There Is No Broligarchy: Tech Elites as Courtiers in Trump’s Personalist America
Note to Reader:
This analysis is speculative, reflecting developments as of June
2025. It critiques the premature “broligarchy” narrative by applying the
personalist ideal type to emergent trends, not claiming the U.S. is a
fait accompli authoritarian regime. Judicial resistance and civil
society mobilization remain critical variables.
Introduction
The “broligarchy”—a portmanteau of “bro” and “oligarchy”—gained traction in early 2025 as a shorthand for the supposed convergence of tech plutocrats and executive power in the U.S., especially amid Donald Trump’s return to the presidency ([TIME, Feb. 12, 2025]; [The Atlantic, Jan. 20, 2025]; [NPR, Jan. 2025]). Media and public discourse heralded a new, stable, bi-directional power structure: a digital oligarchy, reminiscent of the classic military-industrial complex, with figures like Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Mark Zuckerberg assuming unprecedented visibility and influence as donors and, in Musk's case a quasi-official ("Special Governmental Employee" status as head of DOGE).
Yet as Trump’s second term unfolds, this narrative is already unraveling. The executive’s unilateral, often extra-constitutional actions—most dramatically, the defunding of elite universities and cultural institutions—reveal a system not of entrenched oligarchs but of courtiers, their fortunes contingent on the executive’s favor. This essay offers a real-time critique of the “broligarchy” narrative, arguing that the Achilles heel of the AI and tech sector is precisely this dependence: there is no durable broligarchy, but rather a vertical of power, more akin to Putin’s Russia or Orban’s Hungary than to colonial or modern oligarchic models ([Brookings, Mar. 9, 2022]; [Van den Bosch, 2015]).
I. The Rise (and Limits) of the “Broligarchy” Narrative
The broligarchy concept only gained currency during Trump’s 2024 campaign and the early months of his second administration, with TIME, The Atlantic, and NPR describing a tech-government alliance based on Musk’s $300 million campaign contributions, his Special Government Employee (SGE) role, and the inauguration presence of Bezos and Zuckerberg, who each donated $1 million ([NPR, Jan. 2025]). These accounts, published before Trump’s second term began, assumed a durable, mutually reinforcing nexus akin to the military-industrial complex.
Yet, MSM outlets simultaneously reported Bezos’s Washington Post pivot and Zuckerberg’s Meta policy shifts as capitulation, revealing a contradiction: tech elites are not oligarchs but subordinates fearful of Trump’s ire ([The Guardian, Feb. 26, 2025] [CNN, Jan. 7, 2025]).
Karen Hao’s Empire of AI (2025) reinforced the broligarchy analogy by likening AI firms to colonial empires, extracting data and labor like the British East India Company ([Democracy Now! transcript, May, 2025]). While compelling for global economic dynamics, this analogy presumes institutional stability absent in Trump’s America, where executive fiat overrides corporate influence. Bezos’s directive to limit The Post’s opinion section to “personal liberties and free markets”—despite its clash with Trump’s tariffs and university defunding—was framed as deference, a perception he did not challenge despite 75,000 subscriber cancellations ([NPR, Feb. 26, 2025]). This contradiction exposes the broligarchy narrative’s prematurity, as tech elites’ actions align with personalist subordination, not oligarchic power.
II. The Personalist Turn: Executive Fiat and Tech’s Fragility
The Trump administration’s treatment of tech elites offers a textbook case of emergent personalist authoritarianism, where power concentrates in the executive, and elites’ influence hinges on loyalty.
DOGE as Method and Model:
The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), led by Musk (and conceived originally with Vivak Ramaswami)[NYT Feb. 2025 article on origin and chronology of DOGE) , offered a technocratic alternative to Project 2025’s
ideological staffing, streamlining agency purges with private-sector
expertise, potentially including SpaceX and xAI tools ([NYT, Feb. 28,
2025]; [Business Insider, Jun. 6, 2025]; [Reuters/YouTube, Jun. 2025]).
While claims of widespread AI-driven automation lack concrete evidence,
DOGE’s rapid restructuring and no-bid contracts to firms like Thiel’s
Palantir reflect a hybrid model: technocratic efficiency blended with
ideological loyalty, all under Trump’s control ([Forbes, Apr. 2025]).
Comparative Table: DOGE vs. Project 2025
| Aspect | DOGE (Musk/Ramaswamy) | Project 2025 (Heritage) |
|---|---|---|
| Method | AI-driven, top-down | Grassroots, MAGA loyalists |
| Speed | Rapid (months) | Gradual (years) |
| Tech Role | Central (xAI, SpaceX) | Peripheral |
| Targets | USAID, Social Security | Education, Justice, EPA |
| Source | [NYT, Feb. 28, 2025] |
Pay-to-Play Patronage:
Musk’s campaign largesse, Bezos’s and Zuckerberg’s inauguration
donations, and Thiel’s contract wins reflect kleptocratic logic: loyalty
is rewarded with favors, but only conditionally. Unlike Musk, Bezos and
Zuckerberg avoided dissent, aligning overtly with Trump. Bezos’s Post
shift to “personal liberties and free markets,” despite its
incompatibility with Trump’s trade wars and extra-legal defunding of
universities, sparked resignations and criticism from former editor
Marty Baron, who called it “craven” ([The Guardian, Feb. 26, 2025]).
Zuckerberg’s relaxed content moderation, dubbed a “MAGA makeover,”
earned conservative praise but employee backlash, yet he remained silent
([CNN, Jan. 7, 2025]; [Bloomberg, May 27, 2025]).
Their failure to clarify these moves, despite reputational costs,
suggests fear of retaliation against Amazon’s Pentagon contracts or
Meta’s antitrust battles, aligning with the personalist ideal type
([Frantz, 2021]).
The Oligarchy Debate: Oligarchy, Crony Capitalism, or Kleptocracy?
The question of how best to characterize the power structure of Trump 2.0 has become a central debate among journalists, politicians, and scholars. Some, like Evan Osnos in his influential New Yorker article and book, argue that the United States has entered a new era of oligarchy—government by and for billionaires. Osnos’s reporting is vivid: he documents how seats at Mar-a-Lago dinners, private meetings with Trump, and policy influence are openly bought and sold, with the Trump White House functioning as a “private moneymaking machine” for the First Family and their wealthy allies. Politicians such as Bernie Sanders have echoed this view, declaring, “Trump has made [oligarchy] explicit. He has proclaimed loudly: we have a government of billionaires.”
Yet, a closer reading of Osnos’s own evidence—and of the broader literature—suggests that the reality is more complicated than the term “oligarchy” implies. Classic oligarchy refers to a system where a small, stable, and cohesive elite—often united by shared interests, family ties, or enduring institutional power—collectively shapes policy and guards its privileges over time. In such a system, the ruling elite’s power is not only immense but also reliably wielded and resistant to the whims of any one leader.
By contrast, the Trump 2.0 regime exhibits features more closely aligned with crony capitalism and kleptocracy—and, crucially, personalism:
-
Transactionalism: Osnos’s reporting is replete with stories of billionaires and business elites buying access and favors, but outcomes remain contingent and unpredictable. As one lobbyist put it, “What if he’s in a bad mood? You have no clue where the money is eventually going.” This is not the stable, policy-setting power of a classic oligarchy, but the volatility of a system where success depends on proximity to the leader and can be revoked at any time.
-
Crony Capitalism: Business success is determined less by market competition or institutionalized elite consensus than by personal ties to Trump. Favors, contracts, and regulatory breaks are dispensed to those who demonstrate loyalty or provide resources, but these relationships are always subject to renegotiation or rupture.
-
Kleptocracy: The Trump administration’s open use of public office for private enrichment—by the First Family and their close associates—fits the definition of kleptocracy, where corruption and self-dealing are not aberrations but the system’s core function.
-
Personalism: Most significantly, Trump’s dominance means that even the wealthiest “allies” (as the Musk episode illustrates) can be discarded or threatened if they cross the leader. There is no enduring elite pact, but rather a revolving door of courtiers, each vying for proximity to power.
It is true, as some AI-generated summaries and political scientists note, that crony capitalism and kleptocracy can be considered subtypes or extreme forms of oligarchy, since both involve the concentration of power and wealth in a small group. However, the frequent invocation of “rule by the billionaire class” in media and activist discourse tends to obscure the deep intra-class conflicts, the absence of a united elite, and the vulnerability of even the richest insiders to the leader’s calculations.
In sum, while Osnos’s reporting provides invaluable empirical detail and corroborates the prevalence of transactionalism and elite enrichment under Trump 2.0, it ultimately supports a more nuanced diagnosis: the current system is best understood as a hybrid of crony capitalism and kleptocracy, operating under a would-be personalist dictator. The “oligarchy” label, while rhetorically powerful, risks overstating the coherence and durability of elite power in this context. What we see instead is a volatile, leader-centric regime—one whose instability may paradoxically make it more vulnerable to reversal, but also more dangerous in the short term.
III. Unilateral Defunding and Institutional Erosion
Trump’s campaign to defund universities and cultural institutions via executive fiat further illustrates personalist tendencies, undermining the “personal liberties” tech elites claim to champion.
Elite Universities:
Since early 2025, Harvard, Columbia, Brown, and others faced billions in
federal funding freezes, justified by vague accusations of
“antisemitism” or “wokeness” tied to pro-Palestinian protests
([Chronicle of Higher Education, Apr. 10, 2025]; [Inside Higher Ed, Apr. 18, 2025]; [Fox News, Mar. 25, 2025]).
These actions, based on extra-legal definitions from Trump’s executive
orders, violate Congress’s “power of the purse” and First Amendment
protections, as lawsuits from faculty unions argue ([University World
News, Feb. 8, 2025]).
The firing of professors at Columbia and Brown for supporting protests
directly contradicts “personal liberties,” yet Bezos’s silence suggests
deference to avoid similar reprisals against his businesses ([The
Guardian, Feb. 26, 2025]).
Smithsonian and Cultural Institutions:
A March 2025 executive order tasked Vice President J.D. Vance with
purging “divisive narratives” from the Smithsonian, bypassing Congress
and threatening funding ([PBS NewsHour, Mar. 28, 2025]; [Fox5DC, Mar. 28, 2025]; [Washington Examiner, Mar. 28, 2025]).
These measures, still facing legal challenges as of June 2025, mirror
tactics in Orban’s Hungary, where cultural institutions are subordinated
to executive will ([Journal of Democracy, Nov. 13, 2024]).
IV. Theoretical Implications: From Oligarchy to Personalism
Hao’s colonial analogy and the broligarchy narrative presume a stable, mutually dependent tech-government nexus. In contrast, Trump’s America exhibits personalist traits, where:
-
Power concentrates in the executive, who dispenses rewards and punishments at will.
-
Tech and cultural elites are courtiers, their status contingent on loyalty.
-
Institutions are hollowed out, their autonomy eroded by fiat.
Personalist Fragility and Democratic Recovery:
Political science research shows that personalist regimes—unlike entrenched oligarchic systems—are more vulnerable to reversal after the leader’s exit, precisely because they lack deep institutional roots and elite coalitions ([Brookings, Mar. 9, 2022]; [Frantz, 2021]; [Van den Bosch, 2015]). Brazil and Poland offer instructive cases:
-
In Brazil, Bolsonaro’s personalist rule was quickly reversed after his defeat, with courts banning him from office and democratic institutions recovering ground ([Carnegie, Apr. 2025]).
- In Poland, despite the Law and Justice Party’s attempts to entrench loyalists in the judiciary, a broad opposition coalition and civil society activism enabled a partial restoration of democratic checks after the 2023 elections [European Democracy Hub, Mar. 2025]
-
In both cases, the absence of a durable, power-sharing oligarchy made reversal possible, though not easy or complete.
By contrast, oligarchic authoritarianism—where elite coalitions outlive individual leaders—makes democratic recovery much harder, as subsequent leaders must negotiate with entrenched interests. [Geddes, 1999, 2003]
U.S. Implications:
Trump’s refusal to share power with tech oligarchs or other elites, as
shown by the Musk episode, prevents the formation of a durable,
bi-directional power structure. This makes his personalist project more
brittle and susceptible to reversal if he loses office or is otherwise
removed. If a Democratic administration returns in 2028, it could
quickly reverse many of Trump’s executive actions, as there is no
entrenched oligarchy to resist—unlike the scenario in a true
“broligarchy.”
However, the damage to norms, the judiciary, and civil service may still have lasting effects, and the risk of repeated cycles of personalist populism remains unless deeper institutional reforms are made.
V. The Judiciary as Acid Test: The Boasberg Episode
The judiciary remains a bulwark against personalism, as seen in Chief Judge James Boasberg’s temporary halt to deportation flights under the Alien Enemies Act ([NPR, Mar. 18, 2025]; [Politico, Mar. 18, 2025]). Trump’s defiance, public attacks on Boasberg as a “radical left lunatic,” and the House’s introduction of impeachment articles—rebuked by Chief Justice John Roberts—signal pressure on judicial independence ([The Guardian, Mar. 20, 2025]; [Congress.gov, Mar. 18, 2025]). This episode, still unresolved as of June 2025, contrasts with tech elites’ deference. The judiciary’s resilience, or lack of it, will determine whether the U.S. crosses into full personalism.
VI. Conclusion
The broligarchy narrative, prematurely proclaimed in early 2025, misreads tech elites’ power as oligarchic. Musk’s contract threats, Bezos’s Post overhaul, and Zuckerberg’s Meta pivot—framed by MSM as capitulation yet unclarified despite reputational costs—reveal a personalist system where loyalty trumps autonomy. The contradiction between their rhetoric of “personal liberties and free markets” and Trump’s tariffs, trade wars, and university defunding underscores their subordination. As lawsuits and judicial resistance unfold, this analysis urges political sociologists to scrutinize these trends, as the AI-tech sector’s fragility and institutional erosion demand vigilance to safeguard democracy.
Comparative Perspective:
Recent experiences in Brazil and Poland suggest that personalist
authoritarianism, for all its dangers, is more vulnerable to reversal
than entrenched oligarchic systems. The absence of a durable
“broligarchy” in Trump’s America may paradoxically increase the chances
for democratic recovery—though the window for reversal is narrow, and
the costs of personalist rule are high [Carnegie, Apr. 2025].
References
(See parenthetical placeholders above;
).
In Poland, despite the Law and Justice Party’s attempts to entrench loyalists in the judiciary, a broad opposition coalition and civil society activism enabled a partial restoration of democratic checks after the 2023 elections ([European Democracy Hub, Mar. 2025]
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