There Is No Broligarchy: Tech Elites as Courtiers in Trump’s Personalist America

Introduction

The “broligarchy”—a portmanteau of “bro” and “oligarchy”—gained traction in early 2025 as a shorthand for the supposed convergence of tech plutocrats and executive power in the U.S., especially amid Donald Trump’s return to the presidency (TIME, Feb. 12, 2025; The Atlantic, Jan. 20, 2025; NPR, Jan. 2025)

. Media and public discourse heralded a new, stable, bi-directional power structure: a digital oligarchy, reminiscent of the classic military-industrial complex, with figures like Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Mark Zuckerberg assuming unprecedented visibility and influence as donors and quasi-officials.

Yet as Trump’s second term unfolds, this narrative is already unraveling. The executive’s unilateral, often extra-constitutional actions—most dramatically, the defunding of elite universities and cultural institutions—reveal a system not of entrenched oligarchs but of courtiers, their fortunes contingent on the executive’s favor. This essay offers a speculative, real-time critique of the “broligarchy” narrative, arguing that the Achilles heel of the AI and tech sector is precisely this dependence: there is no durable broligarchy, but rather a vertical of power, more akin to Putin’s Russia or Orban’s Hungary than to colonial or modern oligarchic models (Brookings, Mar. 9, 2022; Van den Bosch, 2015)

This analysis is necessarily provisional, reflecting developments as of June 2025. The judiciary’s resistance remains a key bulwark, and further events may strengthen or weaken the case for personalism.

I. The Rise (and Limits) of the “Broligarchy” Narrative

The broligarchy concept only gained currency during Trump’s 2024 campaign and the early months of his second administration, with TIME (Feb. 12, 2025), The Atlantic (Jan. 20, 2025), and NPR (Jan. 2025) describing a tech-government alliance based on Musk’s $300 million campaign contributions, his Special Government Employee (SGE) role, and the inauguration presence of Bezos and Zuckerberg (NPR, Jan. 2025)

. These accounts, published before Trump’s second term began, assumed a durable, mutually reinforcing nexus akin to the military-industrial complex.

Yet, as subsequent events have shown, this narrative was premature. The broligarchy literature overgeneralized from Musk’s visibility and failed to anticipate the volatility of personalist systems, where loyalty to the executive can shift rapidly and tech elites’ influence is fragile. The conspicuous silence of other tech magnates—despite reputational damage in the mainstream media for “buckling under Trump”—further underscores their vulnerability and the absence of a stable, independent tech oligarchy.

Karen Hao’s Empire of AI (2025) reinforced the broligarchy analogy by likening AI firms to colonial empires, extracting data and labor like the British East India Company (Democracy Now! transcript, 2025)

. While compelling for global economic dynamics, this analogy presumes institutional stability absent in Trump’s America, where executive fiat overrides corporate influence and tech elites act as subordinates, not partners.

II. The Personalist Turn: Executive Fiat and Tech’s Fragility

The Trump administration’s treatment of Elon Musk—heretofore the most powerful “broligarch”—offers a textbook case of emergent personalist authoritarianism. Musk’s elevation in Trumpworld 2.0 was driven by two intersecting factors:

DOGE as Method and Model:
The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), led by Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, aimed to dismantle federal bureaucracy through technocratic reforms, leveraging SpaceX expertise and xAI tools (NYT, Feb. 28, 2025)

. While evidence of widespread AI-driven automation is limited, DOGE’s rapid restructuring and no-bid contracts to firms like Peter Thiel’s Palantir elevated tech elites as tools of Trump’s agenda, not independent actors (Forbes, Apr. 2025).

Pay-to-Play Patronage:
Musk’s campaign largesse and public support were rewarded with contracts, regulatory favors, and a quasi-official role. This is classic kleptocratic logic: those who deliver resources or strategic value to the leader are elevated, but only so long as they remain loyal. When Musk publicly criticized Trump’s budget and tariff policies, Trump responded by threatening to revoke all federal contracts and subsidies to Musk’s companies—a move justified not by performance or public interest, but by personal grievance (NYT, Mar. 15, 2025; Evrimagaci, Feb. 2, 2025)

. The message was clear: political influence is contingent, not entrenched.

The Silence of Other Tech Elites:
Other tech leaders—Zuckerberg, Altman, Bezos, and Thiel—have avoided public dissent, aligning with Trump through inauguration contributions, regulatory accommodations, or contract wins (TIME, Feb. 12, 2025; Bloomberg, May 27, 2025)

. Their conspicuous silence, despite reputational costs and MSM criticism for “capitulation,” suggests a courtier-like dependence and fear of executive retaliation, further undermining the broligarchy thesis.

III. Unilateral Defunding and Institutional Erosion

The most striking evidence for the personalist model is the Trump administration’s ongoing campaign to defund and discipline America’s most iconic institutions—universities, museums, and research centers—by executive order and administrative fiat.

Elite Universities:
Since early 2025, Harvard, Columbia, Princeton, Brown, and others have faced billions in federal funding freezes and grant cancellations, justified by vague accusations of “antisemitism” or “wokeness” tied to pro-Palestinian protests (Chronicle of Higher Education, Apr. 10, 2025; en.as.com, Apr. 6, 2025)

. These actions, based on extra-legal definitions from Trump’s executive orders, violate Congress’s “power of the purse” and First Amendment protections, as lawsuits from faculty unions argue (University World News, Feb. 8, 2025).

Smithsonian and Cultural Institutions:
A March 2025 executive order tasked Vice President J.D. Vance with purging “divisive narratives” from the Smithsonian, bypassing Congress and threatening funding (PBS NewsHour, Mar. 28, 2025)

. These measures, still facing legal challenges as of June 2025, mirror tactics in Orban’s Hungary, where cultural institutions are subordinated to executive will (Journal of Democracy, Nov. 13, 2024).

These lawsuits, still pending as of mid-2025, highlight the fluid nature of Trump’s campaign against institutions, reinforcing the speculative nature of this analysis and the need for ongoing scrutiny.

IV. Theoretical Implications: From Oligarchy to Personalism

Hao’s colonial analogy and the broligarchy narrative presume a stable, mutually dependent tech-government nexus. In contrast, Trump’s America exhibits personalist traits, where:

Power concentrates in the executive, who dispenses rewards and punishments at will.
Tech and cultural elites are courtiers, their status contingent on loyalty.
Institutions are hollowed out, their autonomy eroded by fiat.

Bezos’s Washington Post pivot and Zuckerberg’s Meta shifts, despite clashing with Trump’s anti-liberty policies, exemplify this dynamic: their silence amid reputational damage signals fear of executive retaliation (NPR, Feb. 26, 2025; CNN, Jan. 7, 2025).

For political sociologists, personalism—as an ideal type (Van den Bosch, 2015)

—offers a critical lens to dissect Trump’s America, challenging oligarchic models that assume stable elite influence. Russia and Hungary, as tokens of personalism, illustrate how executive dominance subordinates economic and cultural elites, a dynamic increasingly visible in the U.S.

V. The Judiciary as Acid Test: The Boasberg Episode

While Congress has largely abdicated its checking function, the judiciary remains the principal institutional bulwark. The confrontation between President Trump and Chief Judge James Boasberg is emblematic:

Boasberg issued a temporary halt to deportation flights of alleged Venezuelan gang members, invoking judicial authority over the executive’s use of the Alien Enemies Act (NPR, Mar. 18, 2025; Politico, Mar. 18, 2025)

.
The Trump administration defied the order, and Boasberg found probable cause for criminal contempt, warning that “willful disobedience of judicial orders… would make a solemn mockery of the constitution itself.”
Trump publicly attacked Boasberg as a “radical left lunatic,” demanded his impeachment, and the White House fully backed this call (The Guardian, Mar. 20, 2025).
Chief Justice John Roberts issued a rare public rebuke, affirming that impeachment is not an appropriate response to judicial disagreement.
Articles of impeachment were introduced in the House but are unlikely to succeed.

The Boasberg episode is a critical indicator, but not proof, of personalist transformation. As judicial challenges unfold, their success or failure will clarify the U.S.’s trajectory, underscoring the provisional nature of this analysis.

VI. Conclusion

The broligarchy narrative, prematurely proclaimed in early 2025, misreads tech elites’ power as oligarchic. Musk’s contract threats, Bezos’s Post overhaul, and Zuckerberg’s Meta pivot—framed by MSM as capitulation yet unclarified despite reputational costs—reveal a personalist system where loyalty trumps autonomy. The contradiction between their rhetoric of “personal liberties and free markets” and Trump’s tariffs, trade wars, and university defunding underscores their subordination. As lawsuits and judicial resistance unfold, this speculative analysis urges political sociologists to scrutinize these trends, as the AI-tech sector’s fragility and institutional erosion demand vigilance to safeguard democracy.

References

Hao, K. (2025). Empire of AI. [Democracy Now! transcript].
Norden, L. & Weiner, D. I. “The Rise of America’s Broligarchy and What to Do About It.” TIME, Feb. 12, 2025. (https://time.com/7221154/rise-of-americas-broligarchy/)
Scherer, M. & Parker, A. “The Tech Oligarchy Arrives.” The Atlantic, Jan. 20, 2025.
“What is a Tech Oligarchy and are we in one?” NPR, Jan. 2025.
“Trump And Musk Clash Over AI Deal Controversy.” Evrimagaci, Feb. 2, 2025. (https://evrimagaci.org/tpg/trump-and-musk-clash-over-ai-deal-controversy-179456)
“How Musk Built DOGE: Timeline and Key Takeaways.” The New York Times, Feb. 28, 2025. (https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/28/us/politics/musk-doge-timeline-takeaways.html)
“Trump executive order to force changes at Smithsonian Institution.” PBS NewsHour, Mar. 28, 2025. (https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/trump-executive-order-to-force-changes-at-smithsonian-institution-targeting-funding-for-programs-with-improper-ideology)
“Congressman announces articles of impeachment against federal judge blocking Trump.” Washington Times, Mar. 18, 2025. (https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/mar/18/congressman-announces-articles-impeachment-federal-judge-blocking/)
Van den Bosch, J. (2015). “Personalism: A type or characteristic of authoritarian regimes?” Politologická Revue, 1, 11–30. (http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-282164c6-6aa0-4a78-a0c5-e90b84b45234/c/PolRev2015-1pp11-30.pdf)
“Higher education groups sue Trump over dismantling of DEI.” University World News, Feb. 8, 2025.
“Trump targets elite universities with funding freezes.” Chronicle of Higher Education, Apr. 10, 2025.
“The rise of personalist rule.” Brookings Institution, Mar. 9, 2022.
“How Personalist Politics Is Changing Democracies.” Journal of Democracy, Nov. 13, 2024.
Frantz, E. (2021). “Autocracy.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.
“White House says Trump is right to call for impeachment of judge.” The Guardian, Mar. 20, 2025.

Books&Ideas

Thursday, June 5, 2025

There is no Broligarchy (draft 3)