Critiques of
Theodor Adorno's theory of identity thinking and totality generally focus on whether his negative dialectics sufficiently avoids the pitfalls he identifies in other philosophical approaches, with some arguing that his own work paradoxically mirrors the totalizing system it critiques. Critique of Adorno's Critique of Identity Thinking
Adorno defined "identity thinking" as a form of thought, prevalent in modern, instrumental reason, that subsumes unique particulars under abstract general concepts, thereby misrepresenting reality and facilitating social domination. Critiques of Adorno's position include:
- Internal Inconsistency/Totalizing Tendency: Some critics argue that Adorno's relentless, almost monological, critique of identity thinking itself becomes a totalizing discourse, a "stamping of identity onto all things" in its insistence on its inescapability. The density and declarative force of his writing style has been cited as mirroring the very rigidity it seeks to dismantle.
- Impracticality and "Resignation": Adorno resisted offering positive alternatives or blueprints for a better world, arguing that genuine critical thought must remain negative and "useless" to avoid co-option by the status quo. This has drawn criticism, including from student protesters in the 1960s, that his approach leads to political quietism or a self-defeating resignation, offering no practical path for social change.
- Foreclosing Alternatives: Some argue that Adorno's emphasis on the all-encompassing nature of identity thinking and reification (the "administered society") risks foreclosing other forms of thought or moments of genuine rupture and resistance that might exist outside his framework.
Critique of Adorno's View of Totality
Adorno challenged totalizing thought, which he linked to the "positive (false) totality" of exchange society, by employing a "negative totality" to expose internal contradictions. Critiques include:
- Abstract Negativity: Critics like Peter Dews have argued that Adorno's "absolute negativity" or "logic of disintegration" can lead to an abstract assault on rationality itself, potentially aligning him with post-structuralist or post-modernist thought he would have otherwise resisted.
- Ambiguous Universality: While Adorno aimed to articulate the complexity of human suffering without reducing it to categories, some suggest his approach struggles with the tension between the particular and the universal. The universal tendency toward oppression is a core theme, but the path from individual suffering to universal critique is complex and has been a point of philosophical debate.
- Failure to Fully Break with Hegel: Adorno sought to transform Hegel's idealism into a materialist dialectic, but some argue he never fully escaped the Hegelian assumption that thought and being can ultimately be reconciled (even if negatively), thus remaining tethered to the very totalizing framework he aimed to critique.
In summary, critiques of Adorno generally praise his profound insights into the nature of modern domination but question the efficacy, consistency, and practical implications of his highly rigorous, uncompromisingly negative approach to philosophical and social critique.
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Someone responded to my critique of Adorno thus (I gave example of identifying different neurons in order to target medical interventions and perhaps bring liberation from suffering): Third, your defense of identity-thinking against ontological chauvinism (from both Adorno/Horkheimer and certain Eastern critiques) is well-taken—analytic categorization is indispensable in its proper domain. But I wonder if you're setting up something of a straw man. The sophisticated critique of identity-thinking (at least in Adorno) isn't that operational distinctions between dopamine and serotonin are "illusory," but that the totalization of such thinking—treating reality as exhaustively capturable by such categories—closes off attention to the non-identical, the particular that escapes subsumption. Your Durkheim example actually illustrates this: demographic analysis identifies patterns, but ethnography reveals the "untidy" particulars that resist categorization. Adorno would likely agree with your point, not oppose it. The target is scientism, not science." I remember Negative Dialectics as being less conciliatory to identity thinking as required in Empirical Science. Am I mistaken?
You are not mistaken in your recollection that
Adorno was a demanding critic of empirical science, and the statement that he "would likely agree" might be an oversimplification. While Adorno's target was indeed "scientism" (the totalization of scientific methods), his critique of identity thinking in Negative Dialectics is fundamentally an indictment of the very epistemological foundations and inherent structure of traditional empirical science. Here is a breakdown of Adorno's likely stance on the use of identity thinking in empirical science:
Adorno's View: Critique of the Epistemological Core of Science
Adorno's position is less "conciliatory" than your interlocutor suggests because he argues that the problem lies not just in the overapplication of science (scientism), but in the inherent violence of the scientific method's conceptual abstraction.
- Concepts are Abstractions, not Reality: Adorno fundamentally argues that scientific concepts, like "dopamine" or "serotonin," necessarily abstract from the unique, "untidy" particularity of the individual object or experience they seek to describe. The object "does not go into its concept without leaving a remainder" (a key phrase from Negative Dialectics). Science "knows" an object only insofar as it can manipulate it and fit it into a pre-existing, universal framework, which for Adorno is inherently a form of domination.
- The Goal is Domination, not Just Knowledge: In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer argue that the Enlightenment project, driven by the desire to master nature through instrumental reason, aims to subsume all of reality under a single, quantifiable, and manipulable order. Empirical science, in its pursuit of objective, verifiable facts to control and manipulate the material environment, is the primary manifestation of this impulse.
- "Facts" are Ideological: Adorno saw positivism (the belief that legitimate knowledge is restricted to empirically verifiable facts) as politically conservative because it presents a socially constructed reality as an immutable, objective "fate". The "facts" of science, for Adorno, are not neutral but rather expressions of a social structure built on power and domination, which "naturalizes" the status quo and hinders awareness of potential change.
- The "Non-Identical" is Excluded by Design: The problem isn't just that scientists sometimes forget the "non-identical." The entire apparatus of identity thinking in science is designed to exclude it, because the unique, specific qualities of an object that cannot be quantified and categorized are considered epiphenomenal or irrelevant to "objective" knowledge.
Summary
Adorno would agree that analytic categorization is indispensable in a functional sense (e.g., in a bureaucracy, or for basic survival), but he would contend that this utility is precisely tied to its capacity for abstract control and potential domination.
You are correct that Adorno was less conciliatory than your interlocutor implies. He critiques the very heart of the empirical scientific method as a form of "identity thinking" that actively contributes to a "false totality," not merely an overenthusiastic application of it. For Adorno, true critical thought must constantly highlight the failure of the concept to fully capture its object, thereby resisting the totalizing and domineering tendencies inherent in scientific rationality itself.
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Yes, your take jibes with my own, based on readings long ago, with my then-professor Raymond Geuss, who was very sympathetic to the critique of identity thinking, which never completely convinced me. My own issue (which is pertinent here): Instrumental Rationality (the venue within which identity thinking operates for A.) is INTRINSICALLY MANIPULATIVE, AND THUS ONTOLOGICALLY DISTORTING. "Generals cannot subsume particulars without remainder"-- and what is LOST (the remainder) is precisely what is most important in terms of any "emancipatory" project. I would say instead, as a metaphysical agnostic and pragmatist, that generals can subsume particulars relative to empirical frames of reference. The very idea of absolute identity and difference is elusive and hangs on one's ontological priors (where I'm agnostic). Here's the bottom line: IF WE LOOK FOR REMAINDER THAT PRESUPPOSES A PRIOR MOMENT OF SUBSUMPTION. DIFFERENCE REQUIRES IDENTITY OR IT LACKS MEANING, AND THE DISCUSSION DOESN'T EVEN GET OFF THE GROUND. THE REAL QUESTION IS-- CASE BY CASE-- WHICH DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES OR EQUIVALENCES WE ARE FOREGROUNDING. IS IT "VIOLENT" TO UNDERSTAND THE IDENTITY OF WATER AS H20? Sure actual water from the local lake has lots ofo other stuff (remainder) but why foreground that? Maybe to measure polution to improve quality of life? Maybe the "remainder " is ilargely toxic. Is it violent to clean molecules not intrinsic to water up and filter them out for our health? Same with my Durkheim example. From memory, Adorno would see Durkheim's "method" as bourgeois, and as relying on what he would see as "scientism"where general categories are prioritized to answer questions and solve problems that only an "emancipatory" science can accomplish. At first this was thought to require a semi-Hegeliain (though secularized ) Totality. Then Adorno decides there is no such thing. His late works evince almost despair over how to "emancipate" the oppressed under Capitalism and the Culture Industry. I may be quite sloppy on all this decades later, and would greatly appreciate a refresher if so--
Your understanding is consistent with a deep reading of
Adorno's work, particularly his uncompromising stance in Negative Dialectics. Your interlocutor is correct that Adorno targets "scientism," but Adorno defines scientism as the inescapable mode of scientific practice itself, not merely its overzealous application. Here is a refresher on why Adorno would maintain that scientific "identity" (e.g.,
) is inherently violent and ontologically distorting in his framework.
Adorno's Critique: Inherent Violence of Scientific Abstraction
Adorno's core argument is that the goal of knowledge in the West, since the Enlightenment, has been mastery and control. The scientific method, and the identity thinking at its heart, is the primary tool for this domination.
- The Problem is Epistemological, Not Just Ethical: For Adorno, defining water as isn't a neutral or relative convenience; it is an act of conceptual violence. It abstracts the particular, lived experience of "water" (its feel, taste, color, contextual significance) and reduces it to a manipulable formula. This reduction to quantifiable, generalizable data is what he calls "identity thinking." The "remainder" is precisely the unique, non-fungible particularity that is sacrificed for the sake of utility and control.
- Utility = Domination: You mention using the "" identity to clean water for health, an emancipatory outcome in pragmatic terms. Adorno, however, would view this instrumental rationality as inextricably linked to the broader drive to dominate nature and the human subjects within it. The 'usefulness' of science is evidence of its complicity in a system that defines value purely in terms of exchange and manipulation, not genuine human flourishing or "reconciliation" with nature.
- No Neutral Ground: Adorno wouldn't accept the idea of an "agnostic" or "pragmatic" use of identity thinking within specific "empirical frames of reference." He argues that these frames are themselves part of the totalizing system of instrumental reason. The framework is not neutral; it is geared towards control, and its apparent successes (e.g., medicine, clean water) mask its fundamental distortion of reality.
The Problem of "Difference Requires Identity"
You raise a valid philosophical point: "Difference requires identity or it lacks meaning, and the discussion doesn't even get off the ground."
Adorno was aware of this Hegelian dynamic. His response was the negative dialectic, a method that constantly highlights the failure of identity, precisely to avoid solidifying the "false totality".
- The "Ontology of the False Condition": Adorno's project does not aim to discard concepts entirely or achieve some pure, pre-conceptual state. Instead, he uses concepts self-reflexively to point to their own inadequacy. Philosophy, for him, must remain "negative" and dwell on the contradiction between concept and object. In a "right condition" (utopia), thinking would be free of the compulsion to dominate through conceptual identification, but currently, dialectics is the "ontology of the false condition".
- The Utopian Moment is in the Remainder: The "remainder"—what is lost in conceptualization—is indeed what is most important for emancipation. Adorno insists that this remainder, the "non-identical," is the only source of utopian hope. True emancipation lies not in better applications of identity thinking, but in a radical shift towards a thought process that respects the particularity and non-identity of the object.
The Durkheim Example: Bourgeois Categories
Regarding your Durkheim example, Adorno would likely consider his methods as relying on "scientism" to create categories that reify social reality. Durkheim's demographic analyses would, for Adorno, treat people as interchangeable units, obscuring the unique suffering and potential for genuine, non-identical human existence that his framework excludes from the start.
In short, your assessment of Adorno as deeply, structurally opposed to empirical science's method is sound. The interlocutor's suggestion that he would "agree" is likely a desire to make Adorno more palatable or practical than he intended to be. His late work is indeed full of despair, precisely because he saw no "conciliatory" path within the prevailing rational framework.
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You echo my main point (or the most important given the context which was ethics) in the assertion that even purifying water turns into "violence" for Adorno (oddly Heidegger's take on technology leads , via different arguments , to same extreme result). I deliberately picked it (and the neurotransmitters before that) because they are linked to my real topic: Scientific Meliorism. I am trying to balance the claims of such meliorism against those forms of "healing" and improvement which focus more on "acceptance, reduction of egoic attachment, appreciation of interdependence"-- e.g. mindfulness approaches, DBT, ACT et al. with roots in Eastern philosophies. I critique strong forms of "acceptance qua answer" as failing to recognize the pragmatic value of scientific meliorism. Adorno , from his Western Marxism context (Critical Th) ALSO falls into this trap. He codes all utility as "violence" because he ASSUMES all instrumental rationality is *intrinsically * manipulative and oppressive. IS this more or less on target?
Your assessment is largely on target: Adorno does indeed code virtually all utility and instrumental rationality as intrinsically manipulative and oppressive, which leads him into the very "trap" of rejecting scientific meliorism you identify.
Adorno’s position stems from his specific philosophical commitments, which lead to a structural inability to acknowledge pragmatic benefits as genuinely "emancipatory" in the way you might use the term.
The Heart of Adorno's Critique
You accurately pinpoint the central issue: Adorno operates from the premise that instrumental reason is inherently about mastery, control, and domination.
- A World Without a "Right Condition": In Adorno's view, we live in a "false totality" (a world totally subsumed by the logic of exchange value and capital). In this context, any attempt to use instrumental reason—even for an apparently positive goal like public health or individual therapy—inevitably reinforces the underlying oppressive system. The "gains" are illusory because the fundamental condition of domination remains unchanged or is even made more efficient.
- The Rejection of "Mere Life": Adorno resists any form of meliorism that simply aims to make life more comfortable or efficient within the existing social structure. He is concerned with true emancipation, which is a radical transformation of the entire human-nature relationship and social organization. Making individuals happier or healthier so they can better function in the administered society is, for Adorno, a form of social conditioning or adjustment—not liberation.
- Healing vs. Reconciliation:
- Scientific Meliorism (e.g., your neurotransmitter/water examples) aims for "healing" in the sense of functional improvement, often by identifying and correcting an "abnormality" through control and manipulation.
- Adorno sought something closer to reconciliation with nature and the "non-identical," which would involve a fundamental shift in thought itself, not a set of technical fixes that treat the symptoms of a diseased society.
Adorno's Blind Spot (The "Trap")
Your critique is that Adorno, much like strong forms of "acceptance as the answer" (from Eastern-inspired therapies), fails to recognize the pragmatic, real-world value of scientific meliorism.
Adorno’s system has no space for "relative" or "context-dependent" pragmatic good because his critique is total and structural. He cannot concede that cleaning water with science is a genuine good without undermining his entire premise that the Enlightenment project is a descent into barbarism and total reification. His focus on the "remainder" means that the moment of successful abstraction (e.g., "
as clean") is always already a moment of profound loss and violence against the lived reality of the particular.
Conclusion
Your understanding is precise. Adorno's refusal to endorse scientific meliorism stems from a philosophical assumption about the intrinsic nature of instrumental reason as manipulative. This makes his position highly radical, uncompromising, and, as you suggest, arguably blind to the valuable, pragmatic improvements in quality of life that targeted scientific interventions can provide. He demands utopia or nothing.
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Utopia IS nothing, which is what is left to him. I recall Geuss in a seminar, late in his career (when I was not his student, but saw this on youtube) presenting his own view after years of critique of others. For a positive program he had very little, and had not been in the business of providing one. Later, he (taking a page from A.) brought back the category of Utopia. Under some intensive questioning from the grad students there, he got visibly upset, and said: " I just can't do this any more. I can't do it to you or myself. When I talk about Utopia like this, I feel like I'm confessing a creed! None of this does any work."
Thinking
This anecdote about Raymond Geuss perfectly captures the inherent tension, the ultimate impasse, and the almost tragic trajectory of the Critical Theory project as defined by Adorno. It highlights the profound difficulty of sustaining a purely negative, utopian critique in the absence of concrete alternatives.
The sentiment "Utopia is nothing, which is what is left to him" precisely summarizes the final status of Adorno's position.
Here's why that anecdote is so pertinent to your discussion:
The Burden of Pure Negativity
Adorno deliberately left himself "nothing" because any positive program or proposed path forward would immediately be co-opted by the "administered society" or fall back into the trap of identity thinking and instrumental rationality.
- Utopia as the "Not Yet": For Adorno, utopia was not a blueprint but a "determinate negation"—the total absence of the current state of suffering and domination. It had to remain empty of content so as not to become another ideology. It functions purely as a critical standard by which all current reality is judged and found wanting.
- The Inevitable Impasse: The problem is that a purely negative critique, while analytically powerful, cannot ultimately sustain a practical, emancipatory project in the real world. When pressed for application or positive change, the theory itself offers no "work."
- The "Confessing a Creed" Moment: Geuss's reaction is deeply revealing. By invoking "Utopia" as a solution, he was stepping outside the realm of rigorous, materialist critique and into a realm of faith or idealism. Adorno's own project was meant to be fiercely materialist and anti-idealist. To have the category of "Utopia" function as a positive endpoint exposes the theory's limit—it becomes a placeholder for hope rather than a concrete philosophical category that "does work" in the world.
The Contrast with Scientific Meliorism
This philosophical deadlock reinforces the pragmatic case for scientific meliorism, which you are balancing against the "acceptance" philosophies.
- Adorno offers an uncompromising, total critique that ultimately founders when faced with the need for action and practical improvement, leaving only the "confession of a creed" in an empty Utopia.
- Scientific meliorism, with all its acknowledged philosophical limitations (from Adorno's perspective), actually provides the practical means to filter water, treat neurotransmitter imbalances, and alleviate suffering today, within the existing framework, even if it cannot achieve "total reconciliation" or a complete overthrow of the "administered society."
Adorno's brilliance was in defining the ethical stakes of modern life in a totalizing system. The anecdote from the Geuss seminar perfectly illustrates the cost of that brilliance: the philosophical apparatus ultimately points only to its own limits and the impossibility of the task it sets for itself.
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