Foucault's Poststructuralism: The History of the Modern Subject

In part one of this series we looked at Sartre’s Existentialism as the culmination of modern subject-centered philosophy. For Sartre social, historical and environmental conditions do not inform the free and rational subject. I may be born as a Jew in Nazi Germany, or as a British aristocrat with all the hindrances and privileges that accompany such a birth—but as much as these facts (Sartre’s “Facticity”) constrain or enhance life-chances and options, they do not determine the choices we make as free subjects equipped with the capacity of rational thinking. Individuals are “thrown” into circumstances that they cannot control, but the free and rational subject is forced to interpret those circumstances and act on them alone. Nobody can decide for me (i.e. any subject) whether or not to collaborate with the Nazis in France during WW2 or take up arms and join the Resistance as Sartre did. This experience of struggling against the dismal facts of his own age shaped Sartre’s Humanism. As human beings we all have to take responsibility for our responses to the world we are given. There are no alibis (I was only following orders, I lack the “courage gene,” I had a rough childhood, etc.) for ducking responsibility. Even inaction is a choice, and the perception of being helpless is an interpretation for which the subject is responsible. We interpret, choose and act as responsible beings through the human powers of awareness, rationality, and free will. We may not achieve our goals or “projects” because of outer circumstance. But for Sartre this only means that objective circumstances are sometimes obstacles to the free subject. They influence but cannot determine our choices and actions.

Michel Foucault will turn this picture of existence on its head.

Enter Foucault:

In the years between his 1962 book Madness & Civilization and the 1978 classic Discipline & Punish, Foucault engages the history of the “constitution of the [modern western] subject.” Far from being an ahistorical given, modern subjects have been conditioned by a variety of specific a) institutional practices b) human sciences and c) methods of disciplining and socializing individuals in the modern world. Subjects have been conditioned or socialized to understand themselves as possessing a) more or less direct/unbiased access to the external world through awareness/perception b) the ability to use “reason” or “rationality” to locate individual and collective interests, and c) the power to decide autonomously how they will act in order to realize their goals. This mindset or typical self-understanding is, for Foucault, an outcome of historical contingencies his work will seek to illuminate and specify. The sense most of us have of being rational subjects with agency is, he says, part of the modern “episteme” which can be understood as the normative framework governing the modern period from the late 1700s (the Enlightenment) to present. Crucially, this is NOT a matter of philosophical doctrine or theory. The “episteme” is similar in some ways to the notion of a “paradigm” in that it structures “normal” thought and activity not only in science but, in Foucault’s case, everyday life. We cannot easily notice it because, like the air we breathe, it is operative in a multitude of institutions and power structures from prisons to schools. In order to flesh out these arguments, let us turn to his work from 1962- 1978, which is when this postmodern critique and history of the western subject was enacted by Foucault.

Madness & Civilization: Published in 1962, this book takes aim at one of the “idols” of the modern worldview, i.e. Reason/Rationality. The Age of Reason and Enlightenment, have left us with a picture of humans as being “rational” by default. Unreason/irrationality is seen as “Other” In the Age of Reason the distinction became a dichotomy which altered long held patterns of living and thinking.
During the middle ages and the Renaissance, there were all sorts of eccentrics still mixed in to the villages and towns of Europe. There were village idiots, holy fools, madmen and witches defined as such by social conventions. Generally, their lives were integrated with those of the “normal” people in Europe. We see this in reading Cervantes and his depiction of Don Quixote, or Shakespeare’s Hamlet, or the Holy Fools too simple for civilization yet pure and blessed, as often found in Russia (c.f. Andrei Rublov) . Such types (the mad, idiotic, divinely mad, ) were tolerated and seen as having a place in the “order of things” or natural hierarchy of beings in the Middle Ages and early modern period. Foucault sees this changing during the mid 1600s to the mid 1700s. (the Age of Reason). The mad got lumped together with the impoverished, vagabonds, criminals, libertines, non-conformers and others, and all came to be policed and scientifically categorized in ways that set them apart as an irrational and morally troubled population that needed to be quarantined from rational healthy normal human beings. Skipping over the details of how this occurred, what is important is that during this period institutions of confinement were established to divide these people off from the rest. Often leprosariums (previously used to confine lepers) were converted to asylums, hospitals and prisons. Lepers were no longer found in Europe in any significant numbers, but the fear of the newly established mental diseases and spiritual afflictions was as real as fear of leprosy had been. The non-rational population came to be controlled through the manipulation of their bodies in a number of ways called by Foucault dividing practices. Put simply, those who met the new and emerging scientific or religious criteria of deviants (madmen, the idle, libertines, vagabonds,“riff raff," holy fools) were removed physically from free society and locked away where they would not spread the new leprosy of irrationality and madness.

The Human Sciences: In The Order of Things and The Archeology of Knowledge,Foucault tries to wrest from the pages of history certain newly emerging discourses -- that centered around the concept of Man as an object of knowledge (the sciences of man). For example "the study of labor" gives way to the discipline of Economics. Certain new discursive formations are necessary in order to treat human subjects as objects of knowledge from an economic standpoint. The articulation of "Homo Economicus," the rational, calculating subject that appears in the 19th century both in economic theory and utilitarianism can be analyzed in terms of its internal logic, as Foucault did in some chapters of The Order of Things. But the important thing to bear in mind is the way in which these sciences and disciplines function historically and socially to produce certain behaviors and self-conceptions (e.g. of Man as utility maximizer). His later work on "genaeology" will do much to connect the dots between supposedly autonomous sciences and the ways they come to shape everyday life (a topic treated below). The new systems of classification in human sciences are seen as an iteration of Reason. The goal of the human sciences is to describe and classify the rational human being as an object. This makes it possible to uphold rational man as The Norm, and contain or rehabilitate those who fall short or deviate from Rational Subjectivity. So, it is not philosophy professors but emerging social engineers in medicine, economic/social planning, psychiatry, and criminology and others who codify the traits and behavioral expectations that shape and constrain Rational Subjectivity. The systems of knowledge that arise are called “regimes of truth”not because they are True in some ultimate sense, but rather because they are systems that define what counts as being true for a given population at some specific time and place in history. Like Nietzsche, truth is a matter of perspective. There is no discussion here of unconditional or absolute Truth—a concept debunked by postmodern philosophers.

So far we have seen that the “other”/ non-rational is a) codified by discourses or disciplines that define the normal and abnormal (clinical sciences) and that b) the unwanted non-rational beings are physically coerced and treated in the name of science (jurisprudence, economics, criminology, psychology etc.). But this is all supposed to be part of progress and modern improvement. Science is in the business of curing or at least trying to cure and rehabilitate the unfortunate others, not punishing them for the sake of retribution alone. This leads to the last book we’ll consider here.

Discipline and Punish (1978) in many ways brings the dividing practices and taxonomies of human science together in terms of a history of “normalization of the subject.” How did the modern western subject with confidence in free will, rationality and the power of applied science come into being? How are subjects in the modern period socialized?

In the Middle Ages, socialization was mostly based on authority and coercionbacked by corporal punishment to drive the point home. In the modern period there is far less overt torture. Foucault opens the book with a graphic description of an accused man being drawn and quartered by horse, then skips to a rule-book for use in a criminal detention center 7 decades later. Methods of disciplining offenders had changed dramatically in the interim. What began as a modern“Disciplinary” approach to rehabilitating” and “normalizing” deviants, was progressively extended into the domains of ordinary citizens in education, factory work, military training (e.g. boot camp) and the hierarchical bureaucracies of professional life in the 20th century.

There are three aspects of this socialization process all of which emerge in the clinical sciences first and then extend outwards until they operate ubiquitously as the modern episteme or regime of truth most of us now take for granted.

First there is “Observation.” Rather than torturing the bodies of the accused criminals or deviants, clinics, hospitals and prisons begin to use what Foucault calls “Moral Authorities” (at first some were religious, but later they functioned as scientists) to monitor and catalogue “abnormal” behaviors. The architecture of prisons, hospitals and later schools reflects the need to position moral authorities above the populations being disciplined. The use of one way glass, open floors, well lit classrooms with rows of desks easily surveyed by the teacher—all of these can be traced to the paradigm of observation from 18th and 19th century criminologists. The most famous example mentioned in Foucault’s book is the “Panopticon” designed by the utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham. Though it was never built, it conveys the main idea,and serves as almost an archetype of modern surveillance-based social control. Those who are criminals or mental patients are situated in well-lit separate cells built in a circular formation. In the center stands an observatory where any cell can be carefully observed at any time day or night. No inmates know if and when they are actually being watched, and the idea of being visible and under close scrutiny conditions their behavior to avoid infractions and conform with the observer’s expectations. In the 20th C institutions of correction and education among others have incorporated elements of this design. This typifies the “Scientific Gaze” that takes itself to be the “objective” or neutral mode of observation. It objectifies people and reads this back as a legitimate means of gaining “objective knowledge” in the human/behavioral sciences, and various related applications in business management, industrial/organizational planning etc.

“Normalization” is the second disciplinary approach that begins with deviant populations and spreads to mass-society. Here the idea is that the “experts” judge behaviors to be right and wrong not intrinsically but according to mathematical ranking schemes. For example, if the goal is literacy, then it’s not enough to read and write. Instead you will have to measure up to a standard that can change over time. As the members of a classroom become more literate, the standards go up. What is normal in a fairly illiterate environment may be judged as abnormal in a more literate one. Thus the standards of normality are easily adjusted to meet any possible situation. There is no way to escape this “normalizing” tendency which authorities and experts define and revise constantly through various policies governing everything from life in prisons to conduct that is acceptable in public space or offices.

The last disciplinary approach is “ Examination” in which the individual is turned into a “case” among other cases to be documented and stored in dossiers that track individual lives vis a vis norms. The criminal record, the school record, the background check—all start with the goal of “caring for” others intensively, turning them into objects to be controlled. But not controlled in a conscious or malevolent manner, rather it is part of the cultural system of norms, the “modern episteme,” to make sure that all citizens are visible, can be tracked and ranked in terms of their conformity or deviation from laws, required skills/credentials, knowledge, and a host of other factors which become the objects of public policy. None of this is seen as intrusive; rather most modern subjects are already “constituted” in such a way as to see this as a normal and productive aspect of civilization. Whether it is psychiatric exams, parole boards, school exams, guidance counseling, or the metrics established by employers for establishing “acceptable levels of productivity” and appropriate wardrobe and behavior, we all know and accept the fact that we’re being judged and evaluated for performance across multiple social domains over the span of our lives. The pervasive combination of these three disciplinary approaches reveals that knowledge (the modern episteme) is manifested as power. Not domination over others, but the widespread nexus of institutions that make all or most of us into “normal productive subjects.” We may understand ourselves to be rational, objective and free-willed subjects, but it is the intensive nature of modern socialization that has led us to internalize these and other beliefs.

Modern subjects, then, are not free agents but socially and historically constituted beings that understand themselves as rational, self-interested discrete individuals making decisions in terms of cost-benefit analysis, much in the manner of “homo economicus” i.e. the rational subject economists posit when they study consumer behavior or supply and demand. So what about Sartre’s Humanism and his notion of the individual who freely engages in constructive projects and thereby defines him/herself often in opposition to social forces? Foucault says that is all illusory. There is no unconditioned free subject, we have already been "constituted" as modern subjects conditioned to behave and think in particular ways. This applies to all movements that attempt to overthrow the episteme and power structures of the age. Foucault targets Marxism (to which the older Sartre turned) which also claims to resist oppressive social structures by means of rational agents who realize their class interests (self interest) and use free will to act in revolt (agency). “Illusions all!” says Foucault. Marxists are just as socially conditioned or “constituted” as any other modern brand of subjectivity. Capitalists and Marxists may differ in some respects, but both are already constituted by modern presuppositions, i.e. both can only occur in the modern episteme where certain understandings of subjectivity are already taken for granted. In short, most modern movements and so-called “ideologies” are fundamentally similar because they are based on the concept of the abstract and a-historical “Man” (the modern subject writ large, and mistaken for an abstract and universal category). But there simply is no pristine subject with privileged access to the “truth” whether couched in terms of existentialism, phenomenology, Marxism, psychoanalysis, secular humanism or any other subject-centered projects. None of these belief-systems is more true or false than the others, as the only standard by which to assess any of them is the current “regime of truth” or the modern episteme which is itself a social and historical construct. There is no “objective perspective”, no way of escaping the systems of knowledge that regulate belief and conduct and determine what counts as true in given contexts through human history.

If all of this seems a bit dystopian and deterministic then you’ve been paying attention.
Foucault’s conception of Modernity leaves little room for a rich, creative, personal dimension of living that is not constrained and constituted by historical and social forces in advance. Towards the end of his life, seeing this deficit, Foucault starts walking back some extreme claims and developing a conception of “caring for the self” or developing a relationship with one’s own self that allows for experimentation and some freedom. He explores these ideas in his last works on the history of sexuality, which we will not discuss here. But he did entertain the possibility of exploring a limited form of ethics in which some measure of personal gratification outside social determinations could be cultivated. In his final years (1979-84) he was reevaluating the concept of human agency. We cannot know what he would have done or written had he lived longer. In 1984 he died of HIV aids, putting an end to a brilliant career. His work, unlike many of the other “postmodern philosophers” is felt strongly as an influence on many diverse fields, not only philosophy. His version of historical contextualism has arguably become a part of our 21st century self understandings. Many ordinary people now view universal truths and definitions of timeless human nature with great suspicion. Foucault brought Nietzsche’s relativistic view of knowledge into the writing of European history, sociology and of course philosophy leaving an imprint that shows no sign of disappearing soon.­­ Perhaps most interesting of all, he debunked categories of Reason, Freedom and the Unity of the Subject not by employing philosophical arguments, but by showing that these concepts had roots and branches (“a genealogy”) that operated more powerfully outside of philosophy-- in the realms of social control apparatuses which bequeathed to us the techniques by which we now routinely socialize and normalize modern citizens and subjects.

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Possible questions and considerations for discussion:

-It appears that Foucault leaves little or no room for the concept of human agency (ability to act effectively as individuals) outside of normative systems. This can lead to the problem of social/sociological determinism. The sociological determinist sees institutions and norms as the causes of personal action in the world. But how do institutions and norms form in the first place? If they are, as claimed, social constructions, then who, if anyone, does the “constructing?”

-Do you think that impersonal social forces have a very large impact on your own beliefs, values,goals and actions? Or do you think more along the lines of Sartre that you evaluate your options as an individual relatively unaffected by social
institutions and norms?