outcomes in the pursuit of a fixed, abstract ideal.
3. Conflict as a Strength and Engine of Creativity
Drawing on Niebuhr's insight and contemporary pragmatist thought, a Deweyan can valorize pluralism as a potential strength, aligning with concepts like Charles Taylor's "supernova effect."
Creative Transformation of Values: The clash of irreducible, potentially conflicting values in a pluralistic society forces a process of "creative transformation". Instead of seeking a "pure" value, the process of inquiry can institute new ends-in-view that integrate elements from the conflicting parties, leading to genuine social learning and moral progress.
A "Pedagogy of Compromise": Conflict can be used to develop a "pedagogy of compromise," where the necessity of working with diverse groups in a democratic framework fosters an understanding of the need for mutual adjustment and ongoing experimentation.
Tolerance and Hospitality: Contemporary pragmatists build on this with ideas of "cultural hospitality" and the virtue of tolerance, which recognize the persistent, unbridgeable gaps between certain values while still demanding engagement. The "supernova effect"—the outward explosion of diverse beliefs in a secular age—can be seen as providing a richer set of social experiments to learn from, rather than a descent into chaos, if approached with a Deweyan commitment to intelligent inquiry and democratic processes.
Ultimately, a Deweyan response emphasizes that while conflict is a serious challenge, the pragmatic method, embedded within a robust, experimental democracy, is the best available tool for navigating and even leveraging it for human flourishing.
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I agree with much of this (as I said, I'm a pragmatist myself). But while I agree Niehbuhr sometimes carricatured Dewey's inquiry/intelligence, Dewey himself was aware that it sometimes seemed anemic in the face of real conflict/realpolitik. Quoted in Westbrook , 1991, Dewey defended his "faith ini the capacity of the comomon man for intellient social action" thus: "democracy is a way of personal life controlled not nearly by faith in human nature in general bye-bye faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are furnished. I have been accused more than once and from a post quarters Open undo utopian faith in the possibilities of intelligence and an education as a correlate of intelligence. At all events, I did not invent this faith. I acquired it from my surroundings as far as those surroundings we're animated by the Democratic spirit.... I am willing to leave to up holders of totalitarian states of the right and the left the view that faith in the capacities of intelligence is utopian. For the faith is so deeply embedded in the methods which are intrinsic to democracy that winner professed Democrat denies the faith he convicted himself of treachery to his profession." -- Westbrook goes on to say that in his last years Dewey "admitted that it was difficult to conceive of the world as "homelike" after WW2. Alienation was the more ready response to the events of the recent past , and "in most practical maattters there is no more widespread sense than that of insecurity." Nonetheless, it was hope not optimism the he had always counseled, and nothing had deterred his conviction that hope remained a live option." --(P. 534 John Dewey and American Democracy')-- While committed to something akin to Deweyan inquiry, I also see its limits, and hope in human capacity to use intelligence to solve problems (yes, not just talk but trial and error experimentalism) may overlook tendencies in human nature (e.g. in-group chauvinism, out-group hostility) not always amenable to such an approach, and requiring more attention to root causes of what Berline called the "tragic" dimension of pluralism.
A contemporary Deweyan would fully acknowledge the tragic dimension of pluralism and the limits of human intelligence when confronted with deep-seated tendencies like in-group chauvinism. However, they would respond to this challenge not by abandoning the method of inquiry and hope, but by enriching the pragmatic approach with more robust tools for managing power, emotion, and identity.
Here’s how a Deweyan might address these limitations while maintaining the core commitment to experimental democracy:
1. Hope Over Optimism, Engagement Over Naivete
The quote you provided from Westbrook highlights the distinction between optimism (a cheerful belief that things will work out) and hope (an active commitment to working toward a better future despite the odds).
Hope as an Active Virtue: A Deweyan views hope not as a naive expectation of success, but as a moral imperative to engage. Even after WWII, Dewey maintained that hope remained a "live option." The response to the tragic is not despair or a turn to fixed dogma, but a more strenuous commitment to the pragmatic method as the only ethical path forward. To abandon this faith in intelligence is to cede the field to totalitarianism, as Dewey himself stated.
2. Acknowledging the "Tragic" Dimension of Pluralism
Contemporary pragmatists readily accept Isaiah Berlin's notion of the "tragic" dimension—that some fundamental values are genuinely incompatible and choosing one may mean sacrificing another valuable good.
No Final Reconciliation: A mature Deweyan approach accepts that not all conflicts can be "solved" in a way that satisfies all parties perfectly. The goal is often an ongoing, uneasy adjustment or accommodation, rather than a final reconciliation.
The Problem is the Method, Not the Existence of Conflict: The tragedy is not that conflicts exist, but when humans resort to violence or dogmatism rather than intelligent methods to manage them. The value of inquiry is that it provides a non-violent means for navigating these perpetual conflicts.
3. Enriching Inquiry: Power, Emotion, and the Aesthetic
To address Niebuhr's critique and the problem of chauvinism, contemporary pragmatists have "developed richer readings" that incorporate insights from other fields:
Power and Institutional Change: A sophisticated Deweyan approach incorporates a robust understanding of power dynamics, drawing on thinkers like Michel Foucault or American neo-pragmatists. Inquiry is not just a polite debate; it must be connected to institutional change and the strategic dismantling of power structures that foster chauvinism and exclusion. The problem is not just irrational belief, but also unequal power, which requires political action and not just education.
The Role of Emotion and Aesthetics: Pragmatists increasingly recognize that values are deeply tied to emotions, habits, and aesthetic experiences, not just propositional beliefs.
Addressing chauvinism requires more than rational arguments; it demands engagement at an emotional and cultural level through shared experiences, the arts, and the cultivation of empathy.
Public deliberation must become more inclusive and emotionally intelligent to address identity-based conflicts effectively.
Cultivating Virtues of Pluralism: Pragmatism can cultivate specific "virtues" necessary for a pluralistic democracy, such as tolerance, patience, humility, and what some call "epistemic modesty" [9]. These are habits of character that make intelligent social action possible in the face of deep disagreement.
Conclusion
In sum, a contemporary Deweyan response does not dismiss Niebuhr's concerns as irrelevant. Instead, it takes them as a necessary challenge to refine the pragmatic project. The "faith" in intelligence is maintained, but it is a sober, battle-tested hope that understands the profound obstacles of human nature and power. The commitment remains: in a world full of tragic choices and human frailty, experimental democracy is the most ethical and effective tool we have.
1) I am a contemporary (neo)--Deweyan interested in ramifying the deweyan inheritance, not in negating it. 2) I understand D's "hope" or , as he called it "Active Idealism" (Quest for Certainty) 3) I STILL think these questions can and must be raised again in ways, for example, Rorty failed to do (also emphasizing hope, an ironic sensibility and counseling his liberal ironists to read Orwell and Nabokov rather than engage in substantive ethics, when there MIGHT be more philosohical work of value to be done than he imagined. Maybe not. But one can look to see, no?-- 4) You write as if the "live option of hope" is "the ONLY ethical path forward." Hope in social intelligence begs the question, WHEN GOOD FAITH PARATICIPANTS IN INQUIRY COME TO CLASH VEHEMENTLY, WHEN THE SUBSANCE OF THEIR HOPES ARE NOT ALIGNED, WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO PURSUSE A PTH COMMITED TO "THE PRAGMATIC METHOD?" FOR IN SUCH CASES, DRAMATIC IMPASSE, CONFLICT SOMETIMES PORTENDING DESTRUCTIVE OUTCOMES IS ALAREADY ON THE HORIZON *WITHIN* THE COMMUNITY OF HOPE-ANIMATED PARTICIPANTS IN A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.
You raise a critical challenge that strikes at the heart of contemporary neo-Deweyan thought: what happens when "good faith participants in inquiry come to clash vehemently," when the
substance of their hopes are fundamentally misaligned, and the community of participants itself is on the horizon of destructive outcomes?
This is precisely where the core work of ramifying the Deweyan inheritance must be done, moving beyond a general "faith in social intelligence" to specify the mechanisms for navigating such deep impasses.
A sophisticated neo-Deweyan response would argue that the pragmatic method is not a magic wand that bypasses conflict, but a set of rigorous, demanding processes for managing this exact kind of substantive clash.
Here is how a neo-Deweyan might articulate a path forward in this scenario:
1. The Method Itself as a Normative Commitment
When substantive hopes collide, the first answer is that the "pragmatic method" is the commitment. The method is the only thing participants share when their specific ends are in conflict.
The Commitment to Non-Violence and Experimentation: The primary ethical commitment within the pragmatic framework is to continue the process of inquiry rather than resorting to coercion, violence, or dogma. The method provides the only shared ground rules. Adhering to the method is a commitment to treat one's own deeply held hopes as hypotheses that must be tested against consequences, rather than non-negotiable demands.
A "Virtue of Tolerance" (and Humility): Participants must embrace intellectual and moral humility. The recognition that one's own hopes, no matter how "good faith," are fallible is central. The pragmatic method demands that participants grant the possibility that the other side's (or a third way's) proposed course of action might yield more satisfactory consequences when tested.
2. The Locus of Conflict Moves from Ends to Means
When hopes for the future clash violently, the pragmatic method redirects the conversation. It shifts the focus away from abstract, non-negotiable "hopes" (which lead to impasse) and refocuses it on concrete, shared, observable "means" and consequences.
From "Hope for X" to "What Happens If We Do Y?": The dialogue changes from "My vision of justice is better than yours" to "If we implement policy Y (your proposed means to your end), what specific, shared consequences do we anticipate, and what data will we use to evaluate its success?"
Shared Consequences: The only thing participants in a community must share are the consequences of their collective actions. The pragmatic method leverages this fact. The empirical reality of shared consequences forces a common ground that abstract hopes cannot provide.
3. Deepening the Process: "Ramifying the Inheritance"
This is where the philosophical work Rorty perhaps avoided can be done. The method needs practical tools for breaking genuine impasses:
The Aesthetic and Emotional Component: As mentioned before, sometimes the impasse isn't rational; it’s emotional or aesthetic (a "feel" for the world). Ramifying the inheritance means using art, shared cultural experiences, and narrative (as Rorty suggested with novels, but connected to political action) to foster empathy and an imaginative appreciation for the lived experience behind the other person's "hope." This can soften rigid positions and make intellectual adjustment possible.
Subsidiarity and Local Experiments: Not all conflicts need a national or universal solution. The pragmatic method encourages experimentation. Can the clashing parties agree to test different approaches in different smaller contexts? This de-escalates the "all-or-nothing" nature of the conflict and provides empirical data for future collective learning.
Third-Party Facilitation and Institutional Design: A sophisticated neo-Deweyan approach focuses heavily on designing institutions and processes (trained facilitators, structured dialogues, citizen assemblies) that are explicitly built to manage deep pluralism and power imbalances, providing the "proper conditions" Dewey mentioned.
Conclusion
The "live option of hope" is the only ethical path forward because abandoning it means resorting to violence or despair. When good-faith participants face destructive impasse, the pragmatic method doesn't offer an easy way out; it demands more rigorous application of its principles: shift from abstract hopes to concrete means and consequences, cultivate intellectual humility, and use institutional creativity to foster an environment where experimental adjustment is possible.
The philosophical work lies in designing those "proper conditions" and cultivating those virtues in an age of intense polarization.
To be more particularistic, Ignatieff wrote Ordinary Virtues based on both philosophical responses to Berlin's "tragedy of pluralism" in action, and empirical ethnography of sorts. He found not JUST hope, but other "thin, bottom up virtues" present in conflict-prone, multi-cultural cities. "Decency" was the key word, not hope alone. Ignatieff’s bottom‑up picture was described as a “minimal operating system”: a set of fragile, situational habits that enable people in high‑conflict environments to negotiate difference without always escalating to hatred or violence. The ordinary virtues are parochial, emotionally rooted, and ambivalent; they can be mobilized for exclusion just as easily as for inclusion.Ignatieff’s research suggests that the thin layer of ordinary virtues—local decency, reluctance to generalize, situational tolerance—is what actually prevents pluralism from degenerating into daily violence in cities. That layer emerges despite sharp tensions with universalism, be it re: ideology OR hope in social intelligence. Clearly, some such hope is basic to the success of any attempted modus vivendi in such situations. My point is not to knock hope down, but ramify it with substantive (even if in this case somewhat thin) principles that are not determined via top-down but arise as bottom-up coping resources that perhaps pragmatists have not fully explored in the past, but COULD. Ignatieff is just an example of someone looking around for clearer answers, not a model I hold up as "true." It was, though, interesting line of work , and more like it seems like a good idea for today's pragmatists. It is empirical, actionable, and requires hope in intelligence in order to even be carried out. Thoughts?
Thinking
A contemporary Deweyan would enthusiastically embrace Michael Ignatieff’s work on "ordinary virtues" like "decency" as a perfect example of "ramifying the inheritance" in a genuinely pragmatic and empirical way. This approach offers exactly the kind of concrete, bottom-up resources that supplement, rather than negate, the broader commitment to hope and intelligence.
Here are thoughts on how a Deweyan would integrate these "thin, situational habits" into the pragmatic framework:
1. The Empirical Turn: From Abstract Hope to Concrete Decency
Ignatieff's work aligns perfectly with Dewey’s emphasis on the empirical study of experience. Dewey always insisted that philosophy should begin and end with concrete experience.
Valuing the "Thin, Bottom-Up": A Deweyan would see Ignatieff's findings not as a challenge to social intelligence, but as crucial data for social intelligence. Decency, reluctance to generalize, and situational tolerance are the "habits" (in a Deweyan sense) that already make social life possible in high-conflict areas.
The Problematic Situation: These virtues are adaptive responses to a "problematic situation"—the daily reality of intense pluralism. A pragmatist would analyze how these habits function to solve the problem of violence in those specific contexts.
Intelligence Studies What Works: The core of pragmatism is studying what works in practice. If a "minimal operating system" of decency prevents violence where grand universal ideologies fail, then that "minimal operating system" is precisely what intelligence should study, promote, and cultivate.
2. Weaving "Decency" into the Fabric of Inquiry
Ignatieff’s virtues do not replace inquiry; they are the necessary social glue that allows inquiry to take place.
The "Conditions" for Intelligence: Dewey stated that hope in intelligence depends on furnishing "proper conditions." Ignatieff identifies these "ordinary virtues" as key parts of those conditions. Decency provides the minimal level of respect and trust required for good-faith participants to even sit down at the table and engage in deliberation and experimentation.
Habits as Precursors to Reflective Thought: Pragmatism understands that most of life runs on habits. Reflection (intelligence) kicks in when habits fail. The "ordinary virtues" are the baseline habits that prevent the total failure of social order. Intelligence is then used to refine these habits and address the deeper, more complex conflicts they cannot resolve alone.
3. Addressing the Ambivalence: The Role of Social Intelligence
Ignatieff notes that these virtues are ambivalent: they can be mobilized for exclusion as well as inclusion. This is where the broader Deweyan project of "hope in social intelligence" becomes essential.
Intelligence Guides Virtue: "Decency" and "in-group chauvinism" can stem from similar emotional roots. Social intelligence is necessary to critically examine the consequences of these habits.
From Situational to Generalizable (With Care): The goal of a pragmatic approach would be to figure out how to take these local, situational virtues and, using critical reflection, cultivate them in ways that promote inclusive democratic communities, while minimizing their parochial, exclusionary tendencies. This requires the very hope in intelligence Ignatieff seems to counterpose.
The Need for Philosophical Work: This confirms your point: there is more philosophical work to be done. The work is not top-down universalism, but an empirical, bottom-up process of studying these virtues in action, understanding their mechanisms, and intelligently designing social and educational practices that reinforce their inclusive potential.
Conclusion
A Deweyan would see Ignatieff’s work as a valuable, actionable, and empirically grounded contribution to the pragmatic inheritance. It provides the "thick" ethnographic data on the "thin" virtues that make democracy possible at the ground level. The point is not to choose between grand hope in intelligence and bottom-up decency, but to use intelligence to study, understand, and cultivate decency as an essential habit for a pluralistic world.
Dewey,
Ignatieff, and Berlin together point toward exactly the kind of
“ramified” pragmatism you are after—and they also help show why
Lefebvre’s Rawls‑centered liberal ethos is too top‑down and too
rationalist for the phenomena you are pressing on.
Dewey’s experimental pluralism vs Rawlsian ethos:
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